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Policies, achievements and problems of full-time higher vocational education teacher development in China: 1983-2013*

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Abstract
Through analysis of policies of China’s higher vocational education (HVE) from 1983 to 2013, we find that full-time teachers at vocational colleges have undergone


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four stages of development: conceptual exploration of full-time teacher development, forming of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”, clarification of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”, and development of formal training systems and platforms for “dually qualified teachers”. This process has seen a rapid expansion in the number of full-time teachers in HVE institutions, as well as great improvement in the overall quality of these teachers. There are, however, several areas which require improvement. There still exists a lack of professional standards for these teachers’ performance, weakness of research ability of these teachers, and low efficiency of programs fostering “dually qualified teachers”. In the future more efforts should be made to accelerate composition of professional standards for full-time teachers in HVE institutions and to improve their practical skills and applied research abilities.

Introduction

As a new form of higher education, China’s higher vocational education (HVE) dates back to 1980. In the course of more than 30 years of development, from 1982 to 2013, China's higher vocational education has provided 28.1 million graduates, accounting for 43.51 per cent of higher education graduates (see Figure 1), which has greatly promoted the development of the economy and society.

China’s HVE has played an important role in promoting social class upward mobility. According to MyCOS survey figures, 88.1 per cent of the vocational college students who graduated in 2011 were the first college students in their families, a record that has been maintained for three consecutive years from 2009 to 2011. It has been reckoned that in those three years close to 8.5 million families had produced their first generation of college students (Shanghai Academy of Education Sciences & MyCOS Institute, 2012).

China’s HVE has also played an important role in training talents for underdeveloped regions. Of the total number of students who graduated in 2011 from vocational colleges, 12.7 per cent came from impoverished areas, 22.2 per cent from the western regions, and 16.2 per cent from minority-inhabited regions
(Shanghai Academy of Education Sciences & MyCOS Institute, 2012). In 2013, 67 per cent of the graduates from vocational colleges in middle and western regions were employed in local areas. In some ways, the HVE has met the needs of the underprivileged and the poor for higher education. (Shanghai Academy of Education Sciences & MyCOS Institute, 2014).

Figure 1: Number of graduates from HVE institutions and all HE institutions in China: 1983-2013 (thousand people)


By the end of 2013, there were 1321 HVE colleges, in which 1108 specialties and 47,347 programs were being provided, and 9,736,373 students were being trained in China. The HVE system has gradually been improved. The HVE has become an important part of higher education, and played an increasingly important role in the whole education system (Figure 2). The tremendous achievement is inseparable from the teachers from HVE colleges, who have made a great contribution to the development of HVE. Meanwhile, the team of teachers in HVE has also improved a lot during the period.
Since HVE’s first appearance, China has been exploring ways to cultivate full-time teachers for it. After combing through all relevant policies over the past three decades, four stages were identified in its full-time teacher development: conceptual exploration of full-time teacher development, forming of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”, clarification of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”, and development of a formal training system and platforms for “dually qualified teachers”. The first
stage, conceptual exploration of full-time teachers’ development, happened from 1983 to 1990 when no national policies had stipulated specific requirements for full-time teachers in China’s vocational colleges, but some vocational colleges had emphasized the requirement of “being competent to guide students’ practical training” on their full-time teachers. Then, in the second stage from 1991 to 1999, the requirement of “dual qualification” had gradually been accepted by vocational colleges and included in national policies, in which employing a certain percent of “dually-qualified teachers” was defined as a basic requirement for establishing and running a vocational college, but no clear definition or standards of “dually-qualified teachers” had been set up until the third stage from 2000 to 2004, clarification of the concept of "dually-qualified teachers." In 2004, *Assessment Scheme for Students Training in Vocational Colleges (trial version)* formulated by Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) codified the concept of “dually-qualified teachers” from perspectives of professional qualification, industrial experience, technical training, abilities to carry out applied research or R&D, and defined the concept and criteria for assessing “dually-qualified teachers” officially. Since 2005, however, government policies turned to focus on how to train “dually-qualified teachers” in both practical competencies in the industry and practical training competencies in colleges, such as setting up a system for teachers’ going back to industries, establishing on-job training bases for teachers, and so on.

Coupled with policy evolution is the continuous expansion of China’s full-time teachers in HVE institutions, especially after the Great Expansion of China’ higher education in 1999. In 2013, the number of full-time teachers in China’s vocational colleges reached 436,561, accounting for 29.17 per cent of the total number of full-time teachers in all Chinese institutions of higher learning. Meanwhile, quality improvement was also seen among full-time teachers in HVE institutions, with the percentage of “dually-qualified teachers” reaching 57.2 per cent of the total of full-time teachers in HVE institutions. However, the teacher-student ratio in China’s vocational colleges has stayed above 120 since 2003, signifying a lack of teachers even after part-time teachers from industries are also included.
There are however several problems in development of full-time teachers in HVE institutions which are in an urgent need for improvement. These problems are a) a lack of national professional standards for employment and promotion; b) little attention on teachers’ research abilities by HVE policies and practices and consequently weak research abilities; c) weakness of practical competencies in a corporate environment though “dual qualification” has been remarkably advanced.

Therefore, entry requirements and promotion criteria should be formulated as soon as possible by the Chinese government together with industries and vocational colleges. Meanwhile, a system should be established to promote co-operation between colleges and industries where full-time teachers can advance their practical competencies by getting involved in industries’ practice. Finally, attention should be placed on strengthening full-time teachers’ research abilities. Full-time teachers should be encouraged to carry out applied research or R&D so that their research abilities can improve, thus improving the quality of the whole team.

