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Special issue on

SECURITY IN CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS

Festus Aubyn
China’s Foray into African Security and the Question of Non-Interference

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Dragon under the Blue Helmet: a quantitative analysis of China’s motivation for participation in UN peacekeeping operations

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An analysis of China’s consular protection practice in Africa
African East-Asian Affairs

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Editor’s introduction

By Ross Anthony*

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Over the past decade, China’s influence on the African continent has grown significantly. While this growth has been primarily within the economic sphere, such expansion has increasingly become bound up with issues of political involvement. There has been growing international pressure for China to play a greater role in peacekeeping efforts on the continent, a call which increasingly challenges its “non-interference” policy. As China increases its clout on the world stage, it is increasingly obliged to demonstrate traits of global leadership, not least of which is playing an instrumental role in maintaining regional and global security. The question of security in relation to China’s “going out” policy is most pertinent to the African case, where weak governance, ethnic conflict, civil and regional wars have wracked the continent. In fact, it is partially for such reasons that the Chinese have such a significant presence on the continent: Euro-American economic interests have, for many years, steered clear of various African states due to unacceptably high risks which business would have to shoulder. The African states where the most developed countries have tended to invest - particularly Europe - are states which have maintained

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strong ties harking back to the colonial period. China’s drive, particularly for resources, has obliged it to enter markets where others have feared to tread. In the past decade and a half, the Chinese government and various Chinese companies have had to learn some hard and fast rules with regards to risk and security. From its initial high-risk investments, such as China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) drilling for oil in the midst of the Sudanese civil war, China is becoming increasingly risk aware. Chinese companies are increasingly embracing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) models, hiring private security firms and using international political risk consultancies.

Thus the issue of security in relation to the Chinese presence in Africa is complex, ranging from the practical nuts and bolts of investment and the risk involved in such ventures but also the broader picture of China’s role in regional and global security architectures. The bulk of articles in this edition (with the exclusion of Zhou Hang’s piece) are a selection of extended versions of presentations given at a conference hosted by the CCS on the 25th and 26th of April 2013 entitled ‘Managing Security and Risk in China Africa Relations’. The conference, which addressed issues of security ranging from business investments to the role of international organisations, attempted to grasp the topic from a number of different scales and perspectives. Despite the varying subject matter, a theme which unified the conference was that China’s attitude toward security in Africa - at all levels - is one which is undergoing significant change. The arrow of this transformation points in the direction of China becoming an increasingly normative power, with greater risk awareness at the level of companies and greater participation in regional security organisations.

While China has long been reticent in this regard, signs of change now abound. Festus Aubyn’s paper in this edition notes a distinct shift from the late 1980s onwards, when China began committing troops to the likes of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Sudan, Western Sahara, Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique. Earlier this year (June 2013), China announced
that it would send combat troops to Mali – the first commitment of this kind. China has also demonstrated a more pro-active utilisation of its membership on United Nations Security Council (such as its abstention – as opposed to its usual pattern of vetoing - with regards to the intervention in Libya in 2011) and a heightened commitment to the protection of Chinese citizens abroad (such as in its evacuation of 30 000 Chinese from Libya in 2011). The reasons as to why China is more assertive are discussed in some of the articles in this edition of AEAA. Zhou Hang’s paper scrutinises which countries China sends its UN peacekeeping forces to in relation to the political and economic advantages which may be gained from deployment to that region. Using quantitative political science methods, his results are complex (and may be difficult for the non-specialist to grasp), but nonetheless suggest that China is selective as to where it sends its troops. It tends to avoid deployment in areas engaged in territorial conflict and leans toward greater deployment in regions of special economic interest. Certainly, huge capital investments are inevitably bound up with questions of securing assets and personnel, many of which belong to state owned enterprises (SOEs) which specialise in strategic commodities such as petroleum. In this sense, China’s growing role toward creating political stability on the continent is related to its long-term interests of creating a stable environment in which it can conduct its economic affairs.

Additionally, as this issue’s article by Xia Liping highlights, the Chinese state itself is playing a greater role in the everyday security of Chinese citizens and companies in Africa. Drawing on data from a survey carried out on Chinese companies in Africa, coupled with data gathered from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she presents an extensive list of the dangers posed to Chinese citizens and the preventative various measures taken by Chinese consulates (which include the development of registrations systems, regular safety checks, joint meetings with local police, government and business organisations and the growing role of the internet communication for safety interests). One of the reasons for this shift is that there is domestic pressure on China to protect its citizens abroad. Another reason is that as China integrates itself globally, it is increasingly adopts the western “norms” of risk and securi-
ty calculus. A current running through several of the papers suggests that China’s official policy of ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of other countries requires some reconceptualization. A major driver for this shift is that as China increases its economic and political presence on the continent – and the world at large - adhering to such a principle becomes increasingly unrealistic (within Chinese policy circles, there are debates about re-framing the term, such as Wang Yi-zhou’s notion of ‘creative involvement’). Tom Wheeler’s paper, which draws on various examples of the interface between economic and political interests, highlights China’s inevitable (and in his view, healthy) path toward playing a greater role in African security issues. At the same time, he highlights some of the barriers to this engagement, such as Chinese ministries shying away from allocating funds toward security. Such reticence is in part structural: ministries’ mandates and budgets often do not include provisioning for such measures; transforming these structures is no easy task, as officials are weary of being drawn into intractable conflicts they would rather not have to worry about.

This issue of AEAA goes to press as the events of a terrorist attack by al-Shabaab upon a shopping mall in Kenya unfolds. The attack has left scores dead, including Kenyans, Ghanaians, South Africans, British, Americans, Chinese and Koreans. It has been speculated that the site was targeted precisely because of its attraction to the international community living in Nairobi. This event, in tandem with broader threats of Islamic militancy in East and West Africa, not to mention piracy off the coast of Somalia, indicates a broader threat to the international community in Africa, in which Chinese citizens are as vulnerable as a host of other nations’ citizens. There have already been calls in the Chinese press for greater co-operation between various countries in the combating of such attacks. Making a break from the usual discourse which pits China and the West at economic and political odds within Africa, such events may bring China and the international community closer together in terms of security co-operation. Judging by the recent changes in China’s attitude toward African se-
curity, coupled with continued economic investment in the continent, we can expect that in years to come the question of security and engagement will only increase in importance. The articles in this special edition of AEAA offer the reader some food for thought as to how this evolving process may play itself out.
China’s foray into African security and the question of non-interference

By Festus Aubyn*
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Abstract
Historically, China-Africa relations have been dominated by economic rationales and the policy of non-interference has restricted its engagement in African peace and security. However, in the past two decades, Beijing’s contribution towards African peace and security has dramatically expanded. In this paper, we seek to ascertain the factors behind China’s growing role in African security at the multi-lateral, continental, sub-regional and national levels and how it has impacted on China’s foreign policy of non-interference. The paper argues that although the policy of non-interference was a workable model in the 1950s, it is not in sync with current realities. Therefore, Beijing needs to rethink its policy of non-interference in order to protect its economic investments and political interests, which have come under threat in recent years. Undeniably, the increasing role of China also has important implications for the policy and interests of other external actors on the African continent such as the United States of America, the European

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Union (EU), India, and Canada. To this end, the paper concludes by exploring ways in which China can collaborate and coordinate its activities with these actors to foster sustainable peace and security on the African continent.

**Introduction**

As China-Africa relations have grown rapidly in the past two decades, China’s engagement with the continent has evolved from being mostly economic to now including the spheres of peace and security. Particularly since the beginning of the 21st Century, Beijing has become increasingly engaged in the prevention, mediation and resolution of African security dilemmas, contrasting sharply with its passive posture circa the 1970s and 1980s. This paper examines the security dimension of China-Africa relations in the past two decades and how it has impacted on its foreign policy of non-interference. To put the study into context, the paper begins with a brief overview of China’s relation with Africa since the post-independence period. Next, the key factors shaping Chinese interests in African security are explored. China-Africa relations have been dominated historically by economic rationales; the policy of non-interference has, until the 1990s, restricted China’s engagement in global peace and security. For that reason, we seek to ascertain the factors behind China’s increasing role in African peace and security. The subsequent section examines the role or contributions of China to African security at four levels: the multilateral level at the United Nations (UN); the Continental level of the African Union (AU); the Sub-regional level of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and China’s role at the national level with individual African countries. Increasingly, China’s growing role in African security issues has challenged or put strains on its long-established policy of non-interference, to the extent that many scholars have questioned whether it is possible for the policy to be maintained today. In this regard, the paper also interrogates China’s increasing role in African security and how it has impacted on its policy of non-interference, particularly taking cognizance of Beijing’s recent approach to the conflicts in Sudan and Libya.
The paper argues that the policy of non-interference is not in sync with contemporary realities or challenges of conflicts and political instability in Africa. There is no doubt that the policy was a workable model in the 1950s and beyond, when China’s economic interaction with Africa and the rest of the world was at a minimum. With growing Chinese investments, political interest and power on the global stage, we argue that Beijing needs to foster sustainable peace and stability on the continent as well as re-think its non-interference policy in order to protect its interests, which have come under threat in countries such as Libya, Sudan and Nigeria. Lastly, the heightened engagement in Africa by China undoubtedly has important implications for the policies and interest of other external actors, such as the United States of America, the European Union (EU) and emerging powers like India, Brazil, Canada, Australia and Russia. In this regard, we also explore areas where both China and other external actors differ in their approach to the resolution of African security challenges and where they can collaborate and coordinate their activities to foster sustainable peace and security in Africa.

**China-Africa relations: a brief historical overview**

China and Africa first came into contact during the 10th Century when the Egyptian city of Alexandria started trading with China. However, it was only during the Bandung Conference on Non-Alignment\(^1\) in April 1955 that China and Africa truly rediscovered each other (Aning & Lecoute, 2009).

Beijing’s relations with Africa during this period was characterised mainly by a policy of anti-Soviet rhetoric and support for the anti-Portuguese nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique. China also supported many liberation movements in Africa, and established diplomatic and economic relations with several newly independent African states (Gill, Huang & Morrison, 2007). This policy formed part and parcel of its wider policy thrust to boost its political influence globally and expand the “One China” principle which was to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. In response, African states also reciprocated by providing
diplomatic support to China to replace Taiwan in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971 (Chau, 2007). China’s foreign policy towards Africa during this period was underpinned by five basic principles, namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence (Hellström, 2009). These principles continue to shape China’s policy towards Africa today. For many African countries, China is more appealing than many Western countries due, in particular, to its non-interference policy, as it seems to be an alternative to the Western economic prescriptions that are marred by aid conditionalities and needless foreign interference that disrupts their national sovereignty (Ayenagbo et al, 2012).

In contrast, China’s relations with Africa post-1978 shifted into a relationship in which Chinese investments, mainly in infrastructure, were offered in exchange for African natural resources (Aning & Aubyn, 2013). After a decade hiatus in the China-Africa relationship, three important events reignited Beijing’s interest on the continent. The first was the crisis in China’s international relations after the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. The incredible expansion of the Chinese economy in the 1990s and 2000s was the second factor. The last factor was the support granted by African leaders to Beijing at the UN in the face of intense criticism by the West of its human rights record (Taylor, 2013). Throughout the 1990s, China-Africa relations grew rapidly and in particular, received a major boost in 2000 when the first session of the triennial Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit was held in Beijing. Subsequent FOCAC meetings were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2003), Beijing, China (2006), and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (2009) and once again in Beijing in 2012. Apart from providing an important multilateral mechanism for forging new commitments and strengthening political ties, the FOCAC meetings have provided opportunities for governments and businesses to strengthen their economic cooperation. Furthermore, it has also promoted diplomatic relations, trade and investments between China and African countries (Thompson, 2005). More importantly, through the various FOCAC agreements since 2000, China has pledged to support
African peace and security endeavours. The 2006 *China’s Africa Policy Paper* for example indicated that:

*China will support the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa*³.

While these FOCAC commitments on peace and security are by no means rhetorical, they are rather brief and ambiguous in detail when compared to the commitments on economic relations. This means that though peace and security issues are given some level of attention in Beijing’s cooperation with Africa, economic rationales or interests continue to dominate this relationship (Large, 2008). But in reality, China’s relations with Africa are more driven by a desire to obtain sources of raw materials and energy for China’s ongoing economic growth and for new export markets (Taylor, 2006). Suffice to say that if economic impulse is the dominant motivation inspiring China’s safari in Africa, why now the rising interest in African peace and security issues? To unpack this, the next section examines the factors behind Beijing’s evolving role in African security issues.

**Motivations underpinning China’s expanding role in Africa security issues**

Three main interrelated factors appear to inspire Beijing’s expanding role in African security issues. The first is that China has numerous investments in especially the energy and mineral extraction sectors across the continent, in countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, Zambia, Ethiopia and Kenya. In Sudan, for example, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) dominates the oil sector with an investment which is valued to be about $7 billion (Hellström,
2009). Other Chinese National Oil Companies such as the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), PetroChina and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) also have considerable investments in many other African countries (Taylor, 2006). Moreover, in the mineral extraction sector, Chinese companies have been given access to gold mining in Eritrea, manganese in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Gabon, bauxite in Guinea, titanium in Kenya, uranium in Niger, chromium in South Africa, copper in Zambia, coal and platinum mines in Zimbabwe (Hellström, 2009). Increasingly, most of these investments have come under serious threat due to conflicts and political instability. In Ghana for example, since 2011, there have been several violent clashes between local mining communities and small-scale Chinese miners who are often accused of illegal gold mining activities known in Ghana as ‘galamsey’; such activities have also caused huge environmental destruction to farmlands and rivers through the use of heavy machinery, bulldozers and pay loaders (Aning & Aubyn, 2013, op. cit. Bax, 2011). This led to the deportation of some 38 Chinese in September 2012 from Ghana who were alleged to have been involved in illegal gold mining (Nsiah & Kodie, 2012). Similar incidences have also occurred in several other West African countries and other African countries such as Kenya, Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe. Therefore, in order to protect and safeguard its commercial interest and investments, Beijing has inevitably been forced to take a keen interest in the stability and development of those countries where its companies have invested. This partly explains why in certain conflict situations, like that of Sudan where its interests were at stake, China had to be flexible on its dogma of state sovereignty and non-interference to the extent that, it had to publicly encourage Khartoum to allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur (Aning & Lecoutre, 2009, op. cit. Large, 2007).

The next important factor is that Africa is a major market for Chinese manufactured goods such as textiles, clothing, consumer goods and machine tools and at the same time, the import market of energy (oil) and raw materials such as minerals (copper, bauxite, uranium, aluminium, manganese, iron ore), precious stones, timber, cotton, and fish products (Rotberg, 2008). For this reason, securing markets for Chinese
goods and the supply of raw materials from Africa for China’s manufacturing companies has been a major priority in Beijing’s engagement with the continent. Furthermore, China is currently Africa's largest bilateral trading partner and during the past decade, trade between China and Africa has increased more than six-fold. It is therefore clear that without growing prosperity on the African continent, the supply of energy resources and raw materials will be seriously affected and African markets will never meet their full potential for Chinese goods and products. Trade between Africa and China would also be hampered. As a result, any form of armed violence and conflicts on the continent will arguably have implications for its domestic growth rate and development. Accordingly, upholding African security is a way of enhancing China’s own domestic development as stability in Africa means a secure market for Chinese goods and investment as well as raw materials and energy imports (Rotberg, 2008).

Beijing’s broader foreign policy goal of expanding its political spheres of influence and wish to be seen as a responsible global power who is contributing to international public good of maintaining peace and security is also accountable for its somewhat active role in African security (Saferworld, 2011). That is to say, China’s interest in African security issues is also motivated by its global ambitions of being recognized as a significant power on the world stage. For example, apart from contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, China’s participation in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden is symptomatic of this assertion (Kostecka, 2010). Though some scholars would argue that China’s involvement in the Gulf of Aden was motivated by geo-politics and the protection of national interests, it also shows its willingness to share the burden of upholding international peace and security as a responsible big power (Saferworld, 2011).

