AFRICAN EAST-ASIAN AFFAIRS

THE CHINA MONITOR

East Asia at the frontiers: Japan then - China now

Issue 73 - July 2012
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Dear Reader,

This issue of *African East-Asian Affairs / The China Monitor* examines two topics which, at first glance, have little to do with current Africa. They bring excursions to Papua New Guinea in the Pacific – and to foregone times of the early 20th century. At the same time, however, they ring intriguingly familiar for those who look at contemporary Chinese engagement on the African continent.

In the first article, Australian scholar Graeme Smith from the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney Business School examines Chinese investment and activity in the Pacific state of Papua New Guinea. More often than not, the relationship is portrayed as one of Chinese traders and entrepreneurs abusing the local industries and inhabitants, beyond the so-called control of Beijing. Smith’s piece unpacks the actually complex and fragile relationship China and Chinese entrepreneurs undertake with Papua New Guinea – which, like many African countries, is sorely in need of investment and development.

The second piece, from Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière of the Asia Centre in Paris, takes a step back in time, looking at another East-Asian power, Japan, which has a long and complex history with the African continent. Chaponnière offers fascinating historical parallels between Japan in Africa then, and China and Africa now, particularly from the perspective of competitive foreign trade powers, and frustrated local industries. The historical parallel should, as the author points out, not be overstretched. Each country and each time has its own dynamics and limitations. Yet, some reminders of past cases might ease make current events sound less unique, even if scope and magnitude differ.

We’re on the cusp of some big changes at the CCS. This very publication, after some changes that have already been implemented, is set to undergo another transformation shortly, from this monthly edition to a larger, more academically dense quarterly edition. In other words, we are taking yet another step towards a proper scholarly journal.

Likewise, our long-awaited move to new offices on the top floor of the Wilcocks building on the corner of Ryneveld and Victoria streets in Stellenbosch is now upon us. The new premises – right next door to our previous ones and thus still at the heart of Stellenbosch Campus – will offer not only new perspectives, but also some more space and conducive work environments for us, our visiting scholars and our guests! And work, we still have plenty!

We hope you enjoy the read!

Your sincerely,

Director

*Centre for Chinese Studies*

*Stellenbosch University*
Beyond the reach of the whip: Chinese Investment in Papua New Guinea

By Graeme Smith
China Studies Centre, University of Sydney Business School

The phrase *bian chang mo ji* (beyond the reach of the whip) captures the opportunities and the challenges faced by Chinese entrepreneurs and companies operating in countries such as Papua New Guinea, well beyond the effective reach of the Chinese state. It is tempting to draw on the better-known phrase *tian gao huangdi yuan* (the Emperor is as far away as the sky), but this implies that Chinese businesses are up to nefarious activities in the Pacific, which is not universally the case, despite several accounts that would have you believe otherwise (Henderson and Reilly 2003; Crocombe 2007; Kocsis 2012).

Many of the Chinese I’ve interviewed in Papua New Guinea, be they Sichuanese mine workers at the Kurumbukare mine site, Fuqing merchants running stores on remote Karkar Island, or site managers from Guangzhou supervising the University of Goroka dormitories project, all admit to the same mistake: we thought it was in Africa. Africa has a lot of Guineas, after all. This article will examine the three primary forms of Chinese investment in Papua New Guinea: retail, infrastructure and mining.

Many of the Chinese I’ve interviewed in Papua New Guinea all admit to the same mistake: we thought it [Papua New Guinea] was in Africa.

A few numbers are useful for placing Chinese Outbound Direct Investment (ODI) in Papua New Guinea into context.

**Chinese ODI stock in the Pacific (USD, millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>258.1</td>
<td>289.9</td>
<td>315.1</td>
<td>323.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>587.4</td>
<td>794.3</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>3355</td>
<td>5863</td>
<td>7867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>51.27</td>
<td>51.17</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most striking is the volatility of Chinese ODI, particularly in resource-rich countries, such as Australia and Papua New Guinea. Single projects, such as Chinalco’s acquisition of a stake in Rio Tinto in 2009, or the commencement of PNG’s Ramu Nickel project in 2007, can cause a sharp spike in the measured level of ODI. Large, state-owned companies undertook both of these ventures, and thus their investments are captured accurately by the Ministry of Commerce data set, which is based on surveys completed by Chinese companies on a monthly basis.
However, this is only part of the picture, as investment by Chinese migrants and ODI sourced from private, small-scale enterprises is not captured in the official figures of any of the Western Pacific economies. In Vanuatu, which has seen a dramatic rise in Chinese investment in the retail and wholesale sector over the past decade (Radio Australia 2012), no rise in Chinese ODI was recorded in official figures from 2005-2008. In Solomon Islands, where riots in 2006 led to the burning of Honiara’s Chinatown, no net ODI in-flow was recorded for the entire period from 2004 to 2010, although this can partly be attributed to the government of Solomon Islands recognising Taiwan, rather than the People’s Republic of China.

Making up for the lack of MOFCOM data, researchers at the PNG Investment Promotion Authority (the agency that all foreign-owned enterprises register with) suggest that investment in the PNG retail sector is more significant than in mining, accounting for around 40 per cent of Chinese ODI, and overshadowing the much-publicised Ramu nickel project. How, then, is the wave of investment in the retail sector and beyond playing out in Papua New Guinea and how does it affect local communities?

Table 2 China-PNG Imports and Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Machinery and parts</td>
<td>Wood, wood products and charcoal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iron and steel products</td>
<td>Fuel, oil and bitumen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Electrical equipment, sound</td>
<td>Cereals and dairy products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equipment and accessories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Plastics and plastic products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rubber and rubber products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Textiles (new, sets and used)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Vehicles and spare parts (no trains)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Furniture, bedding, prefabricated housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: MOFCOM and Chinese Embassy in Papua New Guinea, 2011, p. 16

"While the inflow of ODI for 2010 was reported as only $5.3 million, the trade volume between the two countries reached $1.13 billion, a rise of 27 per cent on the previous year."