Thirty years of policy evolution

During the 30 years from 1983 to 2013, there were four stages about the teachers’ development in HVE in China, namely stages of conceptual exploration of full-time teachers’ development, forming of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”, clarification of the notion “dually-qualified teachers” and the development of formal training system and platforms for “dually-qualified teachers”.

The first stage from 1983 to 1990: conceptual exploration of full-time teachers’ development

Following China’s first vocational college, Jinling Vocational College in City of Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, were establishment as part of the first batch of thirteen vocational colleges approved by the National Education Committee (former name of MOE) in 1980. Born out of practical needs, these vocational colleges followed a bottom-top development route. Consequently, no national guidelines were formulated for their development, let alone nationally standardised requirements for teachers in vocational colleges until 1982 when “Interim Regulations on Vocational
*Colleges in Jiangsu Province*” was published, calling for “fostering a contingent of vocational teachers with devotion to China’s educational cause as well as teaching competencies so as to maintain normal orders of teaching, to systematically summarise teaching experience, to continuously improve teaching practice and quality, “and suggesting employment of part-time teachers where necessary. The regulations also demanded full-time teachers in vocational colleges be assessed and conferred with academic titles or technical titles in line with relevant rules and requirements set up by MOE” (Ye Chunsheng, 2004).

At that time, the differences between HVE and general higher education were identified in students training objectives, teaching processes and quality requirements on full-time teachers. For instance, Jianghan College, one in the first batch of vocational colleges founded in 1980, identified, in its college experience retrospect in 1986, two key competencies for teachers in HVE institutions: competencies to transmit knowledge and to guide students’ practice (Chen Yingjie, 2007). Unlike six years earlier, vocational colleges have since realised the importance of their teachers having competencies to guide students’ practice, though little theoretical research and very few state policies have touched upon what elements comprise the competencies and how to develop the competencies among teachers.

The second stage from 1991 to 1999—forming of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”

The notion “dually-qualified teachers” was first defined as “engineers and teachers” in an article published in 1991 featuring teacher development experience of Shanghai Metallurgy College. It pointed out:

*The key factor for setting a tertiary technical college apart from universities is to foster a contingent of ‘dually-qualified teachers’ who master both knowledge and ability to put knowledge into practice.* (Wang Yicheng, 1991)

This article signified the commencement of research into the topic of “dually-qualified teachers” in China’s vocational education, followed by a gradually
increasing number of issues on the necessity of a contingent of “dually-qualified teachers” in vocational colleges (Zhou Mingxing, 2009). Then in 1994, *Opinions of the State Council on Implementing the National Outline for Education Reform and Development* mentioned that:

Entry criteria for vocational teachers should be formulated in line with characteristics of vocational education, and full-time technical teachers in vocational institutions could apply for both academic titles and technical titles. (The State Council, P.R.C., 1994)

One year later, the *Circular Concerning Model Vocational Colleges Development Project*, promulgated by the National Education Committee, set up a basic requirement for vocational colleges: they must have a team of teachers with an appropriate ratio between full-time teachers and part-time teachers, and with remarkable aptitude, of which over one third is “dually-qualified teachers” and in which both specialized course instructors and practical training instructors have ample practical competencies. It was the first time a national policy mentioned the concept of “dually-qualified teachers” and set it up as an objective for full-time teacher development in vocational colleges, and in the whole vocational education field. By then, though the concept of “dually-qualified teachers” had been put forward in government policies, apart from the emphasis on teachers’ “technological application” and “practical competencies”, no detailed statements had been made concerning clear definition or standards of “dually-qualified teachers.”

The third stage from 2000 to 2004--clarification of the notion “dually-qualified teachers”

Due to lack of clear definition, the term of "dually-qualified teachers" was only interpreted as teachers with both teaching qualification and other occupational qualifications (for example an engineering qualification). This misinterpretation was seen in such government policies as a) *Decision on Deepening Educational Reform and Promoting Quality-Oriented Education* promulgated by CPC Central Committee in 1999, which demanded excellent engineering and administrative professionals from industries be attracted into serving as teachers in vocational institutions while
the building of a contingent of "dually-qualified teachers" with both teaching qualification and other occupational qualifications be sped up; b) *Opinions on Strengthening Teaching Staff Training in Vocational Colleges* issued by MOE in January 2000, which defined "dually-qualified teachers" as “teachers who are also engineers, accountants, and so on” (the MOE, 2000).

Different criteria for "dually-qualified teachers" were put forward in MOE’s *Circular on Carrying out Research into cultivation of Teachers in Higher Vocational Education Institutions and Junior Colleges* issued in March, 2000:

“dually-qualified” full-time teachers of engineering disciplines must either a) have two years or more of engineering work experience and be able to guide practical trainings in their area of study, or b) have chaired (or participated as a key member) at least two engineering researches or development projects or at least two laboratory revamping projects, and have published two scientific and technological papers on college-level journals or above. These criteria can serve as a reference for other non-engineering disciplines.

It was the first national policy clarifying the meaning of "dually-qualified teachers" though a slightly different term of “teachers with dual qualifications” was adopted by the Circular. These criteria pinpointed the connotation of “dually-qualified teachers" from the perspective of qualification mix and highlighted the importance of teachers’ practical competencies in a particular field. These criteria are more operable in that it focused on measuring teachers’ industrial experience and scientific-technological R&D abilities (SUN Cui-xiang & LU Shuang-ying, 2013).