**China’s contributions towards African peace and security: gains and limitations**

This section examines some of the gains and limitations of China’s security en-
gagements with Africa at the multilateral level of the UN, regional level of the AU and at the Sub-regional level of the Regional Economic Communities.

**Multi-lateral level initiatives at the UN**

At the multilateral level, China has exhibited greater commitment to peacekeeping activities by increasing its participation in UN operations and peacebuilding efforts as well as providing diplomatic support to African countries during debates at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Saferworld, 2011, op. cit. Davies, 2008). With respect to peacekeeping, China’s efforts in Africa have since the 1990s steadily evolved from a position of unwilling participation to one of active engagement due to its strict adherence to principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, consent of host state before peacekeeping deployment and the non-use of force other than in self-defence. However, in recent times, China’s position on these principles has become more flexible and less conservative due to the recognition that traditional peacekeeping is ill-suited to contemporary conflicts (Ayenagbo, et al, 2012, op. cit. Saferworld, 2011). Since its first participation in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989, China has deployed its personnel to African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Sudan, Western Sahara, Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique. Although the number of Chinese Peacekeepers in Africa cannot be compared to that of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, it ranks as the largest contributor among the five permanent members of the UNSC and also the seventh highest provider of assessed contributions (3.93%) to UN peacekeeping operations as of February 2012 (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013). This is particularly significant at a time when Western countries are unwilling to deploy personnel to peacekeeping missions in Africa. Beyond these contributions, China as a permanent member of the UNSC has also played a very significant role in the decision-making process with regards to the deployment of peacekeepers to Africa. Beijing has also put greater emphasis at the UNSC on the need for improved cooperation between the UN and African regional/sub-regional organisations towards the maintenance of international peace and
security. In *China’s Africa Policy Paper* for example, China urged the UN Security Council to pay attention to, and help resolve, regional conflicts in Africa. On the issue of UN reforms, China has also called on the UNSC to give priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, in particular those in Africa. On the diplomatic front, China has sought to represent the interests, positions and concerns of African regional organisations through its permanent seat at the UNSC. A good example of this was China’s support to the AU’s opposition to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against President Omar-Al-Bashir of Sudan at the UNSC. However, some critics assert that China was only using its position at the UNSC to protect partner regimes and its economic interests in Sudan and moreover, obstructing international action on an urgent situation.

**Continental level initiatives: China and the African Union**

China has traditionally adopted a state-centric approach towards each African country governed by principles of state sovereignty and non-interference instead of a one-size-fits-all approach to the whole of Africa (Aning & Lecoutre, 2009, op. cit. Saferworld, 2011). However, the past five years has seen a deepening cooperation between China and regional organizations such as the AU, which are largely centred on conflict management and resolution primarily through offering support to peacekeeping, humanitarian and mediation efforts. The most visible aspect of this growing partnership is perhaps the new $200m (£127m) AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that was donated by the Chinese government in January 2012 (BBC News, 2013). China has been very instrumental in supporting the AU as it seeks to find African solutions to African problems. It has, through the provision of both material and financial assistance to the AU, supported the implementation of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

In particular, China has supported AU peacekeeping activities in Sudan [AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID)], Somalia
[AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)] and also assisted in the development of the African Standby Force (ASF). In 2010 for example, China provided $1.32 million to the AU of which a portion was specifically intended for AMISOM (African Union Commission, 2010). Again, in 2011, China provided equipment and material valued at about US$4.5 million for AMISOM (African Union Commission, 2010). Although these are paltry sums, Beijing has over the years shown greater commitment and willingness to support AU efforts in peacekeeping. But unlike other actors, like the European Union (EU), which has specific programmes such as the African Peace Facility, China’s assistance to the AU has been given on an ad hoc basis in the form of grants to support specific mediation/peacekeeping efforts. Thus, in reality, actual support has been context specific and limited, in that whether China engages with any African country depends on the internal dynamics and economic strength of the country. The support to AMIS was a graphic case in point where China provided one of its greatest ever sums, of $3.5 million, to AU in 2006. Apart from the financial contribution, it also sent five batches of humanitarian aid to Darfur in 2004 worth $5.2 million, consisting of cross-country vehicles, ambulances, medical instruments and mobile houses.

**China and the regional economic communities in Africa**

In its dealing with the RECs in Africa, China has prioritized economic over security issues. For that reason, its relations with the RECs in terms of peace and security have been very restricted. Beijing’s relation with the RECs is now expanding and gradually taking shape. But this notwithstanding, China has supported conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms of RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Regarding ECOWAS, for example, China contributed an amount of U.S $100,000 to the ECOWAS Peace fund in 2008\. In 2005, China appointed representatives to SADC, ECOWAS and the AU, signifying its burgeoning relationship with these organizations. Diplomatically, China has also aligned with the positions of RECs at the
UNSC. A typical case was in 2008 when China and the Russian Federation vetoed UNSC’s measures intended to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and 13 other Government and security officials considered responsible for the violent crisis in the country. China supported the offices of SADC and the AU, and called upon all parties not to take any action that might have a negative impact on the situation (UNSC Department of Public Information, 2008).

**National level engagements**

At the national or bilateral level, which has been the traditional model of China’s cooperation with Africa, it has fostered military-related technological exchanges and cooperation with a number of African countries such as Guinea, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Ayenagbo et al, 2012, op. cit. Saferworld, 2011). It has provided de-mining and intelligence gathering support to African armies, helped train African military personnel and supported the construction of defence and army buildings of African countries (MFA-PRC, 2006). However, one area of grave concern is the secrecy surrounding these forms of military cooperation and the impact of the training programs on the work of African military personnel. This is because some Chinese-trained military personnel have in the past been chided for unprofessional conduct and others implicated in various violations of international humanitarian law (Saferworld, 2011, op. cit. Aning & Aubyn, 2013). In 2009 for example, Chinese-trained commandos in Guinea were involved in the killing of 150 protesters (Saferworld, 2011). These shortfalls thus raise questions as to how China can ensure that its military assistance is delivered in a more transparent and effective manner and also targeted towards making African military more accountable to civilian authority.

**China-Africa security relations and the policy of non-interference**

China’s role in African security issues has been guided by one key principle,
non-interference, which it deems as the internal affairs of other states. This is because the Chinese government itself does not allow interference in its own domestic affairs. The Chinese government advocates that national governments alone should be the focus on matters relating to domestic political, economic or social affairs. It was designed in the 1950s to reach out to non-communist states in Asia and to reflect solidarity with newly independent states in Africa, with an emphasis on territorial sovereignty defined in the most rigid and traditional Westphalian terms (Iyasu, 2012). Although the policy of non-interference applies to military interventions and regime change, the principle has been China’s *modus-operandi* in its investment and economic interactions with Africa (Iyasu, 2012). For most African countries, the policy of non-interference seems to be one of the more attractive factors in their partnership with China (Ayenagbo *et al*., 2012). However, there are growing concerns that the policy is merely to benefit Chinese business and investment interests in Africa as it largely overlooks realities of contemporary conflicts and socio-political realities on the continent. This is because in practical terms, the application of the policy has been tailored to suit Chinese interest wherever it is at stake on the continent.

In Sudan for example, which is one of China’s key trading partners and oil suppliers in Africa, despite Chinese claims of non-interference policy, it was involved in the domestic affairs of the country to primarily protect its economic interests. China supplied the Sudanese government with arms and weaponry even when the Darfur crisis was still ongoing. In fact, most of these arms were used for persistent and systematic violations of human rights by government and rebel forces. The supply of arms to the government of Sudan for example, indicated a paradigm shift in China’s non-interference foreign policy (Ferim, 2013). This ambiguity raises important questions about what some scholars have referred to as China’s neo-imperialist ambitions on the continent. Again, when the UNSC resolved to pass a resolution that mandated sanctions against the Sudanese government and intervention by a UN force to end the Darfur crises, instead of voting “no” and vetoing such intervention which is germane to its non-interference policy, it rather abstained from voting (Saferworld (2011). China’s position only changed later on when it accepted the necessity of in-
ternational action by supporting UNSC Resolution 1769 which created the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The role of China in the Sudanese case for example, reinforced the perception that it supports partner regimes in order to protect its economic interests. Similarly, the Libya crises also had negative consequences on China's economic interests, causing Beijing to modify its policy of non-interference. That is, although Beijing expressed grave reservations over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign, it chose not to use its veto to block the intervention. Instead, it abstained when Resolution 1973 was passed to impose a no-fly zone and to authorize all measures necessary to protect civilians, though it supported UNSC to impose an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo against Gaddafi’s regime (Hughes, 2012). Clearly, China’s adoption of a flexible and pragmatic approach in its diplomatic stance on Libya was arguably to protect its economic interests in the country which was contrary to its principle of non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs.

Clearly, the role of China in Sudan and Libya, especially as discussed above, suggests that in reality non-interference does not mean that China sits back and watches or that non-interference equals indifference. Beijing has adopted a flexible approach in its implementation of the policy, usually allowing China to protect its interests wherever it is at stake on the continent. This however, raises important questions as to whether China’s long-standing dogma of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states is still relevant today. The effect of the policy is that it has allowed China to “stay silent” in times of crises in Africa or wait for other nations especially Western countries to interfere. This has in some cases obstructed urgent international action in crises situations on the continent. Other scholars have also criticized Beijing of reaping the benefits of peace and security underwritten by its co-members at UNSC because of its sometimes minimal involvement in the resolution of crises on the continent. Given China’s current status as a global power and its increasing investments on the continent, Beijing needs to redefine its non-interference policy and actively
participate in the resolution and management of African security issues. Currently, there are debates ongoing within China on this issue. One of such discussion has centred on academic Wang Yizhou’s notion of “creative involvement” as a replacement for “non-interference (Zhou, 2011).” The notion of “creative involvement” calls for China’s active participation in international Affairs instead of intervention by force. Thus, it calls for an adjustment of attitude and new diplomatic methods which should focus on the use of cautious, creative and constructive mediation when dealing with international issues (Zhou, 2011). Indeed, this notion is not in opposition to the Chinese principle of non-interference or traditional diplomatic principles, but rather an enrichment of these principles.

Some recommended future policy directions

There is no doubt that the policy of non-interference was a practical model when China’s economic interaction with Africa and the rest of the world was negligible. However, with regards to growing investments, political interests and power on the global stage, China needs to acknowledge the fact that its policy of non-interference does not fall in line with the realities and challenges of contemporary conflict and political instability on the African continent. In fact, it is antithetical to global norms of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Responsibility while Protecting (RWP) which holds not just states, but also the international community as being responsible for protecting citizens under eminent threat or danger from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UN General Assembly, 2005). Using its status as a global economic power in addition to its veto power in the UNSC, China needs to play a much greater role in the prevention, management and resolution of African security challenges to establish sustainable peace and stability on the continent. Otherwise, the consequences of conflicts and political instability for Chinese investments and interest in Africa could be extensive. Playing an active role in African security issues would invariably help change the perception that China is purely exploiting African countries and is Africa’s new colonial master rather than a development partner.
Rethinking China’s policy of non-interference should not follow the approach of the West which has received immense criticism from African countries and which has driven African states to China in the first place. Rather, the revision of non-interference should mean a balanced act of investment and conflict sensitivity by China and a more robust engagement of Africa beyond the economic sphere. To this end, African countries need to develop a common framework or collective strategy to guide their own dealings with China and insist that China supports the national, regional and continental institutions for peace and security which lacks funding and technical support. That is, African governments need to move from competition among themselves for Chinese investment and work together to identify critical areas of technical and financial difficulties where China can support. But most importantly, African countries need to bear in mind that they have the primary responsibility in strengthening their domestic as well as regional institutions of peace and security. Apart from supporting African peace and security, China should also make a concerted effort to ensure that its investments are not fuelling conflict and undermining peace and security in the continent.

**China and other external actors in Africa: toward a more co-operative approach**

Indisputably, the heightened engagement of China in Africa has important implications for other actors on the continent such as the US, European Union, Brazil, Japan, Canada, Australia and India. Generally, there have been long-standing suspicions among these actors, fostered in part by different philosophies and approaches towards governance and sometimes a clash of interests on the continent. For example, one problematic issue between China and the West is that of promoting good governance, transparency and human rights in connection with development aid (Thompson, 2005). Thus, while the West and their institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) link development aid to the promotion of political transparency and good governance in African coun-
tries, Chinese aid comes with no strings attached except the ‘One China’ principle and tying aid and loans to Chinese Companies and materials. For this reason, China, for instance, ignored Western sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe and continued to be one of the most important suppliers of military equipment to both countries. Moreover, some Western countries have also criticized China’s non-interference policy of allowing it to “stay silent” in times of crises in Africa, or wait until other nations interfere and later reaping the benefits of peace and security underwritten by its co-members at UNSC\textsuperscript{13}. In other words, China is unable to take a firm stance and reach resolutions on matters relating peace and security in Africa.

China and the West also differ in terms of the interpretation and application of UN peacekeeping normative principles such as the use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. China has concerns about robust peacekeeping interventions that go beyond UNSC mandates. That is, Beijing has persistently cautioned the West’s use of civilian protection mandates as a façade for other political agendas, such as regime change and pursuing other ulterior motives and agendas (Bellamy & Williams, 2005). This was particularly the case during the Libyan crises when China and other members of the UNSC became sceptical about the motives behind the use of force that was being advocated by some Western countries. China’s scepticism was premised on its long-established ‘five principle foreign policy’ which emphasizes non-interference and steering away from using force.

In spite of these differences in approach, China and other external actors, especially the US, frequently fail to distinguish areas where they can cooperate and work together for the mutual benefit of Africa. China and the US, for example, can ensure that African security issues take a higher priority in their relations. To this end, trilateral dialogues such as China-Africa-US forums can be initiated to allow for frequent exchanges of views and perspectives on security issues concerning Africa. Though this proposal is difficult to achieve, it can be explored. This cooperative effort can also be extended to other sectors such as economic and political relations. Collaboration between China and the US will help, for instance, to address differences in ap-
proaches to conflict prevention, management and resolutions in order to increase mutual understanding and gradually build consensus around key norms and international best practices. For example, in the protection of civilians, Chinese and US policy makers can compare different policy approaches and start to develop consensus around best international practices. Furthermore, while the assistance of the West explicitly seeks to improve governance and generate political reforms in post-conflict countries, China does not share the same liberal norms as it rather prefers economic development to post-conflict reconstruction\textsuperscript{14}. Building consensus around some of these diverse approaches can also serve as an entry point through which both China and the West can cooperate more extensively to promote peace and security in Africa. But it is important that Africa plays a more proactive role in shaping and directing any cooperation between China and the West, as well as setting the priorities for such cooperative efforts and initiatives\textsuperscript{15}. For instance, in areas of disagreement and tensions between China and the West, such as issues of governance, human rights, and environmental standards, Africa can facilitate debates and dialogue among them and create a greater African voice. This is imperative because African leadership on such contentious issues can help harness cooperation in a more constructive way to the ultimate benefit of the continent.

Endnotes

1. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) consist of states that were not formally aligned with neither the Western or Eastern bloc during the Cold War period. It was formed to ensure the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, domination, and interference.

2. This conference involved more than 80 ministers from China and 44 African
countries together with representatives from international organisation and business communities.


4. On this point, it would be recalled that the changes of post-Cold-War conflicts from inter-state to intra-state conflicts led to a paradigm shift in the way UN operation was conceptualized. As a result, in certain conflict situations like Liberia in the early 1990s, which highlighted the need for rapid, early and robust intervention, the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was evoked to forecast peace in the country. But China unlike its Western counterparts had strong views against such interventions as it placed strains upon China's core principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

5. China ranks 16th (with personnel of 1,870) out of 113 police and military contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations. See the UN DPKO (2012) ‘Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations’ Month of Report: 30 November 2012.


7. The APSA gives the AU the necessary instruments to achieve not only the objectives of its Constitutive Act, but also the tasks set out in the Protocol that establishes the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC). Some of these tasks as set out in the PSC Protocol include among other things: mechanisms for conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, promotion of democratic practices, humanitarian action and disaster management. See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), 2002.