Before exploring what this means for the nature of Chinese engagement in Papua New Guinea, a brief examination of recent trade data for China and Papua New Guinea follows. While the inflow of ODI for 2010 was reported as only $5.3 million (MOFCOM 2011, p. 87; all figures in USD), the trade volume between the two countries reached $1.13 billion, a rise of 27 per cent on the previous year. Trade was very much in favour of Papua New Guinea, with China purchasing $780 million worth of imports, more than double the value of its exports to Papua New Guinea (MOFCOM and Chinese Embassy in Papua New Guinea 2011, p. 16). The table above shows the breakdown in trade categories.
While trade and investment volumes can be unrelated, the large gap between the volume of trade and the amount of investment (less than two per cent of the value of Chinese goods sold in Papua New Guinea) could be used to support PNG nationalists’ claims that Chinese involvement in the economy is simply extractive and exploitative. Papua New Guinea is the second largest supplier of logs to China after Russia, and beyond serving a handful of politicians connected to the logging industry, there seems to be little economic benefit to Papua New Guinea. Malaysian Chinese companies dominate the logging industry (Filer 2012), so investment associated with forestry does not appear as Chinese ODI. Chinese traders are highly visible in the retail and wholesale sectors, with their ubiquitous red plastic buckets and cheap shoes. Many Chinese shopkeepers do simply rent or buy existing shops. However, it is also common for small Chinese investors to build new shops or small factories from scratch, along with the electricity and water infrastructure needed to support them in remote areas, and bringing goods to communities that often never had them before.

"Chinese traders are highly visible in the retail and wholesale sectors, with their ubiquitous red plastic buckets and cheap shoes."

While the Chinese state is effectively absent from the lives of its expatriate retail investors in Papua New Guinea, these shopkeepers dominate the retail trade in major towns across the country, and were the target of nationwide riots in May 2009, just as they were in the Solomon Islands in 2006 (Smith 2012). They have become a focus of resentment for local inhabitants, who believe Chinese entrepreneurs are monopolising business and employment opportunities and preventing local participation in the retail sector. The Papua New Guinean state recently responded to these concerns by launching a $56 million campaign, called the Stret Pasin Stoa (Fair-Deal Store) scheme, to assist local entrepreneurs trying to compete in the retail and restaurant sectors (Callick 2012). Funded by the National Development Bank of Papua New Guinea (NDB), the aim of the scheme, which “provides 100 per cent funding for our citizens to take over or build new shops, bakeries and kai (food) bars” is “to replace all non-citizen trade store and kai bar operators by citizen owners and operators” (NDB 2012). The scheme will be coupled with the reintroduction of the colonial era Reserve Activity Legislation, which will “lawfully disallow foreigners from owning and engaging in retail shops and kai bar businesses” (NDB 2012b). For their part, both old and new Chinese arrivals agree that they provide a convenient scapegoat for a state that has failed to improve the lot of most of its citizens.

While smaller-scale Chinese investors are expanding beyond retail, the capital raised for their ventures is still privately sourced. Around 90 per cent of the “new Chinese” merchants hail from the same town in Fujian province, Fuqing, which is renowned as a source of entrepreneurial migrants, both legal and illegal (Liu-Farrer 2009). As has been noted in Africa (Dobler 2009), the Chinese state has only a limited influence on these entrepreneurs’ lives, mostly through its embassy in Port Moresby. The embassy assists with setting up friendship associations and mutual aid groups, but it has little capacity or inclination to intervene to protect its citizens—a policy that Chinese expatriates, in turn, have come to resent. As one shopkeeper complained, “Even when someone gets killed, they’re no use. They’ll just send out a notice telling you to take extra care, and not to go out.” The Guide to Investment in Papua New Guinea does
indeed contain this exact formulation (MOFCOM and the Chinese Embassy in Papua New Guinea 2011, p. 7). The authors of the guide cannot be accused of lacking a sense of humour; “social upheaval” is listed as a “transmissible disease” in Papua New Guinea, alongside malaria and dengue fever. The upside of the Chinese state’s whip not reaching the shores of Papua New Guinea is that all retail traders, when asked whether it was easier to do business in China or Papua New Guinea, responded that the Pacific was easier. Although there is risk to their persons and property, Chinese traders face less competition, have fewer officials to “take care of,” and can make higher returns than they would back in Fuqing.

Similar scope for “institutional escapism” (Wang and Wang 2011) is evident on the part of Chinese infrastructure providers in the Pacific. Researchers from Australia’s most influential think tank, the Lowy Institute, have critiqued Chinese infrastructure aid in the Pacific, calling on the Chinese government to address issues of transparency, project quality and the impacts of debt (Hanson and Fifita 2011). They rightly raise concerns about excessive future debt burdens on Pacific Island nations such as Tonga. Such concerns have led to Papua New Guinea placing an unofficial freeze on further Chinese “soft loans” and to the Cook Islands putting “on hold” a $37 million loan (which would have represented 17% of that nation’s GDP) (Brant 2012). In PNG, the freeze was lifted during the course of the 2012 election campaign, with incumbent Prime Minister Peter O’Neill announcing China Exim Bank would provide a soft loan of US$3 billion to rebuild the rapidly-deteriorating Highlands Highway. The loan is an order of magnitude larger than the $375 million soft loan facility announced in April 2006 for the entire Pacific region. According to the Minister for Works, Francis Awesa, the Chinese side were “more than happy to give” up to $10 billion. (Radio Australia; 2012b)

Yet for Chinese infrastructure providers in Papua New Guinea, there is nothing remarkable about international “aid,” which they treat as just another type of investment. For companies such as the Chinese Overseas Engineering Group (the Asian Development Bank’s favoured contractor for road-building projects in Papua New Guinea) and China Harbour Engineering, which recently won a US$285 million project to build Phase I of the Tide Terminal project in Lae (Talu 2012), Chinese government aid projects are only a small part of their overseas business strategy. Moreover, contracting companies such as these are influential enough to attract support from the Chinese state for projects developed in collaboration with local partners in Papua New Guinea. Consequently, what first appears to be state-run aid often turns out to be contractor-driven ODI. These types of infrastructure projects are increasingly dominant in Chinese investment in Papua New Guinea. The longer Chinese contractors are based in a given country, the more likely this “bottom up” model of developing infrastructure assistance projects is to emerge (Smith 2012b). Chinese infrastructure providers are generally welcomed both by local partners and multilateral funding agencies, praised for their understanding in the face of delays, their ability to deliver projects on time and on budget, and their aversion to resorting to the courts.

The largest Chinese investor in Papua New Guinea, China Metallurgical Corporation, is also averse to the courts, yet has rarely found itself out of them. The Ramu nickel project, managed and majority-owned by MCC, has suffered nearly two years of
court delays. MCC recently conducted the mine’s first on-load test (ACN Newswire 2012), which produced nickel and cobalt hydroxides, although it is expected that final processing will be undertaken in China.