A more detailed definition of “dually-qualified teachers” was given in 2004 by MOE’s *Scheme for Assessing Students Training Quality in Vocational Colleges* (trial version)

“dually-qualified teachers” are those teachers who have an academic title of lecture or above, and meet at least one of following requirements: a) having intermediate or above technical titles (or qualification certificates, titles of occupational certificate assessor or vocational skill assessor) in their field of study;
b) within the last five years having at least two cumulative years of working experience in industries relevant to their field of study, or having attended vocational skills training programs organized by MOE and received certificates signifying the abilities to guide students’ practical training of all kinds; c) having chaired (or participated as a key member) at least two applied researches within the last five years and the research results have been utilized by industries and have achieved great benefits; d) having chaired (or participated as a key member) at least two on-campus practical training facility construction projects or technological upgrading of on-campus practical training facilities, enabling those facilities to function better than those in other vocational colleges of this kind in province areas (the MOE, 2004).

This is the most detailed interpretation of “dually-qualified teachers” by government policies since its conception and is also the official guideline currently in effect for vocational college accreditation and full-time teacher development in these institutions.

The fourth stage since 2005--development of formal training system and platforms for “dually-qualified teachers”

The clarification of “dually-qualified teachers” (dual qualifications) served as a guidance for “dually-qualified teachers” training. Since 2004, the focus of governmental files and policies has been shifted to training of “dually-qualified teachers,” instead of its definition. Decision of the State Council on Vigorously Developing the Vocational Education, promulgated in 2005, and clearly stated that the country should:

Implement a teacher quality improvement scheme for HVE institutions while financial departments of local governments should provide financial support continuously to teacher training and training centre building. A system should be set up to encourage teachers to go back to the front line of production or service for at least two months every two years to get industrial practice.

It was the first requirement in national policy for teachers in HVE institutions to
obtain industrial practice and it was subsequently institutionalised. Following policies mostly focused on how to improve quality and practical competencies of teachers’ with “dual qualification” by establishing a college-industry co-operation and platforms for teachers’ industrial practice. For example, Several Opinions on Improving the Overall Educational and Instructional Qualities of Higher Vocational Education, issued by MOE in 2006, stated that “on-job practice in industries should be arranged for teachers with a view to gaining practical experience and hence improving practical training competencies” (the MOE, 2006), while the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020), promulgated in 2010, called for:

a) Development of “dually-qualified teachers” and practical training centres for students, b) improvement of fundamental capabilities of vocational education, c) building of “dually-qualified teachers” training centre with the joint efforts of higher education institutions and both large and medium-sized enterprises, and d) perfection of the system for teachers’ regular industrial practice. (The State Council, 2010)

Opinion on Further Improvement of Training System for Vocational Education Teachers, promulgated by MOE in 2011, proposed a training system via college-industry co-operation, in particular by taking advantage of both large and medium-sized enterprises, provision of a group of “dually-qualified teachers” training centres and partner enterprises for vocational teachers’ industrial practice. It was stressed again in Decision of the State Council on Accelerating Development of Modern Vocational Education, issued in 2014,

Implementation of a system for teachers to obtain industrial practice and construction of teacher training centres by the joint efforts of top-quality vocational colleges and both large and medium-sized enterprises. (the State Council, 2014)

Through retrospection of the above relevant policies, we can conclude that over the past three decades the objectives of teacher development in HVE institutions has been gradually clarified and teachers’ industrial/practical competencies increasingly
valued. Since its invention, the notion “dually-qualified teachers”, as a key topic for governmental policies, has been continuously highly valued by governmental policies and its interpretation also steadily improved, by governmental policies. Along with this the policy focus shifted from what teachers vocational colleges need, to how to evaluate teachers’ “dual qualification”, and then how to help teachers advance their “dual qualification”. These policies covered not only the definition, standards, number, training of “dually-qualified teachers”, but also system for “dually-qualified teachers” training (SUN Cui-xiang & LU Shuang-ying, 2013). Nowadays cultivation of “dually-qualified teachers” with both practical competencies in industry and teaching competencies has become the core of all policies in the field.

**Achievements both in quantity and quality**

During the evolution over the last 30 years, there were also great achievements both in quantity and quality regarding the full-time teachers in HVE. The number of teacher teams was increasingly expanded and the quality was steadily improved.

**Achievements in quantity: the continuously increasing total number of full-time teachers**

In 1983, a small number of 54 vocational colleges (then named as short-cycle term vocational colleges) employed 2321 full-time teachers, only accounting for 0.77 per cent of the total number of teachers employed by all institutions of higher learning. Since then, the number of vocational colleges has been continuously increasing while its teacher cohorts have been continuously expanding. Especially after the 1990s when the Chinese economy started to take off and industries began needing more skilled workers, increased importance was attached to vocational education. A decision (termed as “three revamping and one supplementing”) was endorsed in the early 1990s by the government, suggesting that:

*HVE can be developed by reform, reorganization and transformation of existing occupation university, post-secondary junior colleges and universities for self-taught adults, and that if all these are not enough, the shortfalls be filled by*
upgrading a small number of authorized key vocational high schools. (Li Lanqing, 2003)

Pushed by this decision, HVE as a whole witnessed a rapid expansion in the middle and late years of the 1990s. In 1998, Higher Vocational Education Division, also responsible for development planning and governance of post-secondary junior colleges, besides those of vocational colleges, was set up under the MOE, resulting in the reform of some post-secondary junior colleges towards vocation-oriented colleges and a sharp increase in the number of both vocational colleges and their full-time teachers. Moreover, a surge in the number of both vocational colleges and consequently of their full-time teachers was witnessed in 1999 when China started its great expansion in higher education, in which a majority of the enrolment quota

Figure 3: Number of Full-time Teachers in HVE Institutions in China: 1983-2013 (thousand people)

was given to vocational colleges. In 1999, the number of full-time teachers in HVE institutions reached 88,206, accounting for 20.72 per cent of the total (425,682) in all

Figure 4: Ratio between Students and full-time Teachers in China's HVE Institutions: 1983-2013


institutions of higher learning. The number increased steadily to 436,561 in 2013, accounting for 29.17 per cent of the total (see Figure 3).