11. See Iyasu, (2012), op. cit.;

12. See Iyasu, (2012), op. cit.;

13. See Iyasu, (2012), op. cit.;


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Dragon under the Blue Helmet: a quantitative analysis of China’s motivation for participation in UN peacekeeping operations

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Abstract

From a staunch opponent to a reluctant supporter and now an active participant, China has dramatically transformed its perceptions and behavior in UN peacekeeping during the past three decades. China’s shifting attitudes have attracted increasing academic attention. However, little quantitative study has been conducted to systematically explore China’s motivations and selection criteria for participation in UN peacekeeping. It is therefore difficult to make generalizable claims. This essay focuses on China’s participation from 1989 to 2010 and employs both logistic and linear regression models to examine the roles of China’s economic, territorial, reputational interests and security policy in China’s decision-making around peacekeeping. The statistical results show that the change in the PLA’s operational orientation positively influences China’s participation and China appears primarily to be a self-interested actor as to peacekeeping.

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Introduction

From not participating in the voting on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) to supporting the majority of resolutions on it; from not paying any peacekeeping related dues to being the 7th financial provider (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2012), China has dramatically shifted its attitudes on UNPKO in the past three decades. The UNPKO constitutes a new platform where the interaction between China and other international actors (the UN, host countries and other troop contributors) unfolds. In fact, China is currently the top troop contributor among the P-5 members.

China’s increasing contribution could not come in a more timely fashion. The post-Cold War period has witnessed a worldwide surge of UNPKO deployment, mainly due to the re-ignition of civil wars which the US-Soviet rivalry used to keep a lid on. Both peacekeeping and conflict are becoming more complex. Nevertheless, while the UN peacekeeping regime is facing unprecedented challenges in terms of material, human and financial resources, the West remains ambivalent and distant at a moment when UNPKO is in urgent need of support and largely embodies a Western interpretation of peace, that is to say – peace operations become more about contributing to the construction of democratic polities, liberal economies and societies (Bellamy & Williams, 2009: 44). This vacuum is gradually filled by the emerging countries, of which China is representative. In fact, UN Security-Generals Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon have both encouraged China to boost its contribution to peacekeeping (Ransom, 2008; UN Radio, 2004).

China’s about-face from its originally recalcitrant position vis-a-vis UNPKO has attracted increasing attention from academia. While research on China’s participation in UNPKO is growing, the bulk of literature concentrates itself methodologically on qualitative single-case studies, in which different, or sometimes conflicting arguments have been put forward to decrypt China’s motivation. Through either focusing on China’s role in one specific UNPKO (e.g. Hirono, 2011; Lanteigne, 2011) or mainly providing a historical overview of China’s changing attitudes (e.g. He,
2007; Wang & Zuo, 2010), comparative case studies are also very limited. These methodological limitations are especially noticeable in literature published in Chinese, most of which is non-theoretical and essentially policy-oriented (e.g. Guo, 2008; Wang & Zuo, 2010; Zhang 2004). Without the support of statistical evidence, a number of explanations advanced by analysts to elucidate China’s motivation could risk being drawn from the study of outlier cases; and therefore cannot be generalized. This paper aims at filling this methodological gap and unveiling Beijing’s selection criteria for participating in UNPKO by conducting a quantitative study on the research question: why China sends its peacekeepers to some UNPKOs instead of others?

Based on Wallensteen’s (2011) four models of major power politics – Kapitalpolitik, Geopolitik, Idealpolitik and Realpolitik, previous research on China’s motivation for participation can be classified into four different analytical angles. Research based on the Kapitalpolitik and Idealpolitik models respectively claims that China’s economic and reputational interests propel it to adopt a far more active stand on UN peacekeeping. Argument predicated on the Geopolitik model, on the other hand, asserts that China’s participation is likely to be constrained by its concern over the implications of being involved in peacekeeping in territorial conflict, because of China’s oft-challenged territorial claims over its own border areas and its unwillingness to set a precedent for international intervention in its own territory. Lastly, research based on the Realpolitik model takes an institution-based approach to concentrate on the role of the army in determining state participation in peacekeeping. It argues that a country is more likely to send peacekeepers - and probably a larger number - when its security policy is more externally-oriented.

Ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic regressions are used to test the hypotheses against samples that cover the UNPKOs between 1989 and 2010¹. The problem of influential data seems to plague the statistical test and makes it difficult to draw conclusive statements. Tentative solutions of removing influential
data have been advanced to obtain reliable statistical results. The most significant result is concerned with the effect of China’s security policy on its participation in peacekeeping. China was more likely to participate and send more peacekeepers after the introduction of an increasingly externally-oriented security policy introduced in 2005. The roles of economic and territorial interests are both pointed to by evidence from the statistical test, which suggests that China’s decision on peacekeeping appears to be guided by self-interest. Besides, the number of battle-related deaths seems to be the worst predictor. It exerts no influence on whether or not China participates and how much contribution it makes.

The structure of this paper is as follows: the next session briefly presents the development of four hypotheses on China’s motivation based on previous research. Following this is a short discussion of the research design which is then followed by the presentation of statistical results and the discussion of their implications. The paper concludes with a summary of the findings and some general policy implications that can be derived from the findings.

Development of hypotheses

This paper resorts to Wallensteen’s four models of major power politics as a reference framework to categorize previous research on China’s motivation for participation. Each model represents one area of interaction between major powers, from which change and potential conflict thereof may stem. Geopolitik and Realpolitik are rather self-explanatory – the former concerned with the politics of territory and the latter about the control of military power. Kapitalpolitik is devoted to the question of international trade and commerce, and Idealpolitik is related to the legitimacy of the state. Although these models were not initially formulated to analyze China’s UN peacekeeping, they largely reflect the different perspectives of the majority of previous research on China’s peacekeeping policy.

The majority of research in English on China’s motives for participation is essentially realist and economic-centric. Various authors (Hellström 2009; Hirono & Lan-
argue that China is in pursuit of economic interests through UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping is believed to help secure a favorable external environment for China’s sustainable economic development – more specifically, in promoting trade, such as the export of goods and import of raw materials, with host countries. This argument leads to the first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** The probability that China sends its peacekeepers (China’s contribution to UNPKO is higher/larger) if the trade volume between China and host countries is higher.

Beijing’s support to UNPKO is bound by its flexibility on sovereignty and intervention. China’s historical experience of being “semi-colonized” laid the foundation for China’s rigid interpretation of sovereignty and the establishment of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – including non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty – on which China’s foreign policy is still in principle predicated (Carlson, 2005; He, 2007; Hirono & Lanteigne, 2011; ICG, 2009; Taylor, 2008b: 136; Wu & Taylor, 2008). China’s oft-challenged territorial claims over the border areas obliges it to adhere to a traditional interpretation of sovereignty in case any compromise on the issue of sovereignty and intervention may backfire (Carlson 2005; Chen 2009: 158; Choedon, 2005: 54; Gill & Reilly, 2000; He, 2007, Wu & Taylor, 2011: 138). Many researchers (Carlson, 2005; Chen, 2009; Huang, 2011; Staehle, 2008) observe a softening of China’s attitudes towards intervention and a process of China’s gradual socialization into the UN peacekeeping regime in recent years; however, safeguarding territorial integrity still constitutes one of China’s core interests and priorities; China is concerned that its consent to intrusive missions would have implications for its own territorial interests. The second hypothesis is therefore drawn as follows:

**Hypothesis 2:** The probability that China sends its peacekeepers/China’s contribution to UNPKO is lower/smaller if a mission is established to keep peace in
With its political and economic role emerging on the global stage, China also draws increasing scrutiny, which makes it realize the importance of projecting a benign and positive image. This line of argument can also be considered interest-based, whereas it differs from the previous explanations in the way that it highlights China’s ideational gains instead of material ones. Extensive literature both in English (Carlson, 2004: 11; He, 2007: 48-50; Hellström, 2009: 35-39; ICG, 2009: 12-14; Pang, 2005: 96; Taylor, 2008: 152; Thompson, 2005; Wu & Taylor, 2011: 142; Zhao, 2011: 345) and in Chinese (Tang, 2002; Wang & Zuo, 2010: 49-50; Zhang, 2004: 49; Zhang, 2009: 27; Zhao, 2009: 66; Zhong & Wang, 2006: 36; Zhou & Zhang, 2007: 59) claim that China’s campaign in portraying itself as a responsible, cooperative and benign global power stimulates its recent enthusiasm on UNPKO. Ideally and arguably, contributing to peacekeeping in conflict that is more severe in terms of human suffering constitutes the best testimony to China’s determination of being a “responsible global power” and it may also assist in boosting China’s reputation on a larger scale. In addition, Chinese analysts, such as Zhang (2004: 47), criticize the West for turning a blind eye to conflict areas where peace is difficult to keep and where there is less strategic value but more risk. He highlights the humanitarian and idealist rationales behind China’s decision. It implies that China’s stance on peacekeeping is primarily guided by humanitarian concerns. Consequently, the third hypothesis is advanced.

Hypothesis 3: The probability that China sends its peacekeepers/China’s contribution to UNPKO is higher/larger if the conflict concerned is more severe in terms of human suffering.

All the aforementioned hypotheses are drawn from the analytical perspective that considers China as a unitary actor. Velázquez’s study (2010), disaggregating the unitary state into component institutions, concentrates on how the military and foreign policy circles influence a state’s decision on peacekeeping and concludes that a country with an externally-oriented army is more likely to send peacekeeping troops...
into the field. An externally-oriented army, instead of shouldering major responsibility in maintaining public order and carrying out enforcement functions in the domestic setting – as the army with prevailing national security doctrines does – is likely to appeal to UNPKO, because UNPKO is in accordance with its doctrinal principle. Additionally, it will be especially sympathetic to UNPKO when there is no major external threat, as peacekeeping operations offer opportunity to garner field operation experiences in the absence of war (Velázquez, 2010). It is observed that the PLA’s security doctrine has been evolving towards a more external orientation since the introduction of President Hu’s new concept of “new historic missions” at the end of 2004 (Gill & Huang, 2009: 15; Hirono & Lanteigne, 2011: 250; Mulvenon, 2009). Hu’s concept represents a natural outcome of, and response to, the challenges originating from China’s ever-deepening engagements and entanglements with the world. It also invests the PLA with a new broadened “operational orientation” that ranges “from defense of sea lines of communication for energy security to international peacekeeping operations” (Mulvenon, 2009: 9). The last hypothesis therefore is:

Hypothesis 4: The probability that China’s contribution is higher/larger after 2005 compared to previous years.

Research design

The hypotheses are tested against the UNPKO missions between 1989 and 2010, regardless of whether the mission started or terminated within that period. The time frame is selected because China joined the UN Special Peacekeeping Committee in 1988. In the following year, China sent twenty civilian observers to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia for the first time. The dependent variable is measured in three different ways and therefore different regression models are employed accordingly. The logistic regression model is used when China’s participation is measured by the dichotomous variable participation (parti) and the OLS regression model is employed when China’s participation is gauged by the continuous variable contribution (ctb). The
A dichotomous dependent variable *Parti* is coded as “1” indicating China’s participation, and “0” otherwise. Two continuous variables measuring China’s contribution annually are employed, respectively *Contribution in number (Ctb-num)* and *Contribution in percentage (Ctb-perc)*. Since the number of Chinese peacekeepers in a UNPKO varies month by month within one year, the peak month is selected for the variable *Ctb-num*. For the variable *Ctb-perc*, it is calculated by dividing the number of Chinese peacekeepers by the total UN peacekeepers from all the countries.

Four independent variables are created. The variable *Trade* in million US dollars is used to measure the trade relationship between China and host countries. In the logistic regression, the variable is measured as the average trade volume between China and host countries in the three-year periods prior to the beginning of UNPKO or China’s participation. In the linear regressions, the variable is measured as the annual trade volume between China and host countries one year preceding the annual observations for each UNPKO. The variable *Terricon* is coded “1” if the incompatibility of conflict is concerned with territorial issues and coded “0” otherwise. I rely on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011 (Gleditsch et al., 2002), which makes a distinction between “incompatibility concerning government” and “incompatibility concerning territory” to code this variable. The severity of a conflict is measured by the number of battle-related deaths. The variable *Bdeath* is measured as the aggregate battle-related death one year prior to the start of UNPKO or of China’s participation in the logistic regression; and it is measured as the aggregate battle-related death one year preceding the annual observations of each UNPKO in the linear regression. Two sources are relied on – the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset Version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005), and the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2011. The last independent variable is *Secupo*. President Hu assigned “new historic missions” to the PLA in the end of 2004. Hence, to measure the effect of the security doctrine, in the logistic regression, all the missions that had not ended by the end of 2004 or were initiated after December 31, 2004 are coded “1” and coded “0” otherwise. In the linear regressions, all the post-2005 annual observations of UNPKO are coded as “1” and “0” otherwise. To control any geographical differences,
four dummy variables for the following regions are included: Asia/Pacific, Europe/Former Soviet Union; Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Africa. The Western Hemisphere is the baseline category.

Empirics and analysis

Statistical results

(Table 1 on next page)

Findings for the hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 – Economic interests

The statistical results in Table 1 provide no evidence to the first hypothesis, but this is probably due to the problem of small sample size and influential data. With some influential data removed, there is stronger evidence supporting the hypothesis.

The Trade variable generates only one significant coefficient out of the four regressions. Even more surprisingly, contrary to the theoretical expectation, three regressions indicate a negative relationship between bilateral trade and China’s interests in UNPKO. One of the regressions from the linear regression with Ctb-perc as dependent variable is -5.078E-05, significant at the 90% level.

Careful investigation is needed to interpret this counter-theoretical finding, given that it contradicts the conclusions of previous statistical research (Lawson, 2011; Lin-Greenberg, 2009), in which economic interest is identified as a motivating factor for China. To begin with, the size of samples for the logistic regressions, in which n are around 50, is limited. This dearth of data may cause difficulty in producing significant coefficients. Meanwhile, theoretically, the transformation of China’s security policy into being more externally-oriented can be ascribed to the increasing interdependency between China’s economy and the external world; therefore, a correlation between the Trade and Secupo
Table 1. Determinants of China's participation in UNPKO, Logistic and linear regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Logistic Regression</th>
<th>Linear Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>part</td>
<td>part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original Sample</td>
<td>Adjusted Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.942)</td>
<td>(0.788)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory Conflict</td>
<td>-2.123</td>
<td>-1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.402)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>4.414***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.915)</td>
<td>(0.820)</td>
<td>(0.657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Policy</td>
<td>3.83***</td>
<td>2.632***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific</td>
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<td>2.047</td>
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<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
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<td>AP</td>
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<td>(0.865)</td>
<td>(0.793)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe/Former Soviet Union</td>
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<td>1.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2.128</td>
<td>1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3.128</td>
<td>1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.964*</td>
<td>-2.496**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.856)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% * (Sig values are in parentheses; coefficients that are significant at least at the 90% significance level are in bold)
variable may exist and potentially gives rise to multicollinearity and renders the Trade coefficient insignificant.

However, when the Secupo variable was dropped from all the regressions, the Trade coefficients did not gain significance and the co-linearity diagnostics showed acceptable Tolerance values, which ruled out the possibility of multi co-linearity\(^6\). Lastly, “*the method of least-squares is very sensitive to the structure of the data and can be markedly influenced by one or a few unusual observations*” (Fox, 2012). As the dependent variables Ctb-perc and Ctb-num both measure China’s contribution to UNPKO annually, peacekeeping operations that last for a long period are likely to have over-proportional influence upon the statistical model. A look at the partial regression plots of both linear models reveals problems of potential influential data\(^7\). In both equations, the culprits appear to be some observations drawn from the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). China has not participated in this mission and the annual observations of this mission from 2005 to 2010 are coded with an enormous amount of trade volume between China, India and Pakistan, which seems to bias the shape of slopes\(^8\). A tentative plan to drop these six observations generates the following results:

**Table 2.** Trade coefficients after removing the suspected influential data from UNMOGIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Linear Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>cht-perc</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>-1.4E-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% *
linear model with $Ctb$ as dependent variable, the *Trade* coefficient becomes positive, significant at the 99% level and points to the theoretically-expected direction. It means that when controlling for other variables, with a ten million US dollar increase of the trade volume between China and host countries, Beijing sends approximately 30 more peacekeepers. The *Trade* coefficient in the other regression still does not have the predicted sign, but loses significance.