Local resistance to the project has centred on environmental and labour issues so far (Matbob 2012), with one Australian broadsheet accusing the mine of bringing “neo-colonial slavery” to PNG (Callick 2007). I’m yet to discover chain gangs or Chinese overlords with whips at the mine site, but there is no denying that the wages and conditions offered by Ramu Nickel generally fall short of those offered by other foreign mining companies. The company argues that a low-cost approach is dictated by the marginal nature of the mining project, and the four-decade gap between the discovery of an ore body (it was initially considered as a chromium deposit) and its exploitation seems to bear that out. But another issue of penny pinching could yet catch out MCC. With the construction phase now complete, future disputes may revolve around royalty payments to landowners. Under the mining development contract, which was negotiated with the former Somare government, in addition to a ten-year tax holiday, MCC will pay a low rate of royalties on revenue from resource sales, at 1.25 per cent. This figure is in accordance with Papua New Guinea’s original Mining Act, rather than the 2 per cent presently paid by other mining projects. So if the project fails to deliver substantial royalties, and back of the envelope calculation suggests that it will not, it could face a new source of local opposition.

Despite being run by a company whose director argues that “central government enterprises that secure mines overseas are in reality securing resources for China” (Yan 2010), this project is not directly controlled from Beijing. Due to the emergence of MCC from the former Chinese Ministry of Metallurgy, the corporation is divided into province-based corporations. The mine site at Kurumbukare is staffed by contractors from Sichuan province, while the refinery site has a wider variety of contractors, ranging from Tangshan (in northern China) to Shanghai. These contracting companies are brought in for specific tasks, and are financially independent from MCC’s head office. Rather than constituting a single work unit, each site has a distinctive work culture based on shared histories, cultural preferences and local dialects.

"This level of fragmentation and complexity, which is often found in both mining and infrastructure projects, presents challenges for local communities."

This level of fragmentation and complexity, which is often found in both mining and infrastructure projects, presents challenges for local communities. Many of the disputes at the Basamuk refinery site and along the pipeline route were caused by contracting companies that have now returned to China, leaving the Ramu Nickel management company to clean up, with varying degrees of success. Due to their financial separation from the parent company, some of the contractors engaged during the construction phase of the project had little long-term interest in the Ramu Nickel mine. Rather, their focus was on completing their specific task as quickly, and as cheaply, as possible. Often this led to health and safety issues not being addressed until major incidents arose, such as the accident that led to a large-scale riot at the Basamuk refinery in May 2009, or land being cleared before proper assessments for compensation had been made. But such fragmentation also presents numerous opportunities for Papua New Guinea, as it means Chinese actors are often more willing to compromise and adapt than other, longer-established companies.
Given all of these factors, the implications of Chinese investment in Papua New Guinea are more complex than media reports of ‘neo-colonial slavery’ suggest. Some analysts have called on the Chinese government to do more to rein in the broader effects of this sudden increase in ODI, such as illegal immigration and the reluctance of Chinese infrastructure companies to employ local labour, and there is evidence that elements within the Chinese state share these aspirations. But as Chinese ODI becomes an increasingly organic phenomenon in Papua New Guinea and beyond, the leverage of the Chinese state is becoming ever more limited. On the positive side, being beyond the reach of the whip means that Chinese actors can be more flexible in their engagements with local actors. Distinctions between “state-owned” and “private”, “formal” and “informal” are losing their meaning within China; they mean still less in Papua New Guinea.

References


**Graeme Smith** is a postdoctoral research fellow at the China Studies Centre, University of Sydney Business School, and an Australian Development Research Award fellow at the Australian National University.
China in Africa: Does history repeat itself?
By Jean Raphaël Chaponnière
Asia Centre, Paris

Once upon a time, an emerging Asian economic power made inroads on African markets. The entry of this newcomer aroused a flurry of criticisms from established European merchants. They claimed that this competition was unfair as it employed cheaper labour who toiled far longer hours than Europeans. Not only did this intruder base its competitiveness on the undervaluation of its currency but its financial practices were disloyal as it proposed three year maturity loans while established exporters offered a three month revolving credit. Last but not least, it infringed copyright. This issue was raised by Lieutenant Commander Astbury at a meeting of the House of Commons on November 1933. There, he showed to the assembly a pattern of cloth which had been sent from Manchester to South Africa at 33d. per yard and a copy of that same pattern which was sold at 19d. per yard. He then declared “How on earth can we meet that devastating competition? Within six months after we put a new pattern into the market that pattern is copied and a similar cloth is offered by this Asian competitor at a price which is 75 or 100 per cent below (...). What hope is there for the Lancashire cotton trade unless that competition is stopped?”

These criticisms sound familiar to the reader as there are now used against China. The criticised new competitor in the 1930s, however, was Japan. Japan’s entry in Africa started at the end of the 19th century and its exports surged after the Great Crisis (see part 1 of this article) and there are some interesting parallels to the 21st century rise of China in Africa. Japan’s relations with Africa went beyond trade as illustrated by its special relationship with Ethiopia (see part 2). And as the emergence of this new power challenged Western historical domination, Japan was considered as a model by some African countries (see part 3).

“Today the irruption of China into Africa is sometimes perceived as an exotic illustration of globalisation. However, Asia and Africa relations predated the arrival of Western powers.”

Japan and Africa
Today the eruption of China into Africa is sometimes perceived as an exotic illustration of globalisation. However, Asia and Africa relations predated the arrival of Western powers as the Indian Ocean had been the main trade link between these two continents. In a book written between 20 to 40 BC (“The Perile of the Erythea Sea”), a Greek trader based in Egypt described the Indian merchant activity on the East coast. The kingdom of Askum (former Ethiopia) was engaged in international trade with the Roman Empire, China and India. Further south, Malays reached the island of Madagascar in the 7th century. Between the 13th and 14th century the Zimbabwe kingdom participated in a comprehensive trade network and discoveries of Chinese porcelains are a testimony of the trade between China, South East Asia and Africa. According to F. Braudel, by the 15th century East Africa belonged to a world economy centred on India. Around 1421 China made a brief appearance as the armada of Admiral Zheng He visited several East
African countries. When the admiral sailed back to China, a new emperor had closed the country.