Though noticeable, the surge in the number of full-time teachers lagged far behind the surge in student enrolment. As a result, teacher-student ratio reached 1:24 in 2003, but has been below 1:20 since then. It is alarmingly low even after taking into account of the number of part-time teachers (see Figure 4).

**Steady improvement of quality**

Along with growth in figure, the quality of full-time teachers in HVE institutions also went through a steady advance. A point in case is their academic titles, with the percentage of senior academic title (professors and equivalent level, and associate professors and equivalent level) holders elevated from 5.81 per cent in 1987 to 29.28 per cent in 2013 (see Figure 5).
A non-stop increase was also seen in the number of teachers with industrial practical experience. The percentage of “dually-qualified teachers” reached 28.4 per cent (Ma Shuchao, 2009) in 2007 and then 57.2 per cent in 2013, even over 70 per cent in some provinces like Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and so on (Shanghai Academy of Educational Sciences & MyCOS Institute, 2014).

**Problems that need urgent solutions**

There are also some problems regarding the teacher development in HVE, including no official standards for teacher development available, teachers’ research and practical abilities still remain weak and so on.

**Lack of professional standards for teachers**
According to Ren and Sun (2009):

Professional standards are detailed description of skills, knowledge and behaviours required for entry into a particular profession and yardsticks against which applicants for the profession will be measured. (Ren Bo & Sun Yvzhong, 2009)

In order to strengthen teachers’ professional development, teachers’ professional standards have been formulated in many developed countries, stipulating entry requirements in terms of knowledge, aptitude, skills, conduct codes and assessment criteria. Likewise, Professional Standards for Kindergarten Teachers (trial version), Professional Standards for Primary School Teachers (trial version), and Professional Standards for Secondary School Teachers (trial version) were promulgated by the MOE in China in 2012 to specify essential professional ideology, knowledge and competencies for teachers in kindergartens, primary schools, or secondary schools respectively. HVE, however, is a different level and type of education focusing on fostering students practical competencies. Therefore, teachers in HVE institutions are expected to have some special competencies for HVE, as well as general competencies required for all college teachers. Due to these differences, a unique set of professional standards should be established for teachers in HVE institutions. However, no sound professional standards are available in China for these teachers, and these teachers are still in the same track similar to those of other higher education institutions in terms of teacher certification, which have not yet taken HVE’s unique features and demands into consideration. Even worse, the current teacher certification system only examines applicants’ competencies before their entry into the profession, but no attention has been paid to ongoing assessment and upgrading along with teachers’ professional development. Consequently, this lack of special professional standards for teachers in HVE institutions has disoriented those teachers along their professional development (Zhu Xuemei, 2010).
Negligence of teachers’ scientific and technological research abilities improvement

As one of three functions of higher education, scientific and technological research is a vital means for teachers in HVE institutions to improve their professional competencies. However, over the nearly thirty years of HVE development, and despite the advocacy of “production-teaching-research combination” in HVE, objection to knowledge-oriented and discipline-categorised courses have been the main theme in HVE’s educational and instructional reform and in its teacher development drive whereas academic themes have been marginalised, hence scientific and technological research among the teachers has been weakened (Cheng Yikang, 2012). The status of scientific and technological research by teachers in HVE institutions was further lowered by a government policy publicised in 2006, Several Opinions on Improving the Overall Educational and Instructional Qualities of Higher Vocational Education, in which “research” was removed out of the “production-teaching-research combination” and another term “production-teaching combined approach” was proposed instead. Since then little efforts have been given to improve HVE teachers’ scientific and technological research, although “research” was discussed again in following policies.

Applied technological invention and patents show teachers’ practical competencies, technological application and R&D abilities, and professional proficiency. We searched in the Patent Database under China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) by typing in key words such as “vocational and technical colleges” “vocational colleges”, and “technical colleges” for patents for invention, exterior design or new applied techniques owned by teachers from these colleges. We found that 2,387 patents of the three kinds were conferred to full-time teachers from HVE institutions in 2011, which means 0.006 patents per full-time HVE teacher. Even if these patents were all from teachers of technological, engineering, agricultural, or medical subjects (accounting for about half of the total according to the China Education Statistics Yearbook 2011), subjects involving more technology which are more likely to contribute to technological advancement, the per capita
average is just 0.012, signifying huge room for improvement.

**More efforts should be made to reinforce the effectiveness of “dual qualification” training**

Involvement in industrial practice is the major approach for teachers in HVE institutions to improve their professional aptitude. In recent years, industrial working experience and practical competencies of some full-time teachers from HVE institutions have been improved via doing on-job industrial practicum. There are, however, some problems. First, no mature system has been established for teachers’ deep involvement in industrial practice, therefore the effects of industrial practice vary greatly from institution to institution, from program to program, from individual teacher to individual teacher; second, for some teachers, industrial practicum only means looking around the industries and gaining some industrial working experience while only very few teachers, with excellent technological applications and R&D abilities, can actively participate in enterprises’ technical innovation and upgrading. A survey of "dually-qualified teachers" in vocational colleges in Jiangsu Province found that “32 per cent of all vocational college teachers in Jiangsu cannot learn or acquire new knowledge timely from production front lines, while 90 per cent or so of teachers are poor at operation and technique” (Cai Yi, Zhang Yiping & Sun Xianshan, 2011), which, to some extent, reveals the problems faced by "dual qualification" project in vocational colleges.