The identification of influential data averts a premature conclusion, predicated on the statistical results in Table 1, that there might be signs of a negative relationship between trade volume and China’s participation. While the insignificant results from the logistic regressions possibly indicate that economic interests measured by trade volume is not likely to have influence on China’s willingness of participation, the significant coefficient obtained from the linear regression - when some influential data is removed - suggests that once China decides to participate in UNPKO, it is likely to send more peacekeepers to host countries where it maintains strong economic relationships.

**Hypothesis 2 – Normative concerns and territorial interests**

There is some evidence from the regression analysis supporting this hypothesis. The *Terricon* variable is the proper sign (negative) but does not pass the significance test in both logistic regressions. This result can be interpreted as follows: the incompatibility of conflict concerning territory is not likely to affect whether or not China participates in UNPKO. For the linear regression, the *Terricon* variable reveals some ambiguous results. With $Ctb$ as dependent variable, the *Terricon* coefficient is -43,933, significant at the 90% level. Pointing to a theoretically-expected direction, it implies that when controlling for other variables, China downsizes its peacekeeper contribution by around 44 persons if UNPKO operates in territorial conflict. However, the linear regression taking $Cbt$ as dependent variable results in a *Terricon* coefficient significant at the 99% level, pointing to the opposite direction. It is 0.012 indicating that the percentage of Chinese peacekeepers in territorial conflict is 1.2% higher than that in non-territorial conflict when controlling for other variables. This
outcome suggests that while China reduces the number of Chinese peacekeepers in a territorial conflict, the percentages that it occupies actually increase\(^9\).

A closer look at the data casts light on this seemingly contradictory result. For instance, from 2005 to 2009, the number of Chinese peacekeepers in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, a non-territorial conflict) ranged from 230 to 234 annually, representing only 1.27% to 1.64% of the total mission personnel, while during the same period, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, a territorial conflict) receives only 13 to 21 Chinese peacekeepers, occupying a much larger percentage – 5.7% to 9.1%. Moving from a non-territorial conflict (MONUC) to a territorial one (MINURSO), the \(Ctb\text{-}num\) observes a huge decrease of China’s troop contribution, whereas the \(Ctb\text{-}perc\) marks an augmentation. Evidently, the size of the peacekeeping mission and the contribution that other countries make - while exerting no influence on the \(Ctb\text{-}num\) variable - can greatly influence the value of \(Ctb\text{-}perc\). Consequently, while both measurements gauge China’s contribution, their coding values of the same case can lead to completely different conclusions regarding the relationship between territorial conflicts and China’s contribution. However, it is reasonable to take both values into account, as the seemingly contradictory results may signify the necessity to put into perspective China’s concern over getting involved in peacekeeping in territorial disputes. While China sends less peacekeepers to territorial conflicts, other countries seem to also follow the same pattern - possibly downsizing their contributions on an even larger scale than China, thus making China’s contribution increase in terms of percentage. This interpretation is more understandable, when considering most of the current troop contributors are developing countries - which are generally supporters of the Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty and may find sending troops to intervene in other country’s territorial conflict against their normative understanding of sovereignty.
Overall, it can be argued that, considering its troop contribution to territorial conflicts is significantly less, China is afraid that its decision to intervene in territorial conflicts may boomerang and compromise its own territorial interests. However, this concern is unlikely to fully encumber its latitude to act as to peacekeeping. Probably due to its increasing confidence that comes along with its growing national capabilities, China is willing to put its concern on the back burner to pursue other more important goals.

**Hypothesis 3 – Responsible global power**

The problem of influential data makes the minimal supportive evidence found in Table 1 inconclusive and there is no proof in favor of this hypothesis after a tentative plan to remove the influential data.

While the $B_{death}$ coefficients all point in the expected direction, only one gains significance. The statistical test using $Parti$ as dependent variable does not produce a single significant $B_{death}$ coefficient. This lack of significance has to be interpreted with caution due to the small sample size; however, such a result seems to indicate that the severity of a conflict measured by battle-related deaths exerts no impact on the probability of China’s participation in UNPKO. The $B_{death}$ coefficient for the linear regression with $Ctb-num$ as dependent variable is $0.293$, significant at the 95% level, denoting that controlling for other variables, when there is an increase of 10,000 battle-related deaths, China sends about three more peacekeepers. A look at the partial-regression plot and the scatter-plot of standardized DFbeta of this coefficient reveals that influential data may exist. Three observations could have overproportional effects on the $B_{death}$ coefficient in this $Ctb-num$ regression: the observation of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and two observations of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). As shown in Table 3, it remains positive ($0.111$), but becomes insignificant when these three observations are dropped.
Table 3. Bdeath coefficients after removing the suspected influential data from UNTAC and UNIIMOG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Linear Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle-RelatedDeaths</td>
<td>( b_{\text{death}} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( B_{\text{death}} )</td>
<td>(-2.160E-5) ((0.322)) (0.111) ((0.520))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>280 (0.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: 99%***; 95% **; 90% *

Meanwhile, Table 1 displays that when China’s participation is measured in percentage, there is no significant result. The influence of unusual data is again detected and the culprit appears to be one observation (Year 1992) of the UNTAC, which greatly magnifies the size of effect of \( B_{\text{death}} \) on \( Ctm-\text{perc} \). Table 3 illustrates that the \( B_{\text{death}} \) coefficient in this regression becomes negative, but still insignificant when this observation is omitted. Overall, the statistical results relating to the \( B_{\text{death}} \) variable in the original sample are likely to be biased by influential data. A tentative solution to remove the unusual observations in both linear regressions does not generate any significant \( B_{\text{death}} \) coefficient. Hence, hypothesis 3 does not appear to garner empirical support.

However, it is difficult to fully refute China’s claim of being a “responsible great power” only based on the lack of significance found here regarding the hypothesis 3. Previous research (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004 & 2008) shows that the UN tends to intervene in more “difficult” cases. Following this line of argument, as long as China does not veto a UNPKO, all the established UNPKOs can be consid-
ered as a piece of evidence supporting China’s claim, because it is true by definition that any decision to initiate UNPKO entails China’s support with its P-5 membership. However, troop commitment is different from political commitment; and constitutes a more persuasive signal of being a responsible power. Hence, the non-significant result relating to hypothesis 3 may be more appropriately interpreted as follows: Beijing may think that its claim of being a “responsible global power” has already been convincingly evidenced by its political commitment. When it comes to dispatching troops and getting involved on the ground level – a sign of deeper commitment to its claim, China - probably like other countries - becomes more cautious. A high level of battle-related deaths could be an indication that the peacekeeping on the field involves a high degree of risk and complexity. The desire to be seen as a “responsible great power” alone does not guarantee China’s willingness to take risk and send troops to conflicts with high level of battle-related deaths.

Hypothesis 4 – Security policy

This hypothesis finds strong statistical evidence from the regression analysis. The Secupo variable is the only one that gains significance across all the regressions. The logistic regressions produce coefficients 3.83 and 2.632 from the original and adjusted sample. Both are significant at the 99% level, implying that China’s willingness of participation has considerably augmented since 2005. The Securpo coefficient in the linear regression taking Ctb-num as dependent variable is 114,134, significant at the 99% level, suggesting that when controlling for other variables, a mission receives approximately 114 more Chinese peacekeepers in the post-2005 period than before. Similar results are obtained from the linear model measuring China’s contribution as a function of the percentage of Chinese peacekeepers. The coefficient 0.006 passes the significant test at the 95% level10.

The consistent statistical finding related to the Secupo variable is the strongest result in this study and indicates that since the PLA’s operational orientation became no longer confined to internal security and evolved to be more externally-focused, China is more disposed to participate in UNPKO and makes more substantial troop con-
tributions. However, contrary to the causal direction proposed by hypothesis 4, it is also reasonable to argue that the dependent variable - China’s participation in UNPKO - could be part of the reason why China’s security policy becomes increasingly externally-oriented in the first place. It is worth mentioning here Mulvenon’s study (2009: 2), in which he asserts in a general manner that the change in the PLA’s security policy is compelled by “China’s increasingly global interests and entanglements.” However, it remains unspecified what the “global interests and entanglements” exactly refer to. In this case, the best remedy would be to conduct a more detailed process-tracing case study on the factors conducive to the transformation in the PLA’s operational orientation. If the transformation is mainly due to, for instance, China’s globalized economic interests then the causal effect of security policy on China’s participation in UNPKO can be better evidenced by the statistical finding. Hence, further research is necessitated in order to make fully conclusive statement.

Control variable analysis – Geographical differences

The control variables shed some extra light on the pattern of Chinese UN peacekeeping, with some evidence of regional bias in favor of Africa. In the logistic regressions, the constant coefficients are significantly negative, indicating China is less likely to participate in missions to the Western Hemisphere. In fact, China has only participated in the mission to Haiti out of eight missions in this region. However, the significant result may not be reliable due to the small sample size. The coefficients on the European and Former Soviet Union dummy (-0.016) and the Africa dummy (0.012) are also significant, when Ctb-perc is the dependent variable. The percentage of Chinese peacekeepers is significantly lower in missions to the European and Former Soviet Union countries. Until 2010, China has only participated in two missions to this region, sending 15 peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and 20 peacekeepers to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). These contributions are very small, giv-
en that UNMIBH usually consists of 2000 peacekeepers and UNMIK comprises 1500\textsuperscript{11}. The results, however, need to be treated with caution, because the tolerance value of the *Eusu* variable does not pass the threshold of 2. This is possibly due to a bivariate correlation between the *Eusu* and *Terricon* variables, since the majority of cases coded as *Eusu* is also coded as territorial conflict. Therefore, no conclusive statement can be drawn. However, all these preliminary results may indicate that China exhibits more circumspection on its decision to dispatch troops if the target country is primarily in the lap of other major powers. The opposite trend is detected with respect to missions in Africa, in which China shows propensity for comprising a larger proportion of the UN troops. And if one does not apply a strict rule of thumb, the statistical result on the *Africa* coefficient appears to be reliable, with a tolerance value 0.208\textsuperscript{12}. This finding confirms some researchers’ claim (Butts & Bankus, 2009; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008; Wu & Talyor, 2011) that China accords particular attention to peacekeeping in Africa.

**An African sample**

On the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation, Chinese leaders promise that China would continue to take an active part in UNPKO to promote peace and conflict resolution on the continent. Luck (cited in Lynch, 2006) goes further to suggest that Africa is a "bellwether" for Chinese attitudes on intervention. Therefore, China may arguably have a more coherent, focused and proactive peacekeeping policy towards Africa; missions to Africa constitute a good sub-sample for gauging to what extent China’s policy on peacekeeping can be *active and progressive*\textsuperscript{13}. Statistical results from the multivariate linear regressions against the African sample are displayed in Table 6. At large, the previous comments on the four hypotheses are still germane when it comes more specifically to China’s peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

The results from this sub-sample corroborates that the problem of influential data arises as to the *Trade* variable in the original sample and that China is more likely to send more peacekeepers to African countries with which it has more substantial trade relationship. In this sub-sample, the *Trade* coefficients are significant in both regres-
### Table 4. Results of the African sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th></th>
<th>Linear Regression</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cbt-perc</td>
<td>cbt-numb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Mission</td>
<td>African Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>8.402***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade</strong></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Conflict</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
<td>-21.705</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terricon</strong></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.641)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-1.33, animated</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Death</strong></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.498)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Policy</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>122,123***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secure</strong></td>
<td>(0.537)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Status</td>
<td>-0.063***</td>
<td>-74.345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary Intervention</td>
<td>-0.056**</td>
<td>-193,156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interme</strong></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
<td>17.811</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.490)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significance levels:** 99%***; 95% **; 90% *
sions, which confirms, to certain degree, some researchers’ (Butts & Bankus, 2009; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008; Wu & Talyor, 2011) mercantilist interpretation that China’s peacekeeping engagement in Africa is mainly driven by its economic interests.

Secondly, when the sample is restricted to the African missions, conflicts that are more severe in terms of battle-related death do not appear to receive more or less Chinese peacekeepers, if anything, there is evidence indicating that the proportion of Chinese peacekeeper seems to be in decline in severe conflicts. This finding is generally in line with the previous statement pertaining to hypothesis 3 that Beijing acts prudently when it comes to troop contribution. Dispatching troops to more deadly conflicts does not seem to be the most cost-effective way for China to demonstrate their commitment to being a responsible power.

Additionally, the most interesting statistical finding is concerned with the Terricon variable and reflects how proactive China can be as to peacekeeping. The coefficient is in the right sign (negative) when China’s contribution is measured in number, but does not pass the significance test for the first time in this study. However it remains positive and significant in the linear regression with Ctb-perc as dependent variable. The number of Chinese peacekeepers in African missions is not influenced by the incompatibility of conflict concerning territory; there is even evidence that the percentage of Chinese peacekeepers would increase if missions operated in territorial conflicts. Taking the significant results on the Trade variable into account, it may be claimed that regarding China’s decision-making on peacekeeping in Africa, economic rationale overrides China’s concern over its involvement in the conflict resolution of territorial dispute. This finding illuminates that under certain circumstances – for instance, in pursuit of economic interests – China may deviate from being an obstinate defender of the traditional interpretation of sovereignty.

Lastly, the Secupo variable shows similar results to those in Table 4 and suggests that China’s emerging role in Africa should also be put into perspective. The statistical finding indicates that during the post-2005 period, the number of Chinese peace-
keepers in missions to Africa has grown considerably; but the proportion of peacekeepers that China takes in these missions remains basically unchanged throughout the years. Since the size of UN missions in Africa appears to have expanded in recent years, the increasing number of Chinese peacekeepers that African countries host during the post-2005 period does not necessarily imply that the growth of China’s troop contribution on the continent is out of proportion. Quite the contrary, the share of Chinese peacekeepers in missions to Africa has remained stable. By and large, the rising distribution of Chinese peacekeepers to Africa follows the broader pattern in which the UN sends the bulk of its personnel. that is to say, as the UN accords increasing importance to the conflict resolution efforts in Africa and enlarges the size of missions, troop contributors including China thereupon boost their troop contribution. Hence, China probably does not act more responsibly than other countries; but it does not drag behind either. Regarding the Status and Interme variables, they gain significance when China’s contribution is measured in percentage. However, the limited number of observations for these two variables precludes the possibility of drawing substantial inference.15

Conclusion

While increasing its troop contribution, China remains selective in terms of which missions it sends peacekeepers. Previous research indicates that China’s economic, territorial, reputational and security policy interests could exert influence on China’s decision to send troops. This study draws hypotheses from these theoretical arguments and runs a mix of OLS and logistics regressions against samples composed of UNPKOs (1989-2010) to explore China’s motivation for participation in UN peacekeeping.

The strongest result is that the shift in China’s security policy towards the externally-oriented end has a significant and positive impact on China’s willingness to participate in missions and contribute troops. There is also some evidence indicating that host countries which maintain higher trade volumes with
China tend to receive a larger number of Chinese peacekeepers. China’s territorial interest and normative concern over intervention are found to reduce its contribution, with Chinese peacekeepers featuring significantly less in territorial conflicts. However, other troop contributors probably share the same kind of concern. Finally, the answer to the question of whether participating in UNPKO shows that China is a responsible power may not be as simple as it appears to be. It depends on whether one talks about China’s political or troop commitment to UNPKO; and it also depends on how much troop contribution that the international community expects from China. Regarding the troop commitment, China is no more likely to display stronger willingness to participate or contribute more peacekeepers in deadly conflict. However, there is also evidence indicating that the surge of Chinese peacekeepers in recent years by and large follows the expansion in the size of UNPKO. The exponential growth both in the number and size of peacekeeping missions places the UN under huge stress. Hence the increasing number of Chinese peacekeepers on the ground could also be seen as a sign of China’s commitment to being a responsible player.