While the records of Japan’s contacts with Africa during the pre-Meiji era are fragmentary (Agbi Olu 1992), they can be traced back to the 16th century. There were no further contacts as Japan chose to insulate itself after the failed invasion attempt by the Mongols and those who violated the prohibition were punished with the death penalty. By the mid-19th century, the defeat of the Chinese convinced Japan to accept American Commodore Oliver Perry’s edict and to open the country. Launched by the imperial restoration (1868), industrialisation gave Japan the means to conquer Asia. After its victory over China (1895) by which it gained Taiwan, Japan destroyed the Russian fleet at Tsushima (1905) and conquered Korea.

“While the records of Japan’s contacts with Africa during the pre-Meiji era are fragmentary, they can be traced back to the 16th century.”

During the second half of the 19th century, Japanese travellers began to call on African ports en route to Europe and to Brazil. Late-comers to the colonial adventure, Japanese were interested in the military lessons they could draw from wars (in South Africa and Ethiopia) and also in the Western experiences in managing colonies. In 1897, Dr. Tomizu Hirondo, a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University and an admirer of Cecil Rhodes, published a short pamphlet (The Future of Africa) where he forecasted that Africa and China would become major actors in the 20th century (Aremu Fatai Ayinde, 2009). He advised his government to participate in the scramble for Africa before Europeans completely controlled the continent. While the government did not heed his advice, the administration made efforts to gather information on Africa (Katsuhiko Kitagawa, 1990). In 1903, having spent two months in South Africa, the Japanese consul in Singapore and an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce published the first report on an African country. In 1917, the same minister published a report on the foreign trade of South Africa and investigated the possibility of sending Japanese migrants; it admitted that SA immigration laws would represent a major hindrance to the development of trade.

During World War I, commercial information was collected by Japan’s honorary Consul in Cape Town and after the war, consulates were opened in Mombasa (1932), Addis Ababa and Casablanca (1936) and legations in Cairo (1936) and Cape Town (1937). A 1932 British foreign office memorandum stated that at a time when almost all of Africa was under colonial rule, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry organised an All Africa commercial exhibition (Kweku Ampiah, 1990). The gathering of this information proved to be helpful for the promotion of Japanese exports to Africa.

Up to the end of the 19th century, Japanese overseas trade had been handled by European and Chinese merchants but by 1905, large Japanese trading companies had established trade relations with Europe, North America, Australia and British India while small and medium merchant houses handled trade with Asia, the Middle East and Africa. During World War I, the disruption of trade between Europe and Africa offered a window of opportunity for Japan to enter the British African colonies since Britain had adopted an open door policy in place of the old system of imperial preferences. Even if some protectionist measures were taken during the 1930s, East African colonies remained open to free trade (Kweku Ampiah, 1990).
Japanese exports to Africa flourished during World War I; and while they decreased after their wartime boom, they still remained greater than their pre-war value. In the 1920s, the falling cost of cotton thread and the abolition of the gold standard in 1931 which diminished by 50 percent the value of the Japanese yen against the pound, gave a strong impetus to Japanese exports. In the meantime, the drop in commodity prices caused by the crisis reduced the ability of British colonies to import manufactured products and encouraged them to turn more towards Japanese products. The Economist (3 January 1925) wrote that Japanese low priced products are appreciated by "the natives who put cheapness above quality (...) British machinery holds its own as do British goods of high quality but cheap cottons come from Japan, America and India". Between 1927-1929 and 1936-1938, Japan's share in the imports of Britain's African colonies (Egypt and South Africa excluded) grew from 1.6% to 7.9% in spite of the quotas imposed on them by Nigeria and the then Gold Coast (today’s Ghana).

Textiles represented a significant share of Japanese exports to Africa. From 1927 to 1929, Lancashire firms were shaken by the surge of Japan’s textile market share while Indian exports also shrank. Japanese competition in West Africa was not as serious, as the British colonies had imposed quotas, and French colonies had kept to the imperial preference.
Table 1: Share of Japanese imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British colonies</th>
<th>French colonies</th>
<th>Portuguese colonies</th>
<th>Belgian colonies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-13</td>
<td>1,6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-29</td>
<td>7,9%</td>
<td>4,9%</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-38</td>
<td>7,8%</td>
<td>2,1%</td>
<td>4,5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>3,8%</td>
<td>2,5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bouta Etemad (2005)

"In South Africa, the surge of Japanese exports led the government to a tariff reform, the adoption of protective measures and legislation prohibiting Japanese from residing and doing business."

In South Africa, the surge of Japanese exports led the government to a tariff reform, the adoption of protective measures and legislation prohibiting Japanese from residing and doing business (Richard Bradshaw, Jim Ransdell 2011). Nevertheless, as South African exports felt the pinch of the crisis, the government allowed Japanese wool purchasers to enter the country. A gentleman’s agreement (October 1930), allowing a one year visa to Japanese was strongly criticized in the press which denounced a predicted invasion of retail traders and employees and of Japanese “spying out the land”. It was strongly felt in the textile and in the shoe industries: “plimsolls were selling at one third the price of local hide shoes”, and, according to an issue raised in the House of Commons, Japanese traders were dumping motor cars into South Africa with British names!

In the 1930s, Japanese were often accused of selling “watches by the kilo” and, this could explain why, some years after World War II, the “made in Japan” label has remained synonymous with low quality goods in East Africa as well as in Morocco where Japan was its second largest exporter (well behind France).

Beyond trade: Japan’s special relationship with Ethiopia

The relations between Japan and Ethiopia went beyond trade. Both countries were Empires ruled by very old dynasties. Like the Japanese, the Ethiopians first admitted the Portuguese in the 16th century when it suited them and both abandoned their attempt to live in a hermit kingdom in the 19th century and acquired Western military techniques. In April 1896, the Japanese Ministry of Defence wished to send three observers to follow the Italian campaign in Ethiopia. This request was rejected by Italy who had suffered a serious military defeat at the battle of Adowa in March 1896. Consequently, Ethiopia enjoyed some prestige in Japan. (The first victory of a non-western nation was followed nine years later by the Japanese victory over Russia). At the occasion of the first Japanese official visit in 1927, a draft proposal of a Friendship and Trade treaty was discussed (Hideko Faërber 1998). This treaty was signed three years later when Japanese representatives attended Haile Selassie’s coronation. In the wake of this signature, Japanese government representatives as well as private entrepreneurs visited Ethiopia to explore commercial and political ties. By 1930, Japan was the largest exporter to Ethiopia and it took the lion’s share of Ethiopian imports of textiles.