**Unable to attract professionals from industry to teach in HVE colleges**

Professionals with high skills and rich experiences from industry are the best choice for higher vocational colleges to train their students to meet the need of industry. But just like in other countries around the world, professionals can earn more practicing their profession than they can teaching it. Salary of teachers in HVE colleges in China is just at medium level and less attractive to professionals than industry. So most the professionals with high skills are in the industry and there are few teachers in HVE colleges with skills meet the needs of industry. Therefore, the primary mission of the construction of “dual qualification” teachers’ team is to improve the practical ability of the full-time teachers. For example, a new item is listed in the
Modern Vocational Education Development Strategy 2014-2020 which requires the full-time professional teachers should practice their profession in industry no less than two months every two years. This is one of the reasons that account for the graduates from HVE colleges can’t meet the needs of industry.

Suggestions on teacher development in HVE institutions

Based on the analysis above, we try to put forward some suggestions on teacher development in HVE, according to some policies published recently.

Speed up the development of professional standards for teachers in HVE institutions

The development of professional standards for teachers in HVE institutions has been prioritised by the government and proposed in government files such as the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) promulgated in 2010, asking for “the establishment of professional standards for teachers in HVE institutions correspondent to vocational education’s features,” and Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Development of Modern Vocational Education in 2014, demanding “perfection of teacher qualification criteria and the establishment of professional standards for teachers”. Policies also demanded that, in compliance with the characteristics and development orientation of HVE, the professional standards for HVE teachers are expected to emphasise “dual qualification.” In terms of knowledge requirements, these professional standards should highlight teachers’ mastering of technical and industrial knowledge; as for research ability, these professional standards should focus on technological application and R&D abilities, abilities to apply their research results in enterprises’ production, technological renovation and products upgrading; and as for teaching competencies, teachers’ practical training competencies and their guidance in students’ practical training should be underscored to meet the mission of HVE: training skilled manpower.
To further college-industry co-operation to better enhance teachers’ practical competencies

Working experience in industries and knowing production technologies and operating procedures of a company is an important indicator of professional aptitude of teachers’ in HVE institutions. However, professional aptitude should not be defined only as having working experience in industries and obtaining certain technical expertise and practical skills, otherwise teachers would be directed towards becoming technicians (Song Qinglong, 2007), which is inconsistent with HVE’s orientation as tertiary education. The core of teachers’ practical competencies is the ability to serve industries and businesses, which in turn enable teachers to update their working experience, and then their teaching content, thus providing improved training quality. Serving industries and businesses, means that you get involved in enterprises’ technical renovation and R&D, to provide technical support and consultancy to enterprises, even to lead the enterprises’ technical development, as well as to master technical expertise in that industry. Therefore, HVE institutions should put more emphasis on teachers’ practical competencies and R&D abilities instead of their working experience in industries. Moreover college-industry co-operation mechanisms should be set up to guide teachers’ active involvement in production and R&D of enterprises and increase the effectiveness of the teachers’ practicum by means of deepening the teacher-enterprise co-operation in R&D as well as enhancing their practical expertise.

To guide teachers’ applied research

Teachers’ participation in industries’ applied research or R&D, as a symbol of the two natures of HVE (tertiary and vocational) and an essential goal of HVE development, is not only an effective way for teachers to enhance their practical skills and their ability to serve enterprise but also an effective way to improve the overall quality of HVE. It is beneficial to both HVE institutions and teachers. For HVE institutions, teachers’ participation in industry-demanded applied research or R&D can guarantee sustainable and deep college-enterprise co-operation, hence improved student training quality. On the teachers’ part, applied research or R&D
can greatly enhance their academic expertise, knowledge teaching, and confidence in academic research. Therefore under the circumstance where quality development is stressed, great efforts should be made in both governmental policy and college policy to guide teachers towards applied research and towards research abilities improvement. It should be noted, however, that applied research in HVE should focus on applied research driven by industrial needs, and on didactic research to improve actual instruction. Meanwhile, research and teaching should be well-balanced, instead of stressing research while neglecting teaching.

To construct motivation systems to attract professionals from industry to teach in HVE colleges

China needs to establish multi-sectorial promotion policies, such as policies established by the MOE, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHESS), and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), to attract more professionals from business to teach in HVE colleges. Policies should set a series of salary standards to encourage professionals from industry to teach in HVE colleges, as well as to reward or provide promotion priorities to those whose teach in colleges part-time. Meanwhile, more authority should be delegated to colleges permitting them to employ professionals as full-time teachers at a high salary. It is also a good way to attract professionals to employ as part-time teachers. With a principal of not-for-possession-but-for-using, colleges should employ some professionals with high skills from industry.

Conclusions

1. Conceptually, a principle has been shaped for full-time teacher development in HVE institutions, namely individual full-time teachers should have “dual qualifications” while “dually-qualified teachers” should account for the majority of a teacher cohort.

2. The number of full-time teachers in HVE institutions has greatly increased, now accounting for 29.17 per cent the total in all institutions of higher learning. Compared with the percentage of HVE enrolment, 50 per cent of the total higher
education enrolment, there is a lack of teachers, even part-time teachers from industry.