China’s peacekeeping behavior constitutes a micro-cosmos to observe the increasing complexity of China’s diplomatic and policy maneuvers in its path from being a third-world developing country to a major power. The finding in this thesis generally shows that as to peacekeeping participation, China is primarily a self-interested, rational actor who is undertaking a deliberate cost-benefit analysis and strives to strike a delicate balance between competing interests – each of which potentially requires different policy responses. Rather than being static, China’s interpretation on sovereignty is also maneuverable. Its flexibility on sovereignty and intervention is primarily bound by the security situation in China’s border areas and whether other national imperatives come into play, such as pursuing economic development. This is markedly illustrated by China’s peacekeeping policy in Africa, as economic rational tends to outweigh China’s normative concern and territorial interests. Hence, in practice, rather than being bridled by some rigid principles, China’s decision on peacekeeping is primarily made on a case-by-case basis. Based on the result from this study, it can
also be predicted that as long as China’s security policy remains (or becomes more) externally-oriented - which implies that there is no major internal security threat, for instance, in its border areas - and China’s economic interdependency with the world continues to deepen, China’s contribution of peacekeepers is likely to be remain stable and probably rise in the foreseeable future. In general, this is a piece of good news that the shorthanded UN and DPKO are delighted to hear, whilst possibly making no substantial difference to host countries that are not on the African continent and/or without substantial economic relationship with China. Over a longer period of time, it remains to be seen whether China will follow other western powers’ path to shift its troop contribution to “hybrid” or non-UN peace operations.

Endnotes

1. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is used to predict values of a continuous dependent variable using one or more explanatory variables and gauge the strength of the relationship between these variables. Logistic regression in general is used to predict a dichotomous/binary outcome.

2. In some UNPKOs, China participated in a later stage rather than from the very beginning of a mission. In order to capture such a dynamic, this article follows Lawson’s research design (2011: 27). He considers those UNPKOs to which China did not send its peacekeepers until at least one year after the beginning of the operation as separate cases (UNIBH, MONUC, UNFIL, UNMIK). For instance, the UNMIK in Kosovo operated from 1999 till present. But China did not send its peacekeepers to Kosovo until 2004 and withdrew its participation again in 2009. Therefore, the 1999-2003 and 2009-2010 periods are both coded as “0” because of China’s non-participation, while the 2004-2008 period is coded as “1”. In order to avoid statistical biases that are likely to be provoked by this dou-
ble or triple counting of a UNPKO, the logistic regression is run against a sample that does not treat the above-mentioned missions as separate cases.

3. Data related to all these three independent variables are collected from the *Archive of Troop and Police Contributors*.

4. All the monetary values are converted to constant US dollars (in 2003 dollars). Data on bilateral trade is primarily collected from the *China Statistical Yearbook (1986-2011)*. For a very limited number of cases, data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) *Direction of Trades statistics database* is also used.

5. I also tried to convert this variable into a 0-100 scale; however, the statistical results remained unchanged.

6. As a rule of thumb, when the tolerance value is smaller than 0.2/0.3, one should be concerned with multi co-linearity. multi co-linearity does not appear to exist in all the regressions with respect to all the independent variables.

7. This study mainly relies on the partial regression plot and scatterplot of standardized DFBeta to detect influential data. A partial regression plot shows the marginal role of a variable in the model, given that all the other independent variables are already in the model. DFBeta is a t-test for the difference of the b-coefficient with and without a certain observation.

8. The trade volume of these observations (2005-2010) stands outside around three standard deviations (51.8) from the mean value (12.2) of the *Trade* variable.

9. According to the partial regression plot and scatterplot of standardized DFBeta of the coefficient *Terricon* in both linear regressions, the problem of influential data appears to be minor.

10. According to the partial regression plot and scatterplot of standardized DFBeta of the coefficient *Secupo* in both linear regressions, the problem of influential
data appears to be minor.

11. In 2011, another mission to Europe, UNFICYP (Cyprus), received, for the first time, 2 Chinese peacekeepers. However, this data is located outside the time-frame of this thesis.

12. A less strict rule of thumb: one does not need to be concerned when the tolerance value is bigger than 2.

13. This sub-sample is only used to run the linear regressions because the sample size for the logistic regressions is too limited to establish a sub-sample.

14. As previously discussed, the problem of influential data often generates non-significant results or significant results in signs that are contrary to theoretical expectations in this study. In fact, influential data may hint at the necessity of model re-specification (Fox: 2012). Influential data from UNMOGIP shows that international-level factors, such as the power status of the target state, are helpful in construing China’s troop contribution. It is highly improbable that the gigantic bilateral trade would impel China to send peacekeepers to India, because India is a major regional - increasingly global - power. Meanwhile, some observations from UNTAC are considered as influential data. A preliminary study of the peace process in Cambodia shows that China is probably more likely to commit troops to solve conflict if it has previously intervened as intermediary. Therefore, two new variables Power Status (Status) and Intermediary Intervention (Interme) are included to run robustness checks. The results of robustness checks show that the previous statements pertaining to the four hypotheses still hold. These two variables are also included in regression analysis against the African sample.

15. Based on the list of major power coded by Mullenbach (2005: 542) to scruti-
nize the effect of the power status of target state on the establishment of third-party peacekeeping mission, only three observations can be coded as involving major power in the sample of this study. These are respectively, UNMEE, UNMOGIP and UNIIMOG. Meanwhile, Cambodia and Sudan appear to be the only two cases in which China played a role as intermediary.

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Peace through prevention: practical steps for deepening China-Africa security co-operation

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Conflict and Security Advisor
Saferworld

Abstract

Highlighted at the last Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) as one of five key areas for deepening co-operation, African peace and security has moved up the Sino-Africa agenda. This has been in parallel to, and as a consequence of, the maturing of relations. African actors - most notably states and regional organisations - will have considerable influence over defining the future shape and direction of Chinese engagement on this agenda. Nonetheless, Chinese policy-makers still have important choices to make. While examining why matters of African peace and security are of increasing importance to them, this paper also identifies some of the existing obstacles to deepening engagement. Arguing that an approach rooted in the principles of conflict prevention could prove both practical and effective, the paper identifies three policy areas that merit consideration by Beijing. First, it explores the diplomatic measures China could take to help mediate disputes and crises, as well as why a broadening of diplomatic relations within African countries may be required.

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ond, the paper draws attention to the need for China to support African efforts to tackle the proliferation of small arms whilst critically examining the end-use of Chinese-made weapons. Third, China’s economic co-operation with post-conflict African countries is identified as a means to prevent relapses into violence if it the principles of conflict sensitivity are adopted in what are especially fragile and difficult environments.

Introduction

The underlying foundations of contemporary China-Africa relations – economic co-operation – continue to deepen with trade and investment figures growing by the year\(^1\). Nonetheless, the nature of China’s relationship with African states has evolved. Though the fantasy of Chinese manufacturing jobs moving en-masse to Africa’s shores remains just that, there are signs of a slow diversification beyond the traditional sectors of commercial interaction. Chinese official development aid is potentially evolving into new modalities (Saferworld, 2012) while aid directly from Chinese NGOs will likely become more visible on the continent\(^2\). Relations are expanding elsewhere, with a concerted effort by Chinese and, to a lesser extent, African actors, to engage on issues such as media, academic exchange and the environment. As is inevitable in any relationship, the political honeymoon looks set to end: African civil society and opposition leaders have vocally scrutinised some practices of Chinese engagement, the nuts and bolts of day-to-day relations have generated conflicts of interest and the belief that China’s approach would fundamentally differ from that of others has been checked by reality. While perhaps not welcomed by those Chinese and African diplomats who are forced to revise their rosy rhetoric of the past, these problems are a healthy part of maturing relations and progressive change.

Another healthy sign is the increasing attention that Chinese officials, companies and researchers are paying to the reality of conflict and insecurity in Africa, how it
relates to Chinese interests and how they should respond. Once considered a potentially sensitive issue that Chinese policy-makers and company executives would rather steer clear of, the issue has risen up the agenda and is now more openly discussed and debated in Beijing. As is the case across all dimensions of the relationship, African actors - most notably states and regional organisations - will have considerable influence over defining the future shape and direction of Chinese engagement on issues of peace and security. Nonetheless, as important agents themselves, Chinese decision-makers still have important choices to make. Examining the issue through the lens of conflict prevention may help the Chinese to effectively do so, while getting around some the current obstacles and forging deeper engagement.

This article examines several options for Chinese policy in this regard. It reflects the outcomes of Saferworld's own field research, alongside numerous consultations and engagement with a wide range of African and Chinese officials, NGOs, academics and think-tanks over the past four years. First, it explores some of the reasons why African peace and security has moved up the Chinese foreign policy agenda. Second, it outlines some of the obstacles to deepened Chinese engagement on this issue. The article then explores three policy areas where deeper China-Africa co-operation would be both practical and effective in preventing conflict: diplomacy, arms control and conflict-sensitive economic co-operation.

**China and African insecurity**

Over past two decades Africa has become a more peaceful continent (Africa Progress Panel, 2012: 64-66). Nevertheless, continued instability in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali and elsewhere demonstrate that conflict and insecurity continue to act as obstacles to socio-economic development. As is widely recognised in China, stability is required for development. It has been estimated that by 2025 “the locus of global poverty will overwhelmingly be in fragile, mainly low-income and African, states” (Kharas & Rogerson, 2012: 3). The World Bank considers 17 countries in Africa to be fragile. It estimates that “civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years
of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty” (World Bank, 2011). It has also been noted that low-income, fragile, or conflict-affected countries have been those that have struggled the most to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Globally, countries affected by serious violence account for 60 per cent of the world’s undernourished, 71 per cent of child deaths under the age of 5 and 77 per cent of children not in primary school (World Bank, 2011). In his speech to the United Nations (UN) on the MDGs in 2010, then-Premier Wen Jiabao argued that “if a country does not have durable peace and stability, its people can hardly live and work in happiness and contentment”\(^3\). Individuals, families, and communities in these countries suffer twice: first from the direct impact of violence; second from the longer-term consequences that act as barriers to the relative prosperity enjoyed by the rest of the world.

During his tour of Africa in March 2013, President Xi Jinping followed past Chinese leaders in promising that China would be a partner for Africa, stating that “China will continue to uphold the principle of peace, development, co-operation and mutual benefit, and dedicate itself unswervingly to safeguarding world peace and promoting common development” (‘China will be Africa’s all-weather friend and partner’ – Chinese President, 2013). For a global power with such ambitious aspirations, insecurity in Africa should, at least in principle, be of great concern to Beijing.

Of course, there are other pressing reasons why instability in African countries may worry leaders in the Zhongnanhai headquarters of China’s Communist Party and State Council. The safety of Chinese citizens remains a pressing issue. Over 30,000 Chinese civilians working in Libya had to be evacuated by land and sea when violence broke out in 2011, a vast and challenging logistical operation for the Chinese Government (Virtually all 30,000 Chinese in Libya evacuated China, 2011). Elsewhere in Africa Chinese citizens have been caught up in violence, being kidnapped by pirates off the coast of Somalia and targeted by rebels in Ethio-
pia. In fact, senior officials frequently voice their concern that insecurity in Africa may suddenly force China’s hand and draw it into a crisis it is unprepared to manage. For example, being publicly pressured into deploying military forces to rescue trapped Chinese citizens is understood as an extremely disturbing scenario to be avoided at all costs⁴.

Risks to large investments are also a concern. When the conflict broke out in Libya, 75 Chinese companies were involved in contracts worth $18.8 billion, representing in 2009 some 4.6% of China’s total global project turnover (Chan, 2011). In Sudan and South Sudan, conflict has led to substantial loss in revenues for Chinese companies involved in the oil sector. While starting to adopt more sophisticated risk-management tools themselves, private Chinese businessmen, large company executives and heads of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) all expect the Chinese government to help protect their interests.

Furthermore, China’s reputation and image are at stake. Conflict-affected countries often exist within extremely polarised contexts. Chinese actors may be perceived to be supporting one side over the other in a conflict, for example, when closely working on economic projects with the host government. A negative image in the eyes of local communities, civil society, and political leaders may have long-term costs, especially as political dynamics inevitably change. Globally, it is partially due to China’s engagement in conflict-affected states that have led to accusations of Beijing’s support for ‘pariah regimes’ and complicity in human rights violations. It was Darfur and the crude ‘genocide Olympics’ slogan that threatened to smear China’s coming out party in 2008.

Cooler heads, who recognise that these are overly-simplistic and one-dimensional accusations, still maintain that China’s rising power must contribute to the global public good, including Africa’s security. Likewise, Chinese scholars, researchers and increasingly informed students have joined the chorus of pressing the Chinese government to ‘do more’ as a power. Added to this are calls from African capitals themselves for China to provide more in the form of financial and technical support which
can match its perceivedly deep pockets. Meanwhile, in multilateral forums, diplomats from established powers increasingly expect Chinese delegations to make informed contributions while their embassies in Beijing continue to push for cooperative partnerships with China. All of these pressures on Chinese policy-makers have had an impact. The question today is no longer *if*, but *how* China should engage on peace and security in Africa.

**Three steps**

It is clear that outside actors cannot solve Africa’s security problems. As the last Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) Action Plan states, the “Chinese Government appreciates the concept and practice of ‘Solving African Problems by Africans’”\(^5\). However, in today’s globalised world, insecurity is not only the problem of Africans, and neither are the solutions. Outside actors can have both a positive and negative impact on peace and security, directly and indirectly, intentionally and not. China – which has so dramatically deepened its relationship with Africa – is one such actor.

Attending his last FOCAC meeting in 2012, Chinese leader Hu Jintao called for a deepening of the China-Africa relationship in five key areas, one of which directly addresses insecurity issues. He emphasised the need to “promote peace and stability in Africa and create a secure environment for Africa’s development” (President Hu propose measures in five areas to boost China-Africa ties, 2012). This clearly reflected the growing priority of the issue. In the FOCAC’s Beijing Action Plan (2013–15), there exist clear commitments for co-operation in several broad areas. China will seek to continue its participation in UN peacekeeping missions on the continent, deploy more defence attaches to its embassies and strengthen security relations with those states considered regional and sub-regional powers\(^6\). Notable is the FOCAC agreement to create the ‘Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security’. The Chinese Government and African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council are soon to formalise agreement on this agenda. This will likely facilitate the donation of greater resources to the AU
peace and security architecture, training for AU peacekeepers and African standby forces, and closer coordination in multilateral forums. While the agenda seems promising, the details on such initiatives are scarce and, when compared with other FOCAC commitments, do not appear to have yet resulted in many tangible outcomes.

Indeed, the future direction of China-Africa security co-operation remains somewhat undefined. Beijing is navigating a cautious approach to engagement on African security issues. Perhaps most pressingly, its wider foreign policy establishment remains reluctant to be seen as setting a precedent for creeping interference in what are still seen to be highly sensitive political affairs of other sovereign states. Nonetheless, this could change. Although it will unlikely announce any radical departures from traditional foreign policy principles, the new leadership may in practice allow for the testing - especially in Africa - of a more flexible interpretation of non-interference that will give it greater manoeuvre to protect national interests such as the safety of Chinese citizens or the preservation of partner regimes. At the same time, domestic stability remains the overriding priority for Beijing in the face of a slowing economy, popular political upheavals overseas and perceived containment by the United States. As such, it is equally likely that the new leadership will strongly push back against any further dilution of international norms related to the primacy of state sovereignty, even going as far as to take the lead and build coalitions of developing country solidarity on this issue. Deepening interests to protect in Africa are no guarantee of a softening on non-interference.

Furthermore, serving officials perceive themselves to lack the required experience of engaging on security issues in Africa in order to make informed interventions. They also lack the necessary capacities or even institutional mandates, budgets and structures to do so. Officials are often unclear of where these issues sit between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and other bodies. Information and analysis is another weakness. As the wider policy community in China is well aware, its knowledge and expertise on African security remains rela-
tively thin despite notable advances in the past few years.