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Among the Japanese visitors, some dubious characters also emerged. On 21 September 1933, the London Daily Herald wrote that Ethiopia gave a lease of 1.3 million acres of farmland for the cultivation of cotton to the Nagasaki Association for Economic Investigation and that it had agreed to grant a monopoly for raising opium poppies. This accord had led to the establishment of an emigration company capable of sending 650,000 settlers according to the Far Eastern survey (January 1935). Six months later, the same review wrote that cotton and poppy growing suggestions as well as the arrival of Japanese colonists had not been substantiated.

Even though the deal had not been signed, this information snowballed. A Japanese newspaper wrote that Ethiopia would become a new Brazil. In France in December 1933 Le Temps wrote that, while Tokyo and Addis had rejected the cotton project, Ethiopia had not denied that it wished to promote Japanese investments and that such hostility towards European economic interest called for an energetic response from Italy. Le Temps and the Italian Azione coloniale published worried comments about the possibilities of a Japanese economic and political hegemony in Ethiopia. The British Morning Post denounced Japan’s machination in Africa. However, there were only 34 Japanese living in Ethiopia in 1934 (Hideko Faerber Ishihara 1998)! Nevertheless when Mussolini launched the Italian aggression, he mentioned the “yellow peril” which surrounded Ethiopia.

"The Italian takeover of Ethiopia led to popular reactions in Japan where an armed response was mooted in discussions. However “realpolitik” prevailed."

The Italian takeover of Ethiopia led to popular reactions in Japan where an armed response was mooted in discussions. However “realpolitik” prevailed. The Japanese government chose to stay neutral and did not send arms to Ethiopia. In 1936, as Rome recognised Manchuko (Manchuria) as a Japanese colony, Tokyo recognized Italy’s control of Ethiopia.

Tokyo consensus?

In 1985, the Prime Minister of Malaysia launched its “Look East Policy” and some years later, the Indian government adopted the same principle. In 2005, in a speech given for the 25th anniversary of Zimbabwe independence, President Robert Mugabe advocated [for Zimbabwe] “to look East where the sun rises and to turn its back to West when the sun sets”. Mugabe’s sulphurous personality should not hide the significance of his message. This is not the first time that Africa looked east for a model. Today’s Western critique against the appeal of the Beijing consensus in Africa may be considered as a distant echo of the fear raised by the appeal for the Japanese model.

The emergence of Japan in the 19th century had marked the imagination of several colonized countries and the Japanese victory over Russia had strong repercussions in these countries. Thus in Bengal, a newspaper celebrated the humiliation of the Occident (West) and in Burma they called for the establishment of a Co-Prosperity Sphere around Japan. In Africa the emergence of Japan inspired policy makers in Madagascar and in Ethiopia.
Boylo Baenga (1992) described the fascination exercised by Japan on Malagasy elites at the end of the 19th century. Nationalist sentiment against French colonial rule had emerged among a small group of Merina intellectuals who had been educated by Europeans and exposed to Western intellectual thought. The group was led by a Protestant clergyman, Pastor Ravelojoana, who was especially inspired by the Japanese model of modernisation. In 1912, he wrote: “To know that a non-European people living in a far away, a people in love with progress has been able to succeed a true revolution based on European knowledge, has moved me deeply”. For Ravelojoana, while the French Revolution had brought the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the Meiji revolution of 1868 brought to the world the universal route to break from absolute poverty. One year later, he established a secret society dedicated to Malagasy cultural identity which called itself Iron and Stone Ramification (Vy Vato Sakelika--VVS). On Christmas day in 1915, Ravelojoana was arrested by the colonial authorities. Together with 300 young followers of the Japanese model, Ravelojoana was tried and sentenced to spend the rest of his days in jail. Although the VVS was brutally suppressed, its actions eventually led French authorities to provide the Malagasy with their first representative voice in government.

In Ethiopia, reformers whose influence peaked in the 1920’s and 1930’s were called “Progressive Intellectuals”, “Young Ethiopians” and “Japanizers”.

In Ethiopia, reformers whose influence peaked in the 1920’s and 1930’s, were called “Progressive Intellectuals”, “Young Ethiopians” and “Japanizers” : each of these appellation emphasized something different: the need to reform, the need to find an appropriate model for reform and the impact of Japan’s transformation from a feudal society—like Ethiopia’s—into an industrial power. For these young educated Ethiopians, Japanization was a means to an end—to solve the problem of underdevelopment. One year after his signing of the Friendship treaty, the government promulgated a constitution closely modelled on Japan’s Meiji Constitution of 1889. The same year the Foreign Minister Heruy Welde Sellase went to Japan to seek commercial and political ties as well as military aid. He spent one month there and on returning to his country, he wrote a book published in Amharic – “The Source of Light” - which introduced Japan to Africans. This publication played into western fears that Ethiopia would take Japan for its model for modernization.

Conclusions

A significant share of Japanese exports, 7 per cent in the late 1930s (Figure 1), were directed to Africa before World War II which interrupted these trade relations. The links that had been created before the war explain the rapid resurgence of Japanese exports to Africa in the late 1940s. In the 1950s, Japanese were able to regain market share in Africa and up to the mid-1950s, and, at the time, it traded more with Africa than with the European core (France, Germany, Benelux, Netherlands and Italy)! Japanese share of Sub-Saharan African trade reached a maximum in the 1960s but then it diminished. This Asian rise in Africa was succeeded by South Korea, whose trade share increased up to 2000, and China’s share which shot up after 2000.

Chinese irruption in Africa caused the same critics as did Japan in the 1930s, and it was also accompanied by the same propagation of (unfounded) rumours concerning land grabbing! Historical comparisons are “false friends” and, generally speaking the lessons one can draw from them are not particularly convincing. Indeed, the only truth they bring is that men rarely heed the lessons from history.
End Notes

1 Source http://hansard.millbanksystems.com

2 A few years after Marco Polo, Ibn Batouta travelled from Morocco to China along the Silk’s Road.


4 Mr Rem : “A further question, is he aware that quite recently the Japanese traders were dumping motor cars into South Africa with British names and that the South African Government acted promptly and quickly?” House of Commons January 31, 1934 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com

5 Cotton thread and fabric represented 40 % of Ethiopian imports in 1933 (Le Temps 5 November 1933),

6 While the bulk of Japanese migrants had settled in Japanese colonies (Korea, Taiwan) and in Manchuria, their number had risen rapidly in Brazil and by 1934, there were 134 000 Japanese of which a significant proportion engaged in the cultivation of cotton (Far Eastern Survey 1937 : Brazil cotton and Japanese migration vol 6 nº 4 17 February).