3. Great progress has been made in faculty quality with sharp increases in the percentage of both senior academic title holders and “dually-qualified teachers”. Nevertheless, more efforts should be made to further improve teachers’ practical competencies, and applied research abilities in particular so that they can participate actively in industrial production and technical research. Meanwhile, policies should be established by several sectors jointly, such as the MOE, the MOHESS, and the NDRC, to motivate professionals to teach in colleges.

4. No national professional standards for full-time HVE teacher development are available. Government is expected to work together with industries and HVE institutions to formulate criteria for entrance and promotion of teachers, and to regulate the development of full-time teachers in order to promote the quality of the team.

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China-Africa humanistic education co-operation: a road toward cultural diversity*

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Abstract

For nearly six decades, China-Africa education co-operation has made great progress laying a stronger foundation for a better partnership between the partners and, to some extent, the promotion of African capacity-building. Nonetheless, considering the cultural domination of the West in the world and a cultural crisis that both China and African countries are encountering, technique-oriented Sino-African education co-operation should be accompanied with a stronger co-operation on humanistic education, so as to meet the needs of cultural diversification in a global age. This article argues that it is just the time for China and Africa to address the need of pursuing their closer humanistic education co-operation to counterbalance the Western cultural hegemony and promote diversification of cultures in the world, although in this bi-lateral co-operation Western culture should never be a targeted enemy.

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Introduction

Sino-African educational co-operation has made great progress since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949. However, it does not mean this progress is much associated with or has significantly pushed the world’s cultural diversification. This is mainly due to the reality that technique-oriented educational co-operation between China and Africa has outnumbered their humanity-oriented co-operation.

This article will focus on the humanistic education co-operation between China and Africa over the past few decades, analysing its achievements and challenges and searching for feasible approaches to promote the humanistic education co-operation that can contribute to the diversity of cultures in the world. Taking this into account, the article is divided into three sections. The first section will discuss the theoretic role of humanistic education between China and Africa in its contribution to the cultural diversification in the world. In the second section, the social practices, achievements and limitations of China-African humanistic educational co-operation will be examined and analysed empirically. The road to cultural diversification in Africa and China through education co-operation in the humanistic field will be elaborated on in the third section.

Crisis of cultural diversification in China and Africa and their cultural independence

Crisis of national/local culture in China and Africa

The importance of cultural diversity for humankind is self-evident. The respect and protection of cultural diversity is not simply part of the road to economic prosperity and political stability at national, regional and global levels, but also arguably the precondition of the survival of humanity. The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, issued by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 2001, highly values cultural diversity by stating that:

\[
\text{(A)s a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common}\]

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heritage of humanity and should be recognised and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations. (UNESCO, 2001)

It also stated that cultural diversity:

Widens the range of options open to everyone; it is one of the roots of development, understood not simply in terms of economic growth, but also as a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence. (UNESCO, 2001)

The implication of these words is that both the equality of different cultures and the maintenance of their distinctions should be respected. Cultural diversity is both desirable and achievable if local and national cultures in the same region are recognised by each other and treated equally by political systems. That is, the cultural diversity can be empirically considered as a case if each culture can be independent from any heterogeneous cultures.

Nonetheless, the cultural diversity and many countries’ local and national cultures’ independence have long been undermined by colonialism and the spread of western culture embedded in the process of industrialisation, and especially challenged lately by a new wave of globalisation since the 1990s. As for China and Africa, their national/local cultures are particularly undermined by a series of historical episodes such as Westernisation, de-tradition movements, colonisation, and globalisation.

As for China, huge cultural crises emerged in the late 19th century when western powers entered this old empire and Japan defeated China in 1895 (Leung Kai Chiu, 1993). From then on the Chinese elite has never given up on their search for ways of generating wealth and saving a poor “central kingdom”, hoping to resume the glory of Chinese culture. Nonetheless, since the May 4th Movement in 1919, one alternative road to restore a rich and strong China - overall westernisation, defined as embracing “democracy and science”- was broadly accepted by Chinese elites, despite the early failure of a top-down “Westernisation Movement”.

After the People’s Republic was founded, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a ruling party partly took over the idea of overall Westernisation, in the sense that it set
Marxism and socialism as dominant ideologies. After the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) which led to immeasurable catastrophe for Chinese culture, the CCP declared that it is promoting the partial resumption of Chinese traditional culture in order to make Chinese people learn all “outstanding achievements of all civilisations in the world” to serve for “Four modernisations” and “Socialist Construction” (Hua Guofeng, 1978). Yet in reality all the “outstanding achievements of all civilisations” were mainly referred to as Western cultures in this context.

That is, from the late 19th century, Chinese traditional culture was in great jeopardy, under pressure of Westernisation. And now Chinese political ideology is Marxism, an ideology from Western culture, although at present Marx’s doctrine is not popular among Chinese in reality. It can be said that contemporary China’s culture is like a mixture, blending with Chinese and western, traditional and modern, capitalist and socialist cultures, and it is named as “modern Chinese culture”.

Apart from upper-mentioned voluntary Westernisation, Chinese traditional culture is also seriously challenged by globalisation and Western countries’ intended ideological war in the post-Cold War era. The impact of globalisation on China’s culture is more serious than imagined. Yet, China has never rejected globalisation and internationalisation from the beginning, partially because globalisation is related to internationalisation, which is positive for China as a developing country to become more modernised, industrialised, and developed, and partially because globalisation as a tendency is hard to reject and resist. Consequently, under the impacts of globalisation, China tends to be more westernised in terms of its culture. Although theoretically Chinese culture can also “go abroad” and engage the West and other cultures, Chinese culture finds it hard to compete with American and Western culture in practice.