Other obstacles to engagement exist: Beijing is intent on managing African expectations of China, especially financially. While policy-banks have established means for financing huge infrastructure projects requested by African governments, the MFA has struggled to convince the rest of the government to quickly allocate finances for African security issues. For example, at a 2013 Mali donor conference, Japan pledged $120 million, the US $96m and Germany $20m. China only managed to mobilise $1m, the same as Sierra Leone (Mali conflict: Donor conference raises $445 million, 2013).

Two further issues make Beijing cautious. As with any other external actor, it is worried about being drawn into intractable conflicts, far away from China, which distract attention from far more pressing domestic priorities. Senior decision-makers simply do not want to have to worry about these issues. Second, they are cautious of alarming other powers with a far more established security footprint in Africa. While often urging China to ‘do more’, Chinese officials calculate that any deepening engagement, especially involving the military, might be perceived as threatening or masking geopolitical intentions. That it has taken such great care even in quietly announcing the inclusion of combat troops as part of its contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali – a first for China – illustrates this well.

While these obstacles are by no means insurmountable – where there is a will there is a way – officials in Beijing face a number of challenges to deepening China’s engagement on African peace and security issues. There are no simple answers to such a large and complex issue, but approaching it through the lens of conflict prevention might help to identify tangible and acceptable measures that China can adopt. Conflict prevention can mean taking actions to prevent disputes from escalating violently, containing and preventing existing violent conflict from spreading, or even preventing relapses into violence in post-conflict environments. Strategies can both be direct and short-term (for example during a crisis), structur-
al and long-term (for example addressing the root causes of future conflict) or systematic (for example addressing international drivers of conflict).\textsuperscript{8} There are three specific areas – which are already made reference to in the Beijing Action Plan – where China-Africa co-operation could be deepened to help prevent conflict without resorting to militarised approaches or political interference. First is the area of diplomacy; second is the problem of small arms proliferation; third is the issue of post-conflict reconstruction. There are several tangible and practical steps that can be taken in each of these three areas.

**Diplomacy**

Firstly, greater focus on what diplomatic measures China can take to de-escalate crises and prevent conflict is required. The on-going dispute between Sudan and South Sudan has shown that China not only has great influence over the conflicting parties but that it is able to actively use this leverage to promote peace. Through sending Special Envoys, engaging with Juba and Khartoum’s leaders at frequent intervals and in various forums, and accepting a lead role in the UN Security Council (UNSC), the Chinese Government has tried to meet the expectations made of it. As Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special Representative on African Affairs, notes, the “diplomatic efforts made by China in solving the Sudan – South Sudan issue have been productive, not only easing the regional tension and promoting the two sides’ reaching an agreement in oil revenues sharing, but also consolidating China’s relations with both countries”\textsuperscript{9}(Zhong, 2012). It should be noted that every time China takes bold diplomatic action – whether over the case of peacekeepers to Darfur, the peaceful referendum, or the South’s invasion of the contested Heglig/Panthou border area – there is a positive result on the ground in Sudan and South Sudan.

Nonetheless, Beijing’s existing interpretation of the policy of non-interference has meant that in crises elsewhere on the continent China has often, though not always, stayed silent or only reacted at the last moment. Beijing’s voice carries great weight in today’s African capitals. Its potential diplomatic role in preventing conflict re-
mains grossly underutilised. The Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security presents an opportunity for exploring how China can lend the weight of its influence in support of the AU and other African actors who are trying to deal with crises but often lack the necessary leverage over conflict parties. Agreement on a formal framework for such diplomatic activism in the future means that traditional concerns about interference can be put aside and subsumed by a discourse on constructive intervention. Such a framework could also identify ways for African actors to take the lead to guide and inform Beijing’s interventions, addressing Chinese fears about legitimacy and knowledge gaps. Furthermore, identifying longer-term conflict prevention strategies could lead to benefits that far supersede those of short-term, reactionary, and ad-hoc responses. For example, this could include Beijing starting to build the necessary capacity and confidence to be a neutral host, or facilitator, of negotiations and dialogue between conflicting parties.

Another challenge for China’s non-interference policy is that, if it is to protect Chinese interests in the long-term, it may be necessary to broaden diplomatic relations within African countries. China has traditionally relied on healthy bilateral relations with host governments as the most effective means to facilitate economic co-operation and protect Chinese interests. In order to keep relations healthy, and citing its non-interference policy, Chinese diplomats have prioritised and even restricted their engagement to formal state officials and structures at the expense of engagement with other political actors, civil society or the wider public.

The experience of commercial actors illustrates some of the problems with this approach. Chinese company executives explain that they initially believed that because Beijing had a close relationship with the host government, that host government would protect them. Based on understandings of the nature of the state developed by their experience at home in China, some companies saw this as a sufficient approach to managing risk in conflict-affected contexts. However, these assumptions have been checked by the realities of operating in unstable African
countries where a weak state is unable or unwilling to provide basic security, to enforce regulations (if they exist), manage relations with local communities or resolve disputes. Furthermore, multiple political actors – ranging from competing ministries in capitals to the *de facto* authorities of remote regions - place competing pressures on companies, each seeking to prioritise their own demands, thus blurring lines of authority. In addition, a lack of openness and communication with the public has created a vacuum of information on company operations. In some cases, this has meant that local political entrepreneurs have been able to mobilise popular opinion against companies based on misinformation or half-truths. Finally, political authorities in fragile states have a habit of coming and going without much warning. Many companies have reluctantly accepted that they have had to reach out, listen to and communicate with a much wider set of actors beyond central state authorities.

The Chinese Government also requires a broadening of its still state-centric diplomatic approach. Traditionally, only visiting Party delegations have been able to formally reach out to a wider set of political actors who may be alternative guarantors of Chinese interests, such as opposition leaders, trade unions or civil society. In its day-to-day diplomacy in Africa, the MFA is usually much more restricted. As many African civil society activists have found out, meeting with anyone at a Chinese Embassy can prove impossible, especially when they lack even a public relations officer. The MFA must be allowed to reach out to a much wider set of actors in African countries, including civil society, in order to listen to their concerns, explain China’s own position, better understand conflict dynamics and build relationships that may outlast unstable regimes. Such an approach will support a more effective, prepared and nuanced diplomatic response that can help prevent outbreaks of conflict, instability and crises.

**Combating illegal small arms**

One crucial security issue in Africa is the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which should be a second focus area for China. There are millions of illegal SALW in circulation in Africa and an unlimited capacity by rebel
groups, terrorists, pirates, and other criminals to obtain such weapons, both old and new. SALW do not cause conflict, but they most certainly fuel it and are common factor across diverse manifestations of insecurity. Addressing the issue will help tackle a structural or proximate driver of conflict. While often themselves a direct source of proliferation, African governments have made efforts to address the problems of uncontrolled SALW, establishing national strategies and at the same time agreeing to various regional initiatives, such as the AU’s continent-wide strategy on SALW or Eastern Africa’s Nairobi Protocol. However, Africa’s governments and regional bodies require significant international support to implement their commitments. And, given that over 95 per cent of SALW originate from outside the continent, the international community has a responsibility to provide this support.

As a major supplier of SALW, China has in fact already made concrete commitments to fulfil these responsibilities. At the first three FOCAC meetings in 2000, 2003, and 2006, explicit commitments were made to enhance co-operation to address SALW proliferation. For example, the Beijing Action Plan of the 2006 FOCAC meeting promised from China “financial and material assistance and related training for African countries within its capacity”\textsuperscript{10}. However, none of these FOCAC commitments have been implemented to date. In fact, at the 4\textsuperscript{th} FOCAC meeting in 2009, no references were made to SALW at all.

In a welcome development, however, at FOCAC 2012, a new commitment was made by China “to support African countries’ effort to combat illegal trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons”\textsuperscript{11}. This provides the basis for China to start providing practical support for African-led efforts to tackle the problems associated with SALW. Practical action on the ground needs to replace words. For example, as it has already done to a limited extent for Latin America, China could commit financial assistance for the implementation of regional, sub-regional, and national initiatives that are hamstrung by a lack of resources. Examples of practical initiatives include support for weapons-marking initiatives, assistance with
electronic registration of arms, or provision for the basic infrastructure required to securely stockpile weapons.

Greater focus on the proliferation of SALW presents an opportunity for a frank discussion between African and Chinese governments and civil society on what constitutes a responsible arms transfer. By some estimates, China is already Africa’s largest arms supplier\(^1\). Others might dispute these figures. But debates over who is the largest supplier are largely irrelevant to African security. What matters more is in whose hands weapons end up and how they are used. Responsible transfers can promote stability; irresponsible arms transfers can fuel chaos.

It is the intended end users, always sovereign states according to China’s regulations, that hold primary responsibility for where weapons imported from China end up. Indeed Beijing sees sovereignty as a largely sufficient condition to authorise arms transfers. But it would be patently absurd for Beijing to repeatedly authorise transfers of weapons to a state that repeatedly embarrasses China by misusing them. Nor is it credible for Chinese authorities to consistently claim ignorance of their end use.

There is often criticism of China’s arms exports that is grossly exaggerated. Looking for evidence of Beijing’s apparent indifference to suffering or ill-intentions, western media coverage often only tells half the story. Furthermore, it is also unfair that the finger is only pointed at China: many of the most established arms exporters make a mockery of their professed commitments to peace, human rights and democracy. However, just because criticism is exaggerated does not mean there is no truth to them: Chinese-made weapons have too often fallen into the wrong hands and been used for the wrong reasons. And just because many other larger arms suppliers are irresponsible does not mean China can ignore its own faults.

In April 2013 in New York, the UN passed the Arms Trade Treaty. This treaty establishes common rules on what constitutes a responsible arms transfer. It requires signatories to make risk assessments on agreed criteria before authorising an arms transfer, including risks to regional peace and security, and violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law. African states and civil society led the charge for such a treaty. It could not have happened without their leadership. While China is yet to sign the treaty, it nevertheless provides them with a golden opportunity in joining the majority of developing countries and major arms exporters in demonstrating their commitment to making Africa safer and more peaceful place.

Economic co-operation

A third area that merits serious attention is the great potential China can play in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding to help prevent relapses into violence. Recurring civil wars have become the “dominant form of armed conflict in the world today. In fact, since 2003 every civil war that has started has been a continuation of a previous civil war” (Walter, 2010). China’s financial assistance for development projects, especially in the area of infrastructure, can have a significant impact in countries emerging from war. Schools, universities, hospital, roads, railway lines, and power facilities all need to be rebuilt or, as is often the case, built for the first time. While Western donors shied away from funding infrastructure development in post-conflict Angola, oil-for-infrastructure deals with China contributed to the reconstruction of the country. In South Sudan, assistance for infrastructure has been promised, and in the DRC and Liberia, Chinese companies are active in a wide range of infrastructure projects. More broadly, China’s mutual benefit approach to economic co-operation has been welcomed across the continent and provided benefits, such as jobs and services, which in many cases may be more beneficial and sustainable than Western aid. Economic growth after conflict can help address the root causes of instability and provide a peace dividend, for example, through employing young men who would otherwise join armed groups or through creating economic incentives for elites to seek compromise and maintain stability. In this regard economic co-operation with China can support long-term peacebuilding efforts.

However, China-Africa business-as-usual does not guarantee such an outcome. While explaining China’s continued economic co-operation with a Sudan that was
mired with conflict, some Chinese officials espoused the theory of ‘peace through development’. But as is acknowledged in China, the reality of economic co-operation presents a far more complex picture (Saferworld, 2012; Large, 2012). For example, while Sudan saw GDP growth figures above 10 per cent in 2006 and 2007, the country was far from peaceful in that period. Economic growth, and outside support for it, does not lead to stability on its own.

In fact, outside economic engagement, no matter how well-intentioned, can actually inadvertently fuel conflict and resentment. This is especially when it is seen to favour one group at the cost of another in divided societies. This can occur at a very local level – for example, between two clashing communities – but also on a larger, national scale. China’s role in pre-secession Sudan holds important lessons in this regard: in the South, where economic marginalisation fuelled conflict, people widely believed China only provided development assistance to the North. “They say they have built things – hospitals and schools – but this is in the North, not in the South”, summarises one South Sudanese observer of China’s role\(^\text{13}\). Perceptions of to whom the benefits of development assistance are distributed often matter more for peace than whether assistance is delivered at all. Furthermore, the exploitation of contested resources – whether land, water, or minerals – can be a violent process, as was the case in the development of Sudan’s oil infrastructure. It is disingenuous to argue that the operations of Chinese businesses in these sectors are independent of conflict dynamics. More often than not, they are actually perceived as conflict actors themselves.

These challenges are not unique to China: all actors playing a role in the economy of a conflict-affected state face them. In order to help minimise these risks, there is need for the adoption of more conflict-sensitive approaches by Chinese state-owned banks, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and both state-owned and private companies. A three-step approach is required to be conflict-sensitive: firstly, providers of development assistance or commercial actors must better understand the conflict dynamics of the environment in which they operate,
systematically consulting with all the stakeholders – including governments, local leaders, civil society groups, and communities – is crucial; secondly, they must analyse how their assistance or operations risk impacting on these conflict dynamics; and thirdly, they must act on this analysis to minimise negative impacts and promote positive ones.

Taking a more conflict-sensitive approach offers several benefits to China. For the Chinese Government, it is a way to coordinate the benefits of China’s economic strengths in order to more effectively contribute to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. This would be in line with an emerging narrative amongst some Chinese researchers that suggests that China can present a unique approach to peacebuilding through explicit focus on boosting socio-economic growth after wars end\textsuperscript{14}. For companies, conflict sensitivity offers a means through which to manage risks, protect workers, safeguard investments, and shield their reputations. Using consultation and communication to gain the acceptance of local communities and conflict actors can be a more effective risk management strategy than relying on government security services, who are often targets themselves in conflict zones. Finally, for both government and companies, conflict sensitivity is a way in which to ensure that their actions do not mistakenly fuel conflict, preventing unintentional negative interference.

Of course host African governments and society hold primary responsibility in ensuring that assistance from China is shared equally between the country’s people, that development is catalysed, and that conflict is not exacerbated. But in order for Chinese officials and companies to support such efforts, they must understand how economic co-operation can potentially have an impact on violent conflict and – at the very least – take concrete measures to ensure that no harm is done.

**Conclusion**

Finally, it should be remembered that China is not Africa’s only international part-
Other external actors have equal responsibility to support stability on the continent and to be sensitive about how their current engagement might fall short, considerably so, on many occasions. China should seek to reach out to other international actors, both at capital and in-country levels, to discuss steps that can be taken to partner on the ground. To start with, basic information-sharing between embassies, which is often minimal in many conflict-affected states, would support more coordinated approaches and identify shared interests and priorities. Small, practical projects should be jointly supported to create entry-points for wider co-operation. While African host states might be reluctant to encourage closer coordination between China and other foreign partners, preferring instead to balance them off another, it is in their interests to lead on and develop this agenda before it is developed for them and without them.

Policy coherence is also required at the international level. Further global dialogue and agreement on how the international community can best support conflict-affected and fragile regions of the world is required. As the MDGs expire in 2015, non-governmental organisations, academics, diplomats, and UN officials are already discussing what international development framework should follow them. In its final report, a UN High Level Panel on the post-2015 framework, which included Chinese diplomat Yingfan Wang and several prominent African leaders, prioritised building peace and good governance as one of five transformative shifts for global development, noting that “freedom from fear, conflict and violence is the most fundamental human right, and the essential foundation for building peaceful and prosperous societies” (High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 Development Agenda, 2013: iv). The re-negotiation of a global development framework presents an excellent foundation for an intergovernmental discussion in which both African states and China should make their voices heard, especially with regards to addressing systemic conflict drivers.