7 Le Temps : L’Italie et l’Abyssinie, 18 December 1933

References


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Debates about “cleaning the ‘foreign garbage’” in China – Where has the people-to-people friendship gone?

By Daouda Cissé
Research Fellow, Centre for Chinese Studies

The lack of official response to the recent rant of a news anchor man of Chinese television, calling on Chinese to “clean the ‘foreign garbage’”, is disconcerting. CCS research fellow Dr Daouda Cissé reports back from Eastern China, where he is currently spending time for fieldwork. He is back in China for the first time in a year, after having lived there for five years previously. Considering the sharp rise of China’s prominence, it is not surprising that a lot of things have changed economically with new buildings and infrastructure everywhere. However, economic change does not mean political opening. While the ‘Middle Kingdom’ is increasingly engaging with the world, this does not mean that ‘official China’ welcomes foreigners with open arms, as Dr Cissé reports.

The mood in China has turned against foreigners, after a Briton and a Russian drew bad media coverage in recent weeks, one for molestation of Chinese women, the other for rudeness. Subsequently, Yang Rui, a well-known Chinese TV news anchor man who (ironically) appears on the English language programming at CCTV, called for “cleaning the ‘foreign garbage’”. This passed without any noticeable high-level response and the journalist is still working in his position. On the other hand, official checks and controls are becoming more frequent, and target obvious foreigners in China. Black Africans are often targets of official policies, irrespective of official friendship statements. The pattern looks familiar. During the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, foreigners frequently had to show their passport for visa checks and black Africans were not allowed to enter certain areas or places of the city, even though they were staying in the country legally. This was also the case in Guangzhou during the 2010 Asia Games; many foreigners decided to leave the city because the atmosphere was deemed unbearable. In fact, such scenarios are recurrent in Guangzhou, a southern Chinese city that has one quarter of town dubbed “Chocolate city” because of the skin colour of the relatively numerous African population there. Here again, Beijing seems to have decided to track illegal foreign immigrants who overstayed their visa or who are illegally working in the country.

Personal encounters with ‘official China’

Having landed at Beijing international airport, I spent a few minutes in front of an immigration officer who carefully scrutinized my passport, checked again and again my personal data on the first page and the picture. She then went to my recent Chinese visa page and did the same. I waited patiently – and eventually got my passport back. After this, customs was the next step. A customs officer asked for my passport in Chinese. I wanted to know what he needed it for and his simple answer of “needing to check” made me start an argument with him. I wanted to know why – of all the passengers that had passed through – he picked me? I was the only one he stopped to claim the passport and even the ticket. How would I have come all the way from South Africa to China without a ticket? I left him standing at his position, probably surprised by my reaction and my mandarin skills.
In China, the hotels work closely with the immigration officers to expose foreigners who do not have residence permits. Currently, I am based in Jinhua, a university town in Zhejiang province. Today, while leaving for the city centre, I found five policemen at my hotel’s reception talking to the managers. When I got back to the hotel, a desk was posted at the entry gate and a policeman had a file with him and was asking me to sign up. I asked why I should do so. The question about the why – in Chinese: “wei shenme?” – is usually answered by Chinese officials with “mei you shenme” (There is no why!). I refused to sign the file unless given a reason. There was no reason, so I left him there and took the lift to my room.

**Chinese migration policy – lack of public explanation**

Last week, I read in the news that China is now working on immigration policies to allow foreigners to stay for at least 4 days within the country without a visa. Good, but how does this fit with the obnoxious tracking of foreigners? China needed foreign investments and experts to take off economically and make its ‘open door’ policy in the 1980s a success. Many foreigners are still playing this role in China! In any country of the world, even the most populous one, immigrants (workers or professionals) play an important role for economic development. Overall, they contribute their experience and knowledge to skill/technology transfer and education. Not to forget that they pay taxes to their host country. It is true that in any group of people, you will find dishonest individuals, be they Chinese, Africans, Americans, Europeans or whoever, but targeting foreigners as such means you shoot yourself in the foot! The United States, the world’s first economy, is a typical example of an economy built on migrants. And many European countries have benefitted from immigration, which introduced a labour force, as well as new ideas and lifestyles. The current situation might not be a good advertisement for the ‘Asian giant’ to keep on attracting still much needed foreign expertise and investments.

It has to be said that thus far, I have not seen any anti-foreign resentment amongst ordinary Chinese people – and speaking Mandarin presumably helps. There are many curious and open Chinese; this is well understood, and it’s the same everywhere. But ‘official China’ is quite absent from the current debate. It is startling how little there is public speech against the ‘foreign trash’ rant. I am not saying that China should not control its borders, but there is a decent way to do so! Learning lessons from traditional immigration destinations’ policies (and police training) can be helpful for Chinese officials. Not acting against individual outbreaks of xenophobia is potentially very harmful to Chinese society – and discrimination of foreigners is clearly against the spirit of people-to-people friendship.
Is tolerance towards homosexuality a purely Western issue? – Why not “look east” in this case, too?

By Harrie Esterhuysen
Research Analyst, Centre for Chinese Studies

Gay rights have lately received much media coverage. In the United States, President Obama became the first sitting US president to give his public support for gay marriage. The US and United Kingdom have also in recent months begun to stop government funding to countries that have anti-gay legislation, leaving some African state budgets, such as Malawi’s, in shambles. In many countries such as the Netherlands, Canada, Portugal, Argentina and South Africa full marriage rights have been extended to same sex couples. In many other countries such as the UK, Germany, some US states and Austria, same-sex couples are able to enter into civil unions. Thus the pro-gay movement is increasing in strength around the world: except, it seems, for wider Africa. Is this the smartest move for the developing economies of Africa? Maybe learning from China in this case is not too bad an idea?

China, just like Africa, suffered under colonialism in the era of European expansion. After British colonialism introduced legislation to Hong Kong that illegalized homosexual intercourse, these laws were scrapped in 1991. In mainland China, homosexuality was still seen as a crime and a psychological condition in the 1990’s, even after the World Health Organization declared it not to be a mental disorder in 1990. However, the so called “hooligan” law that criminalised homosexuality was repealed in 1997 and homosexuality was taken off the list of mental disorders in 2001 by the Chinese government, removing legal obstacles to homosexual Chinese from living their lives openly.