The implication is that Western countries (including the United States of America) have successfully “sold” their cultures to the rest of the world (including China) via globalisation, which is considered as (conscious or unconscious) Western cultural imperialism by some scholars (for example J. Schlesinger Arthur, 1974). Clearly, this
process of “selling” their cultures in globalisation is also a process of industrialisation, marketization and internationalisation of Western culture. That is, the spread of Western culture is fit for the capitalist way, it is an efficient business which not only profits those related Western companies but also spreads the Western cultures to the rest of the world at the same time. Furthermore, the West’s success is also due to it deftly taking advantage of the similarities between “Western culture” and “modern culture”, and to its exercising great power of “international” media, a part of Western capitalist system’s great chains.

However, if compared with the West, China lacks the ability to internationalise its cultural industry, including its cultural resources and innovation, and influential “international” media, so the Chinese culture is unable to compete with Western culture at present. In a word, in globalisation, Western, especially American culture, become “globalised culture”, yet other cultures in the world (including Chinese culture) do not.

In addition, another challenge to Chinese culture is that it faces the permeation and even attack of Western ideologies, especially after the end of the Cold War. Some Western countries’ governments often criticise and scold Chinese political and societal systems and some special policies, and this criticism is always grounded in some would-be universal moralities and values, such as respecting minorities, human rights, social freedom or election rights, and so on. This attack of Western countries has encouraged some Chinese dissents to criticise Chinese political ideologies and create value confusion among Chinese people. Together with the action of Western non-government organisations (NGOs) in China that financially support academic communications and cultural exchanges, Western ideologies’ permeation is somehow very successful among some Chinese elites, educated young persons, and even middle-aged women, the latter are not well educated but become the main Christian believers in China (Wu Guihua, 2012).5

As for Africa, its long history of being colonised by European colonists is also accompanied with a long history of under-development of the culture. The dark history is marked by the brutal cultural imperialism of European colonial powers in Africa
and the tragic fate of African culture.

By 1912, except for Ethiopia and Liberia, all other countries in Africa had been colonised by some European countries, namely Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and Spain. In reality, the independence of Ethiopia and Liberia was only in name, the state of these two countries was sub-colonised. Under the colonial ruling, African countries became some Western powers’ backyards and a part of these colonial empires. For example, those colonised regions in Western Africa were incorporated by the suzerain state France into the “Federation of Western Africa” in 1904, and those equatorial regions into the “Federation of Equatorial Africa” in 1910. Other colonial powers took similar tactics to combine their colonies into one big political system which was mixed with different nations, cultures, identities, regions and customs. Hence there emerged German East Africa, Portuguese African Territory, Belgian Central Africa, and so on. As a result of this struggling for spheres of influence among colonial powers in Africa, on the one hand, African territories and peoples were arbitrarily divided and separated, although between the borders of these different colonies, some nations and ethnicities shared the same traditions and cultures. On the other hand, each colonised region was strengthened through economic, political and cultural linkages with Western suzerain states. Thus colonisation is also a process of African division and overall dependence on Western colonial powers. This process did not change substantially until the success of de-colonisation in the 1950s-1960s.

Due to the long history of being under the influence of colonial powers from the 15th century to more or less direct control until the mid-20th century and the continuous link with the pre-suzerain in many ways, African cultures have become deeply influenced and marked by European culture. This has generally resulted in negative impacts on African culture, although slightly sprouted the fledging modernization in African coast and hinterland.

First, because of colonisation and dependence on suzerains, African education is less developed. In the colonial period, African education was only limited to primary and middle school education, only a few higher education institutions in some big cities
were established after the end of the World War II. In reality, the number of primary schools was also insufficient, and was unable to meet the real demands of Africa countries. In the vast rural areas and most towns, schools for black African people were hard to find. The curriculums of schools were not reasonable either, since they were only copies of suzerain’s own systems, and did not match with the real condition and local tradition of Africa. Consequently, African education after decolonialism cannot develop quickly with a lack of resources to be used for the building of national educational systems in Africa after independence.

Second, related to the colonial education mechanism, African elites could not grow to be national leaders, but only the assistants of Western colonists. Obviously, European colonial powers were unable to send their citizens to occupy all positions in African colonies. The colonists selected and appointed those who were educated in suzerains or in colonial schools, and thus likely loyal to suzerains, as the middle and low level rulers in their mother lands. Those educated Africans became a part of the colonial system, maintaining the system’s function and efficiency. And these elites in political and societal areas were also elites in culture. Influenced by these elites, African culture was transformed into a copy of Western culture, and the local cultures in Africa were unable to be inherited and carried forward. That made African people unable to shape their own cultural consciousness.

Thirdly, European suzerains’ institutions were introduced and duplicated in Africa. Gradually, African people become familiar with and used to European institutional cultures. Even after their political independence, African countries almost accepted the overall coloniser’s institutions, especially administrative and judicial systems, and unavoidably those values and ideologies embedded in these institutions, although many African countries desired to reform these institutions. These institutions were less functional, if not flawed.