China’s engagement in Africa is evolving on several fronts as the relationship matures. The area of peace and security is no exception, where pressures from numer-
ous directions are forcing the Chinese Government to become a more engaged actor. Such a direction of travel is unlikely to be reversed. There are perfectly acceptable reasons why policymakers in Beijing are reluctant to engage on what are often highly politicised and sensitive issues on which China has little experience or capacity to engage on. However, these concerns are insufficient to justify inaction, especially when national interest and moral responsibility are at stake.

China is not the answer to Africa’s security challenges, nor to its wider development aspirations. Instead, solutions lie in the hands of African governments, political leaders, and civil society. What matters is how China chooses to involve itself in these efforts. Adopting a conceptual approach of conflict prevention to make these choices offers benefits that are not dependent on militarised responses or unilateral interference. Starting to better utilise China’s diplomatic leverage, paying greater attention to the problem of SALW, providing more thoughtful development assistance to countries emerging from conflict and seeking partnership with others would be strong foundations to build upon.

Endnotes

1. China’s economic slow-down, associated with a falling demand for commodities, may temper this with significant implications for some, but not all, African economies. See for example see Minto, Rob (2013) ‘What’s the impact of China’s slowdown on Africa’ in Financial Times: Beyond Brics 24 April 2013

2. For example, a major Chinese NGO involved in poverty-reduction in China will open its first office in Africa by the end of the year. Saferworld interviews, Beijing, 2013

3. Statement by HE Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, at the UN High-Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium

4. Saferworld interviews, Beijing 2013


6. This includes Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola and South Africa. Saferworld interviews, Beijing 2012

7. Saferworld interviews, Beijing 2013


12. See, for example, Grimmett RF, Kerr PK (2012), Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011 (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service)

13. Saferworld interview, Unity State, South Sudan, August 2011.


Bibliography


An analysis of China’s consular protection practice in Africa

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Abstract

Security issues involving overseas Chinese in Africa have been increasing recently, attracting extensive attention. Based on statistics gathered from the official website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and a questionnaire survey put to Chinese enterprises operating in Africa, the author summarizes various security risks which Chinese confront in Africa. The nature of the risks vary, including political risk, social security risk, risks caused by unlawful acts of Chinese citizens themselves, pandemic diseases, terrorist attacks, piracy, traffic accidents, financial fraud and natural disasters. The work explores how Chinese embassies and consulates in Africa, with the cooperation of Chinese companies, have established a diversified prevention mechanism and an efficient crisis response system in order to provide better protection to Chinese enterprises and citizens in Africa. The paper also addresses some of the pressing issues which still need to be addressed with regards to China’s consular protection practice in Africa.

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Introduction

In terms of China’s “going out” strategy, Africa serves as one of China’s fastest growing destinations for project contracting and foreign direct investment. Currently, Africa serves as China’s second largest engineering contracting market and fourth largest overseas investment destination. As of June 2012, more than 2,000 Chinese enterprises of various kinds in Africa were engaged within 50 African countries (People’s Daily 2012 a). According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs most recent data, over 500,000 Chinese have immigrated to Africa since the turn of the century (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 a). Media reports dating back to early 2012 state that around 1 million Chinese citizens have engaged in various business activities in Africa (Sina 2012). In recent years, the issue of protection has become a prominent issue, with African countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Ghana, amongst others, witnessing security incidents involving Chinese citizens. From July to September 2012, the author conducted a questionnaire in 18 African countries which surveyed 128 Chinese-funded enterprises. Through a textual analysis of the questionnaire, this paper outlines the general characteristics of security threats both encountered and posed by Chinese citizens in Africa. The research also makes some suggestions as to how to improve the security of Chinese citizens abroad.

Consular protection policies are obliged to provide assistance to their nationals, such as providing international travel safety information, assistance to hire lawyers and translators, visiting detainees and helping evacuate dangerous areas (Qichen, 2005). Protection services extending beyond consular protection is an important aspect of this work, particularly to Chinese enterprises, where many Chinese citizens based in foreign countries work (Department of Consular Affairs 2010).

The Security risk categories of Chinese citizens in Africa

One of the primary sources of data for this project has been the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issuance of security alert messages. From 27 June, 2006, to 30 Octo-
ber, 2012, the Ministry listed 932 security warnings; among them, 288 were related to African countries, accounting for 30.9% of the total, indicating that Chinese face significant risks within Africa.

Table 1: Security warnings issued by the MFA
(from June 2006 to October 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Security Warnings</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Security Warnings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>North America</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>932</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3)

The second, equally important source of information is the afore-mentioned survey. Questionnaires were sent to 128 Chinese companies of which only five of the countries are considered “safe” countries; approximately 60% of the companies claimed that the countries in which they worked were safe and that daily life posed no problems; approximately 30% (39) of the companies claimed that they needed to exercise caution when going out; 5% (7) of the respondents from the enterprises interviewed claimed that the countries in which they worked were very unsafe, and they needed to exercise caution at all times. These findings are outlined in Table 2.

Overall, the risks facing Chinese companies in Africa can be broadly divided into the nine following categories:

Political risk
Table 2: Types of security risks facing Chinese enterprises and Chinese citizens in Africa (5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Security Risks</th>
<th>Chinese Enterprises</th>
<th>Chinese Citizens</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political risks (81%)  ;</td>
<td>Poor social order (61%) ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unfamiliar with local laws and regulations (61%) ;</td>
<td>unfamiliar with local laws and regulations (60%) ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bad public security, poor social order (56%) ;</td>
<td>political risks (43%) ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>difficulty in getting visa (26.5%) ;</td>
<td>unfriendliness of local people (15%) ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>difficulty in communicating with the local residents and in integrating into local</td>
<td>others (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community (20%) ;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>difficulty in dealing with local tribes and factions (10%) ;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>others (15.6%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other risks facing Chinese enterprises include no guarantees in the supply of raw materials; powerful trade unions; dishonesty of African business partners; epidemic diseases; traffic incidents and the risk of dual taxation. Other risks facing Chinese citizens in Africa include blackmailing by local people; traffic accidents; poor medical safety; misunderstandings caused by language barriers and different customs. Source: Based statistical results of survey questionnaire from July – September, 2012.
Political risk refers to social unrest caused by drastic changes in a political situation, such as general elections or the death or resignation of important leaders. Political risk is one of the biggest challenges facing Chinese enterprises in Africa. During the period from 27 June, 2006 to 30 October, 2012, the MFA issued 83 security warnings to do with political risk in African countries, constituting 28.8% of the total. Among the 128 Chinese enterprises who submitted the questionnaire, more than a third thought political risk was the most serious risk they faced in Africa. Over the past six years, the Department of State website posted about unrest safety tips related to Egypt, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gabon, Cameroon, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Chad. Security warnings related to political risk in Africa covered 27 countries, nearly half of all African countries.

Unrest in African countries can be broadly attributed to some of the following factors: firstly, democratic governments whose democratic institutions are fragile are prone to unrest prior to, and following, election results. Such fragility entails that certain events, such as the death of a leader, can quickly lead to unrest. With the rapid growth of globalization, a given country’s unrest can quickly spill-over into other countries. This has been evident with the "Arab Spring" phenomenon. In the first half of 2011, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other North African countries which were deemed relatively stable, faced rapid transformation. Other countries, traditionally regarded as stable, such as Mali and Burkina Faso, faced military mutinies (Beijing Youth Daily, 2012). Since January 1991, with the overthrow of the Siad regime in Somalia, the subsequent civil war has led to a situation where a number of regimes have co-existed at once. Additionally, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan have been negatively affected by the impact of anti-government forces. Another powerful force in the African political landscape is trade unions, who can orchestrate paralyzing strikes. This can be seen, for instance, in Nigeria in early 2012 when the federal government of Nigeria announced the cancellation of sub-
sides on refined oil products. Nigeria’s unions organized a massive strike in the cities of Abuja and Lagos, causing confrontation between protesters and the police. The strikes brought traffic to a standstill, with armed bandits blocking highways and robbing passers-by.

Such events have had a serious impact on the safety of local Chinese citizens. For instance, after the military coup in Mali, a local, Chinese-run bar was looted. Two military vehicles carrying seven or eight soldiers approached the Chinese embassy and engaged in a stand-off with embassy guards; the soldiers fired shots and the guards were escorted away. The disintegration of the armed forces exacerbated the instability of the situation. Border clashes have also had implications for Chinese citizens. For instance, in April 2012, the border area between Sudan and South Sudan in the oil-rich Heglig region was subjected to clashes, leading to the evacuation of Chinese companies and citizens.

*Risks caused by poor social order*

Risks caused by poor social order can be attributed to robbery, theft, kidnapping and other criminal activities. Such activities are an important factor in securing the safety of Chinese citizens abroad. Security warnings issued by MFA related to this kind of risk cover 19 African countries (out of a total of 50 countries), making up for 35% of the total. Survey results show that 56% of Chinese enterprises and 61% Chinese citizens in Africa think that poor social order in host countries makes them feel insecure. Violent robbery and kidnapping are some of the gravest threats. In South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Congo and other countries, during holidays or major events, robbery and theft are more serious. It is worth noting that, due to the impact of political unrest in North Africa, certain countries which enjoyed comparatively secure environments, began to undergo substantial change. For example, both Egypt and Tunisia were increasingly subject to domestic crimes such as armed robbery and theft. In March 2012, in the Egyptian capital of Cairo, two Chinese workers were kidnapped. According to an Egyptian security official, this was the first kidnapping of foreigners for ransom within Cairo that they could recall (Beijing Youth Daily 2012).
Security risks posed by the illegal acts of Chinese citizens

Statistics from the Consular Section of the MFA indicate that nearly half of the security problems involving overseas Chinese citizens are caused by their own improper acts (Weiwei 2008). Security warnings on the MFA’s website also reflect this point. Improper acts of Chinese citizens in African countries include: (1) violation of local provisions of employment; (2) smuggling of ivory, pornography and cash reserves exceeding legal limits, as well as other contraband; (3) the use of forged visas; (4) the taking pictures in sensitive places; (5) smoking on airplanes; (6) bribing local police; (7) the illegal possession of alcohol and (8) failure to comply with other local laws and regulations. For example on May 22, 2012, 105 Chinese businessmen in Nigeria were detained under a drive to implement more stringent immigration policies. On the same day, 38 Chinese citizens suspected of illegal gold mining in Ghana were arrested. In October, a number of law enforcement agencies in Ghana’s gold mining areas arrested more than 90 suspected illegal gold miners of Chinese origin, leading to the death of one Chinese citizen. The main problem arising from Chinese engagement with host countries’ laws is two-fold: firstly, there are certain Chinese nationals who do not properly understand the laws and regulations of the host country and secondly, there Chinese nationals who deliberately defy the law for their own selfish ends.

The spread of epidemic diseases

The African continent is prone to epidemic diseases which pose a substantial threat to foreign nationals. Security warnings issued by the MFA related to epidemic diseases in Africa involve 20 countries, about 37% of the total of African countries. Epidemic diseases have arisen in several countries including Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. Types of disease including Ebola, Chikungya fever, cholera, Influenza A (sub-type H1N1), polio, dengue fever, anthrax, Rift Valley fever, H5N1, yellow fever and 10 other kinds of illnesses. Among them, cholera outbreaks are the most extensive. According to the Foreign Ministry website, from June 2006 to October 2012, Angola, Congo
(Brazzaville), Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and the African Republic have all undergone large-scale epidemics.

**Terrorist attacks**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published 33 security alerts on its web-site with regards to terrorist attacks. The countries involved include Nigeria, Niger, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Tanzania and another 11 countries. Chinese enterprises and citizens directly affected by terrorist activities can be divided into two cases, one in which Chinese citizens are directly targeted and the other where they are unfortunate, collateral victims of broader attacks which do not specifically target Chinese persons or enterprises. With regards to the former, in January 2007, five Chinese engineers in Nigeria’s Rivers State were abducted by unidentified armed men; this was the first kidnapping of Chinese workers. In April, a Chinese oil company project team were attacked in Ethiopia by Somali militants; nine Chinese people were killed and seven were kidnapped. In July, employees of a Chinese company in Niger were kidnapped by members of the "Niger Movement for Justice". In January 2012, employees of Sino-Hydro Corporation, busy conducting a highway project in South Sudan’s South Kordofan region, were attacked by the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement –North (SPLM-N). 29 Chinese workers were abducted, and one employee was killed. There are also instances of Chinese nationals being killed in attacks not specifically aimed at Chinese. For instance, in June 2010 in the Algerian province of Bouira, a suicide car-bomb attack killed a Chinese person working as a driver.

**Pirate attacks**

The Chinese Foreign Ministry website has issued 15 security warnings, mainly off the Somali coast. Since 1991, Somalia has been in a state of more-or-less constant conflict. The International Maritime Bureau had deemed the coastal region as the world's most dangerous waters. In the second half of 2008, foreign crews and ships
were frequently attacked or hijacked by pirates near Somali waters. The Chinese government banned their crews and vessels entering waters near Somalia. In April 2009 various countries’ warships patrolling the Gulf of Aden forced Somali piracy activities gradually eastward and southward, expanding 600 miles east of Somali waters and up to the region north of the Seychelles. Hijacking operations increased with multi-country, multi-vessel attacks. Maritime attacks increased elsewhere, such as 170km off the Nigerian coast in February 2012, where eight armed pirates boarded a Chinese vessel in which both the captain and chief engineer were shot dead.

**Accidents**

The main risks attributed to accidents are traffic accidents and arsenal explosions. With regards to the former, Chinese were involved in three serious traffic accidents in Nigeria in the month of February 2010 alone. Although comparatively rare, there have also been two instances of arsenal bombings. On the evening of February 16th 2011, an explosion at a military base near Tanzania’s Dare es Salaam International Airport caused damage to areas around the airport, leading to the closure of roads and the cancellation of flights. In March 4, 2012, an arsenal explosion in Congo Brazzaville, in the vicinity of Beijing Construction Engineering Group's social housing construction project, led to the death of six Chinese employees and caused injuries to another 45.

**Economic fraud**

Security warnings of this nature have been related to Nigeria, Liberia, DRC, Benin and four other countries. In 2009, there were several cases of economic fraud reported in Liberia and Benin. In December 2010, 32 Chinese hospital workers gained employment at a Chinese company in the Congo, via an internet recruitment service. The employees contacted the Congolese embassy complaining that their freedom was restricted insofar as they were overworked and sometimes beaten and imprisoned. Additionally, their wages were reduced. The embassy assisted
in their return home. In November and December 2011, a number of Chinese business people in Nigeria contacted the Chinese Consulate General in Lagos complaining that they had been defrauded while trying to send remittances home. The Consulate General issued two consecutive warnings regarding fraud in Nigeria.

*Natural disasters*

Tanzania and Nigeria have been subject to severe floods, leading to a serious impact on the lives of local residents as well as Chinese institutions and their personnel. For example, in December 2011, Dar es Salaam and other regions of Tanzania experienced heavy rains triggered by floods; this resulted in 20 deaths and left nearly 5,000 people homeless. Traffic in Dar es Salaam came to a standstill with roads, railways and bridges seriously damaged. In April 2012, the Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania issued safety tips during the rainy season, reminding Chinese-funded enterprises and Chinese citizens of possible flooding and how a lack of attention to disaster and disease prevention measures could exacerbate the situation. Chinese citizens whose homes, workplaces and factories were located in low-lying areas need to make contingency plans. In October, the Chinese Consulate General in Lagos issued a safety alert on the embassy website to inform Chinese institutions and citizens that six states were threatened by floods caused by torrential rain, reminding them to take effective measures, such as flood control work, to ensure the safety of persons and property.

The above security risks that Chinese face in Africa are complex and diverse. Certainly, some of these risks are ones which Chinese have suffered in various other parts of the globe including illegal activities by Chinese citizens themselves, accidents and natural disasters. However, certain security risks are more prominent in Africa, such as political risk, security issues, epidemics, piracy and so on.

**Features of African consular protection**

As mentioned above, both Chinese-funded enterprises and Chinese citizens within Africa face a number of heterogeneous risks. To addresses these security issues, Chi-
Chinese consular protection services need to adjust accordingly to the varied situations of the region.