Still, the family pressure to get married in modern China is so strong that gay and lesbian Chinese at times marry each other, relieving the social pressure from their families to find a marriage partner. If people, however, at the surface fit in with the expectations of society, their sexual preferences are not relevant, and they can lead the lives they choose. Tolerance – or indifference – towards homosexuality has a long history in China. All men and women are thought to have aspects of both yin and yang, feminine and masculine. Homosexuality was not on the list of prohibited practices of Confucianism. Rather, Confucianism emphasised doing one’s duty, which - in those days - included having children. Other sexual choices were left to individual preference. Amongst the Chinese emperors, it was not an uncommon practice to have male concubines.

The current Chinese government for their part wants productive citizens that do not cause instability, but goes about with their lives, growing the Chinese economy and not upsetting the status quo. As homosexuality does not threaten the Chinese state, it is a non-issue for the central government. China does not have a dominant church or religion with rigid interpretations of script. This makes it easier for the government to pragmatically focus purely on the economy and political stability. The Chinese government have realised that accepting – even if not condoning – gay rights benefits the state economically and politically. Homosexuality, ironically, even works along with some of the national policies: unintentionally in line with China’s population control, homosexual couples are less likely to have children.
The “it is un-African” myth

African states in contrast to China are notorious for being homophobic, with only South Africa recognising gay rights and same-sex marriage. Homosexuality is often called “un-African”, in spite of anti-gay legislation being a colonial import, just as it had been in China. South Africa abandoned the anti-homosexual legislation that it had inherited from the racist Apartheid regime. South Africa adopted sexual equality, because South Africa’s reformers viewed sexual discrimination as much a human rights abuse as racial discrimination. Archbishop Desmond Tutu famously declared that he had not engaged in the struggle against oppression based on race, just to oppress people for other reasons afterwards.

Africa’s most southern country thus adopted a pro-gay stance long before many western countries, not because of western pressure but because of its own experience with colonial oppression.

Most African governments do not share South Africa’s stance on human rights. In Uganda an act has been repeatedly presented to parliament, which would see homosexuality becoming a capital offence. Malawi, Nigeria, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Senegal all have anti-gay legislation. Cameroon was in the news lately for imprisoning seven men under the law for “sexual relations with a person of the same sex”. And even in South Africa, social (though not legal) homophobia has given rise to crimes, such as so called “corrective” rape of lesbian women to “make” them heterosexual. The legal aspect is therefore a part of the bigger picture; the actual implementation and maintenance of freedom of sexual orientation also needs political will.

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, has criticised African states for treating their gay populations like “second class citizens or even criminals”. The situation in Africa sees governments prosecuting citizens, who do nothing to threaten the stability or wellbeing of the state and its structures. Transparency and democratic values are trampled in an attempt to sentence people for committing acts that are very hard to legally prove. All of these processes distract valuable resources, both financial and social, which could have been used for more relevant projects.

Reconciling economy, state and human rights

Instead of prosecuting its citizens, African countries should look at China, the largest, and economically arguably the most successful developing country of all, and make the logical economical and governance sum. African governments should look at the economic potential of all its populations, including gays and lesbians. Allow gay people to live their lives peacefully, to focus on their work, increasing both GDP and the tax base without being harassed. China is criticised for making calculated economic choices often above human rights. But in this case, China has channelled a course that is both economically beneficial and pro-human rights, a win-win scenario, so to say. Allowing if not necessarily condoning gay lifestyles is positive with regard to economic growth, stability and international standing. If a citizen is not a problem, do not make him (or her) a problem. Beyond any moral consideration: accepting homosexual rights makes pure economic sense.
18 June 2012

**Rio+20: What’s the point?**

By Meryl Burgess  
_Research Analyst, Centre for Chinese Studies_

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit in 1992 was meant to create positive impacts for the future. When the first Rio conference on environmental sustainability took place in 1992, issues such as environmental sustainability, and global development without excessive environmental harm, let alone establishing treaties on climate change, desertification and biodiversity were not on my mind. I had just turned 5 years old, with few cares for anything but Barbie dolls and ice-cream. I had no idea what was taking place in the world at that time. Did this big event change something to the positive?

**Big issues at mega events**

Today, ‘mega events’ (as they are now referred to) such as world summits have become more numerous year in-year out. And certainly, anyone with an inkling at modern current affairs knows that China has been the world’s fastest growing economy for quite a while, so we can move beyond the basic level of discussing these events. A tremendous amount of development, including industrialisation and urbanisation has taken place in China, with concurrent damaging effects on the country’s ecosystems. What might be less in focus is that China and parts of Africa are home to some of the world’s richest and most biologically diverse areas. China is known as one of the seventeen mega-diverse countries in the world, moreover, the continent of Africa has some of the most famous biodiversity hotspots in the world. The problem remains that this biodiversity is under (human) siege.

Among Africa’s primary needs are development and poverty alleviation. This will increase the use of natural resources, for instance via more extensive agriculture, as the sector is feeding the growing population and is creating employment opportunities in China and in Africa. This is the difficult challenge for China and Africa, also seen in other developing parts of the world: the need for development versus the need to conserve already depleting natural resources. In order to develop, developing countries need their economies to grow, likewise to lift their populations out of poverty, they need that growth to create jobs for their people. But what role for protection of natural resources? We’ve seen problems with such single minded development in the past industrialisation period among the so-called developed nations: the more industrialisation occurs, the more the environment is harmed. Biodiversity that is lost is just gone – and no attempts at recoup or repair after reaching higher levels of development can restore it. China is a good (or rather, bad) example for this practice once again.

The more the environment is harmed and biodiversity lost, the fewer natural resources are left to help us feed each other, or simply breathe clean air and maintain our health. Let us not forget the effects of climate change on our environment and the need to develop – actually a much less urgent issue 20 years ago. So what exactly is the point of world summits like Rio+20 when it appears as if things have gotten worse since that first conference?
Why should we care about these summits, or why should we not?