In addressing the volatile political and security situation in Africa, the Chinese Foreign Ministry within African consulates, other government departments and Chinese-funded enterprises need to pay attention to the variety of ways in which preventive consular protection can be administered.

Firstly, in terms of African elections which are susceptible to causing instability, the Chinese Embassy and consulates need to remind local and overseas-funded enterprises to be vigilant and employ safety precautions. In April 2010, with the Sudanese national elections approaching, the Consulate General in Juba took measures to remind local and overseas-funded enterprises to improve security awareness, with timely exchange of relevant information between both the consulate and business and sustained close contact between the two parties. Prior to the Mali coup of 2012, the Chinese embassy repeatedly reminded the relevant enterprises to take precautionary measures in advance. During the coup, the embassy has held three meetings which included political and security updates. There was a drive to reduce the number of unnecessary personnel in the county as well as deploying all possible measures to protect the personal safety of construction workers.

Secondly, changes in a given country’s political situation need to be monitored as they have implications for the Chinese-funded enterprises, property and the personal safety of citizens; such safety depends on maintaining contact with new regimes. After the shift in power of the Libyan government on September 12, 2012, the Chinese government announced its recognition of the Libyan "National Transitional Council" as the ruling authority of Libya and expressed the wish that earlier agreements and treaties between the Libyans and the Chinese would continue to be valid (Xinhua, 2011). After the coup in Mali, the Chinese embassy successfully obtained assurances from the military and transitional government leaders that Chinese enterprises and personnel would not be harmed (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, 2012 a).

Thirdly, Chinese embassies, consulates and enterprises in African countries think highly of cultivating good relations with local influential groups. In March 2011, Chinese embassy diplomats stationed in Ethiopia drove to over 3200 meters above sea level to the village of Dodola in order to consult with administrative official and tribal elders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 b). China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, which has been operating in Nigeria for many years, has set rules that its managers must pay a visit to influential people and local youth organizations at each new place where they intend to start a business (CCTV 2007). Additionally, during the Libya evacuation in March, 2011, Chinese State Owned Enterprise played a very important role in accomplishing the evacuation. China Communication Construction Company Ltd took the initiative to contact local powerful figures to open the route for evacuation when the chartered liners could not pull into shore.

Fourth, considering the poor social order in African countries, Chinese embassies and consulates need to keep close links with local police, the interior ministry and other law enforcement agencies. Joint mechanisms on safeguarding the security of local Chinese composed by Chinese and local police have been established in some African countries such as South Africa, Mozambique and Lesotho. As early as March 2004, the Chinese Embassy in South Africa fostered strong ties with Chinese at the South Africa Police Cooperation Centre. The centre is a non-profit organization run jointly by Chinese communities and the police. The centre is responsible for answering calls from Chinese in order to help them deal with language barriers, unfamiliar legal processes and other issues. The Police Cooperation Centre also works with local police agencies to establish business contacts, familiarize themselves with the work of police procedures and to build interactive channels to allow the police to learn more about the difficulties faced by overseas Chinese communities. In 2011, the Chinese Embassy in Mozambique and the Mozambican police established the "Sino-Mozambican police and defence mechanism" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Chinese Embassy in Lesotho works with the Lesotho Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and other relevant departments to establish joint security mechanisms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 c). The Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania, responsible for the safety of the commercial councillor, regularly consults with the Ministry of the Interior and has encouraged the police to promptly resolve cases involving the protection of Chinese citizens. Such cooperation contributes toward diffusing individual events which may, through accumulation, lead to larger security problems.5 With the approval of the Angolan government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 c), China’s Ministry of Public Security sent a working team to Angola in May 2012 to investigate crimes involving Chinese citizens there. Crimes included robbery, kidnapping, extortion, abduction of women, forced prostitution and other criminal activities. They arrested Chinese criminals in Angola and took them back to China. It is the first time for the Chinese police to crack down on crimes infringing upon the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese in Africa by sending a working team to Africa, which opened a new chapter in the history of the police cooperation between China and Africa (Can and Jie, 2012).

Fifth, the officers of Chinese embassies and consulates have held a number of symposiums attended by Chinese citizens and delegates of Chinese enterprises in Africa. During these meetings, officials update them on the security situation, introduce consular protection and urge them to take responsibility in participating with local society and building a good foundation upon which the development of enterprise and the protection of Chinese citizens can be built. In October 2011, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya held a meeting in the embassy regarding economic co-operation between China and Kenya and the ways in which Chinese enterprises in Kenya might enhance their public responsibility (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 d). In March 2013, the consul general attended a Chinese enterprise symposium in Lagos, Nigeria where he engaged with more than twenty principals of private enterprises (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 e). In April 2012, the Chinese Ambassador to Botswana held a meeting on consular protection (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 f).
Various community members attended including chairman of the Chinese Enterprises Association in Botswana, principal of Confucius Institute in Botswana, chairman in Chinese Chamber of Commerce, chairman of Peaceful Unification Promotion Agency, chairwoman of the Women’s Institute, chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other representatives

Sixth, the office in charge of Chinese embassies, consulates and various other correlative departments convene with local overseas Chinese associations and representatives of Chinese enterprises to hold meetings on introducing local policy and rules to Chinese citizens abroad. Subsequently Chinese citizens and firms follow the dictates formulated in these meetings so as to reduce risk when abroad. In November 2011, the Chinese Ambassador to Botswana and the Botswana Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Investigation Bureau held a seminar to facilitate discussions between Botswana natives and overseas Chinese. Chinese-funded institutions and Botswana Industrial and Commercial Bureau released the Botswana Federation of Private Enterprises’ Code of Conduct (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 f). In February 2012, the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia invited Zambia's employers' association to give a speech on Zambian Labour policy for Chinese enterprises and members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 e). In April 2011, The Chinese embassy to Togo organised an introductory meeting for Chinese citizens in Togo. A head of Togo’s immigration department discussed issues of immigration including Togo’s visa and residence permit policy, working permit policy and the requirement to apply for long-term residence permits (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 f). In June 2011, the consulate general of Lagos organised several activities in which the consulate general introduced local laws, customs, industry rules and issues of risk prevention and control.

Seventh, Chinese Ambassadors to African states have inspected local Chinese enterprises and observed safety conditions at work. In March 2011, China's ambassador to Ethiopia visited Oro state capital city of Adama, location of a concentration Chinese enterprises, and held a seminar on consular protection work. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 d).
Eighth, there has been the creation overseas Chinese consular protection cards (in the form of documentation of registered Chinese citizens and companies) and establishing a system of co-ordinated consular protection. In order to help overseas Chinese communicate their queries to the embassy and seek consular protection, the Chinese Ambassador to Botswana established overseas Chinese consular protection cards in Botswana so that overseas Chinese could access consular protection when needed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 c). In addition, the Chinese ambassador to Botswana asked that overseas Chinese associations select members of the community to serve as consular protection coordinators and to update the Chinese embassy on the community’s current situation. The consular section officers of the embassy hold consular protection coordinator meetings regularly. The Chinese ambassador to Sudan has built up a system in which all staff of firms which register are part of a network of communication (People’s Daily, 2012 b).

Ninth, Chinese embassies business departments keep touch with local business through irregular meetings and networks. The author’s questionnaire showed that 58.9% of companies interviewed claimed that the Chinese embassy had held occasional meetings with them in the context of emergency notification; 32.3% of companies claimed that the Chinese embassy held regular meetings with them with regards to emergency situations. Various Chinese embassies abroad hold occasional security meetings attended by representatives of local business communities. The department, via websites (including the embassy website), “QQ” web chat forums and overseas Chinese websites publish security notices.

Tenth, Chinese enterprises in Africa have a strong sense of risk prevention awareness, and invest much by way of security. In November 2011, diplomats from the Chinese embassy in Kenya were interviewed by the author. They claimed that in
the case of a serious security situation, Chinese enterprises hire local security, normally up to ten people, but in some cases there have been more than fifty. In other cases, hired armed police have been employed. In Kenya, there are two organizations, the China Economic and Trade Association of Kenya and The Federation of Overseas Chinese. The embassy officers go through these two organizations to disseminate information on security measures to Chinese enterprises and citizens in Kenya. In May 2012, a representative of China Hydropower Construction Group in Ethiopia, told the author that the company took many measures to protect their staff. They had pre-arrival training and are taught to pay attention to construction-site safety. When the staff arrive Ethiopia, the representative agency employs an expert to give lectures on the cultural and religious differences between the inhabitants of north and south Ethiopia. During operations in dangerous areas, local police and security are hired; fences have been heightened, no night working is allowed and finance staff are accompanied by security guards when transiting cash. The commerce association in Ethiopia gives workers training, including lectures by lawyers about local laws, labour and tax policy. Chinese enterprises also share their experiences with each other. “QQ groups” between Chinese enterprises employees in Ethiopia communicate to each other about resources, HR and finance. In response to the question “which measures do your company take in the protection of staff safety?”, 78.9% respondents stated that they hire local security companies; 70.3% chose building walls around working and living areas; 64.1% said that the company established detailed security measures, including drilling and regular checks; 20.3% used local army to help with security work. 7.8% and 7% said the company dug ditches around residential areas and hired Chinese security.

Sufficient measures for consular protection

The Chinese embassy has ordered big state-owned companies to have emergency plans. For example, the business section of the Chinese embassy in Ethiopia has requested state-owned companies and big private companies to report their emergency plans, with warnings issued to those who have not submitted plans. Plans included
emergency evacuation routes and the appointment of responsible persons to supervise the task. The embassy visits each firm to observe demonstrations of the plan, including fire escape checks and lists of safety precautions.

Emergencies are categorized into several levels, employing different colours to indicate different emergency situations. The consular section of the embassy has also circulated various documents on emergency consular protection. The business section of the Chinese embassy in Ethiopia relies on the commerce association to send their notices to Chinese enterprises; and there are “QQ” groups between the department and the companies. If they encounter an emergency, the department will inform the principal of the association and two secretaries (separately in change contracting enterprise and investment enterprises), who will inform enterprise representatives.

Second, in terms of dealing with Chinese citizens’ emergencies in Africa, the consular protection emergency mechanism draws on a “four in one” feature. The “four in one” feature refers to coordination between the central government, local Chinese communities abroad, enterprises abroad and local embassies (Xinhua 2012). The escape from Libya in 2011 demonstrated this feature clearly, where the four parties coordinated together and successfully finished the escape mission, which was praised by the media⁹. While the escape mission from Libya was led by the central government, the ammunition depot explosion accident in the Republic of Congo in March 2012 was an example of how emergency measures were led by local government. The Chinese Ambassador rushed to the disaster scene to coordinate the rescue work and help guide related companies in handling follow-up affairs. On the 5th of March 2012, the vice foreign minister of China met with Congo (Brazzaville) embassy charge d'affaires. On 6th of March 2012, the Chinese government quickly sent a team which included Beijing government officials, foreign ministry officials and other ministries to Congo (Brazzaville). The Beijing government sent a five member medical expert team. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 g).
Third, the foreign ministry, Chinese embassy to Africa and Chinese enterprises in Africa have attached great importance to the use of “Weibo”, “QQ” and other new communication tools to gather information and provide emergency help. In the Libya escape mission, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Protection Centre not only used two hot lines and faxes to collect Chinese citizens helping information, but also used messages which Chinese citizens and institutes sent online via “Weibo”. For example, some netizens reflected, via “Weibo” that there were more than eighty staff from a large Chinese telecommunications company in Tripoli which needed assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Protection Centre asked local embassies to investigate two emergency situations, one regarding 800 Chinese citizens in Misrata, the other involving 48 Chinese citizens elsewhere in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011 i). In March 2012, after the ammunition depot explosion in the Republic of Congo, many netizens published information on “Weibo”. The Chinese foreign ministry's Africa's official Weibo site, “Straight Africa”, published many articles about this event, in which condolences were offered to Chinese victims, their families, the staff of Beijing Building Construction Company Consortium and the embassy of the Republic of Congo to China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012 g).

This demonstrates that Chinese embassies in Africa positively cooperate with the Chinese enterprises in Africa, building diversified prevention mechanisms and employing effective emergency response mechanisms for the protection of Chinese citizens in Africa and Chinese enterprises in Africa.

**Some thinking of China’s consular protection in Africa**

It is undeniable that Chinese consular protection in Africa has remained steadfast - the Libya escape mission in early 2011 is one example. Nevertheless, there are still some questions worth considering.

Firstly, Chinese enterprises and Chinese citizens in Africa urgently need to increase their understanding of local laws and policy. As mentioned above in the question-
naire, 61% of respondents thought that a major risk toward Chinese enterprises in Africa was due to a given company’s a lack of understanding toward local laws and policy; 60 % of respondents felt that their workers were ignorant of local laws and policy. Thus, more work needs to be done in terms of reinforcing research on Africa countries’ laws and policy and the spreading of information

Secondly, to mitigate huge political risk purchasing investment insurance is very important. The questionnaire result showed that only less than one third (27.3%) of Chinese enterprises in Africa purchased such insurance; 35.2% of respondents did not and the other 37.5% said they were undecided. This differs from firms in the developed world, in which insurance is far more prominent. Currently, China’s insurance industry with regards to political risk is undeveloped.

Third, in terms of handling Chinese citizens’ offences abroad, some Chinese embassies are prone to take the side of Chinese citizens, sometimes attempting to exempt Chinese citizens from punishment

The author discovered that some Chinese enterprises staff had been arrested for using fake invoices to avoid tax payments. However, when the local embassy received the information, they sent some staff to negotiate with local police, resulting in bail. Other Chinese citizens were caught with ivory but later released. The same situation occurred with South Koreans but they met with different consequences: they could not receive such help from their own embassy, and remained under arrest. While such measures offer a short-term solution to the problem, it encourages citizens to act unethically. Additionally it will hurt China’s national image, damaging relations between China and Africa. Recently, there have been incidents of Chinese citizens fighting with the local police. In this sense, more overseas Chinese need to be alerted to the help they can receive from their embassies. The questionnaire data showed that 53.1% of respondents had heard about consular protection but were unclear with regards to specific information. 10.2% of respondents said they did not even know what “consular protection” was.
Forth, in terms of building China’s image within Africa, the behaviour of Chinese citizens, especially the staff in Chinese enterprises, was the most negative element. More and more Chinese workers arriving Africa have little awareness of local customs. Some workers do not respect local customs, look down on local people, and are engaged in conflict with locals. In May 2012, interviewees said that these phenomena are occurring more and more frequently. Moreover, lack of suitable problem solving methods threatens the security environment. For instance, on 16th of June 2012 in Benin, the staff of a company discovered that a local person had stolen company diesel. What was meant to be a warning shot killed the thief. Following this, around 70 local people surrounded and attacked the company.

In conclusion, the risks which Chinese citizens and enterprises take in Africa are complex and lots of work still needs to be done in terms of China’s consular protection. Recently, such protection has improved but many questions remain. In the practice of protection, personal interests, corporate interests and the interests of the state are bound up. In order to improve, there will be a greater need for the Chinese government, firms, media and citizens to work more closely together.

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**Endnotes**

1. The paper constitutes a sub-division of a larger research project entitled “A New Era of China-Africa Relations and Co-operation” (09JZD0039). The sub project is entitled “China’s interests in Africa with reference to Consular Protection”. This paper and is part of a Beijing Foreign Affairs and Communication Research Institute research initiative.

2. These states are Togo, Mauritania, Chad, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Congo, Cameroon, the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, the Central
African Republic, Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia and Namibia.

3. In the enterprises interviewed, almost a half (62 enterprises, accounting for 48 per cent) are engaged in the construction contracting industry; 14 per cent (18 enterprises) are in mining and energy industry; 7 per cent (9 firms) in foreign trade; 26 per cent in other industries and 5 per cent gave no response.

4. The five companies are in four countries. These countries are Mauritania, Ghana, Senegal and Zambia.


6. Interview with the Chinese embassy in Ethiopia business department officials in Addis Ababa on 24th of May 2012.

7. Interview with the Chinese embassy in Kenya, Nairobi, 18th of November 2011.


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