Speaking pejoratively, these summits are little more than big pageants that mainly involve heads of state coming together in a room full of media to discuss global issues. As can be expected with pageants, very little gets done beyond the histrionics of procedure and diplomacy. Heads of state will sign a new convention with a flourish – and yet, time and again they fail to find the political wherewithal to implement the plans of action back home. According to the UN, more than 130 heads of state, vice presidents, heads of government and deputy prime ministers were on the speakers list for the Rio+20 summit. By now, many of them (not to mention their constituents) will have grown weary of environmental meetings after disappointing events like the 2009 climate talks in Copenhagen where leaders failed to agree on a new, binding treaty on climate change. Diplomatic shows of force around the conference table make great headlines, and appease voters, but where is the real progress towards the issues at stake? Is it a simple case of too many chefs spoiling the broth?

In a positive light, summits like these set out clear conventions for countries which also serve as guidelines for countries. The Convention for Biological Diversity, for instance, calls on countries to establish national biodiversity plans that include setting out protected areas that covers at least 10 percent of the country's land. This gives me and other academics the opportunity to remind government of their pledges – time and time again. In the build-up to the summit, more than 40 countries met in Dakar (Senegal) at an inter-regional learning workshop to share experiences and define implementation approaches post-Rio. Rio+20 thus creates platforms for countries to share ideas and address similar challenges together. Could we see some learning?

The life of the future generation depends on how the world is looked after today. At the Rio+20 summit, world leaders, along with thousands of participants from governments, the private sector, NGOs and other groups, will come together to shape how we can reduce poverty, advance social equity and ensure environmental protection on an ever more crowded planet to get to the future we want. The real work, however, will have to be done at home. And that’s where we have to push our governments – and get over Barbie dolls and “ice-cream for all” slogans.
CCS Discussion Paper:

Development in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Spatial Transformation and the Construction of Difference in Western China

By Ross Anthony

In the past two decades, China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has been the recipient of several large-scale development projects which have occurred in conjunction with market-orientated mechanisms introduced to help foster growth. Because such measures have been introduced in conjunction with the large-scale migration of Han Chinese to this traditionally non-Han region, critics have argued that such measures merely assist a process of “internal colonialism”. The territory, occupied primarily by Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim ethnic group, has a considerable history of resistance to Beijing rule.

Thus, the recent economic development of the region has been viewed by scholars, not to mention many Uyghurs, as Beijing’s attempt to consolidate the Chinese presence in the region. From the Chinese government point of view, this could not be further from the truth: state largess and the fostering of private enterprise have helped achieve one of China’s primary goals in the religion: ethnic harmony and unity.

This paper offers an ethnographic description and analysis of a recent development project in one of the central Uyghur neighbourhoods in the regional capital of Urumqi. The project, a massive Central Asian style-complex earmarked for development by the local government and constructed by a Han-Chinese joint venture, attempts to bring about stability in the region through two aims: the promotion of commerce in the region and the celebration of multi-cultural difference. As is the case of many minority groups in China, the Uyghur’s ethnicity itself has become one of its most important commodities; as Han Chinese become wealthier, they have increasingly ventured out to regions such as Xinjiang to experience “local minority characteristics”. While such a transition has offered an economic lift to certain elements of the Uyghur community, it has also offered opportunities for Han Chinese to profit off such potential. The research is premised upon 13 months of fieldwork in the region in 2007/8.

The Discussion Paper (3/2012) can be accessed via the CCS website (www.sun.ac.za/ccs)
Recent Events at the CCS

CADfund delegation visits CCS – 7 June 2012

On 7 June 2012, a delegation from the Research & Development Department of the China-Africa Development Fund visited the CCS. The delegation and the CCS research analysts shared insights with regard to current trends and issues related to China’s investment in Africa. The CCS looks forward to productive cooperation in the future with the CAD-Fund and the meeting should play a conducive role in expanding mutual understanding for both institutions.

Former “Mr Africa” of the Chinese Government, LIU Guijin, visits CCS on behalf of China Africa International Business School – 8 June 2012

Former Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, and Dean of the China Africa International Business School (CAIBS), LIU Guijin and Dr ZHANG Xiaofeng, Assistant to the Dean visited Stellenbosch University and the CCS on Friday, 8 June. They were visiting Stellenbosch to promote the development of CAIBS, to be established in Hangzhou, China, and also held talks with senior University management.

Chinese universities delegation visits CCS – 11 June 2012

The Presidents and assistant presidents from assorted Chinese universities, including Mianyang Normal University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Dalian University of Technology visited the CCS on Monday, 11 June. They were accompanied by representatives from the China Education Association for International Exchange, as well as Professor XIE Zuoxu from Stellenbosch University’s Confucius Institute, who was their host for the day. The delegation brought greetings from their respective institutions, and held a discussion with CCS personnel on CCS research and activities.
Recent Events at the CCS

The CCS is moving!

After an eight year stay, the Centre for Chinese Studies will be saying goodbye to its offices in the Administration A building at Stellenbosch University in the coming month, as the Centre will be moving to the newly re-furbished R. W. Wil cocks building during July. The building also houses the Confucius Institute, Stellenbosch University’s International Office and the African Doctoral Academy.

The Wilcocks building is situated at the intersection of Ryneveld and Victoria Streets on the Stellenbosch University campus, next door to the CCS’ previous premises. The CCS will occupy new offices on the fourth floor. For more information, contact Bronwyn Grobler at the CCS via bngrobler@sun.ac.za, or via +27 (21) 808 2840

CCS staff travels

The winter months see CCS staff and researchers embarking on trips and research work.

Dr Sven Grimm is on an overseas trip throughout July, taking him to Bonn and Wuerzburg in Germany, to Hong Kong/China, and to Sydney and Brisbane in Australia. There will be numerous meetings as follow-ups of past work, discussing progress on current projects and explore how to further develop the CCS agenda with international partners.

Dr Daouda Cissé is at the Institute for African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University as visiting scholar. Dr Cissé is conducting field work in Zhejiang/China, looking into African traders’ situation and their role in China-African trade. You’ll find some of his reporting in commentaries on the CCS website. Beyond the research, Daouda has had a meeting with colleagues at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and will continue his travels to Tianjin for a presentation organised by UNDP and MOFCOM.

Visiting Scholar, Hannane Ferdjani spent time in Beijing recently researching within the Phandulwazi nge China scholarship. While in Beijing, she was logistically supported by Peking University, for which we would like to thank our colleagues at the Centre for African Studies at the School of International Studies, Peking University. Hannane is now back at the office in Stellenbosch and busy compiling the report.
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