Fourthly, mainly due to the arbitrary creation of African countries by the colonial powers, the natural growth and evolution of traditional local cultures in Africa was brutally interrupted. Originally, local ethnic groups lived together and shared the same or similar languages, totems, religions, and customs, but were divided and
forced to live in different countries and meanwhile, in a new “homeland”, people in one ethnic group had to live with people in another ethnic group who were culturally and ethnically different. For instance, Haussa are living in Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan. Conversely, many ethnicities with different traditions and cultures were sectioned into one country, like in Tanzania where almost 120 ethnicities live together, and in Nigeria, about 250 ethnicities. Consequently, in general the local cultures were ruptured because of the division of nations, ethnicities and tribes, and meanwhile, the national culture in a new country could not be formed easily due to big differences among different ethnic groups and tribes within a country that cannot be bridged in a short term. Furthermore, the local culture does not have the chance to be consciously classified, inherited, and developed in political, social and economic areas by African people.

Humanistic Education co-operation, cultural independence and significance of Sino-African humanistic education co-operation

Not like scientific and technological education, social sciences and humanistic education cannot get rid of the influence of ideology. In other words, social sciences and humanistic education “is never politically and ideologically neutral” (Samuel Kodjo, 1979). In this sense, the humanistic education can promote the cultural independence of a nation by cultivating citizens’ patriotism, self-consciousness on national culture and identity.

The humanistic education, especially on history, literature and language, and philosophy is necessary for developing countries to (re)shape the nationality and consciousness on national unity. That is also the reason that in the beginning of state-establishment, all developing countries that were independent from suzerains and always included different ethnicities, separated territories and heterogeneous cultures were inclined to construct special narrations on “national history”, integrate those different ethnicities’ literatures and philosophies into official ideology. The newly-formed ideology reflects that the “new nation” shared the same histories, customs, philosophies, traditions, dreams and common future, namely, the shared national identity. Based on the intended humanistic education, a new nation is constructed
and its national culture is formed. This is especially significant for a developing country that was deeply influenced and marked by colonial culture or whose traditional culture was not modernised or not integrated into a shared national culture.

Therefore, humanistic education in formal educational institutions- schools and universities- and in informal education is one basic approach to the construction of a people’s consciousness of national citizenship and patriotism, upon which the “cultural consciousness” can be formed. As a concept, “cultural consciousness” means people living in a given cultural circle have the clear self-knowledge on their culture’s history, future and its advantages and disadvantages in comparison of heterogeneous cultures (Fei Xiaotong, 1997).6

Put it in concrete terms, through humanistic education, people can know more about their own culture, then the cultural identity can be formed and the intention to protect local and national cultures is strengthened. If cultural identity and cultural consciousness are formed, the will to refute cultural imperialism could be strengthened and the local and national cultures could be bolstered.

Nonetheless, the humanistic education should take an open attitude towards other cultures, or else it not only makes people have a narrow view on their own nation’s culture, and also perhaps makes them hostile towards hetero-culture and encourages cultural nationalism in society. So a closed humanistic education is somehow dangerous and can lead to extreme narcissism and cultural nationalism, which in return damages the cultural diversity and deviates from the original intention of education.

Moreover, the humanistic education without openness to hetero-culture is unable to cultivate national innovation and imagination. It is proved that cultural diversification is a base of human innovation; conversely, non-open humanistic education is an enemy of innovation. In a globalised age, innovation could be a case only if it was understood and accepted by the people in the rest of the world. Namely, based on local and national culture, creative ideas or goods may emerge, but would not have global significance until they are proved to be universal. Or else
some other ideas and goods similar to them that are commonly understood and accepted in the world will represent them. The so-called “innovation” within a closed culture is not truly innovation since its life-cycle is too short to compete with others. In a sum, the non-open humanistic education is not helpful for national innovation.

Furthermore, to keep one’s culture in vigour, it is necessary to keep some competition on it. Without competition and stimulation from hetero-culture, a local culture will gradually lose its vigour, and finally decline to a more obsolete and static state.

To strengthen national identity, inspire national innovation and keep national culture’s vigour, the cultural exchange and communication is necessary. Due to this, the humanistic education is significant for both China and Africa, especially in the age of globalisation and when both of their cultures are in crisis.

The achievement of China-African education co-operation and challenges

There is a long history of China-African communication. It can at least be traced back to Zheng He’s voyages toward today’s Kenya; however, educational co-operation was initiated only after New China was built in 1949. From then on, Sino-African education co-operation experienced a tortuous road. It has made great achievements and is marked by several stages as follows.

Firstly, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the preliminary education co-operation emerged. The first African country that started education co-operation with China was Egypt. Then Egyptian President Nasser had a close private relationship with then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. They met in the first Asia-African Conference in Bandung of Indonesia and formed good friendship between China and Egypt. Thus even before these two countries’ formal relationship was built in July 1956, the bilateral communication (including educational co-operation) had taken place. In January 1956, the two countries signed an agreement according to which China would receive four Egyptian students to study in China. This as a milestone has some symbolic significance. From then, the first chapter of China-Africa education
co-operation had been unfolded. In the 1950s, a total of 24 students from Egypt, Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda and Malawi had studied in China and three Chinese teachers were sent to Africa. This limited yet unprecedented education co-operation implies both Africa and China needed to enhance their relationship in the time of de-colonisation and anti-hegemony, however this co-operation is limited by their local education’s low development and limited education resources.

Although there was so many shortages, China, as the “standard-bearer” of developing countries in the Third World in that time (the Soviet Union and the US belonged to the First World), had a great will to support Africa’s independence and de-colonisation. So in a very hard time for China in the 1950s-1970s, when China experienced the “Great Leap Forward”, terrible “Three Years’ Natural Disasters” and the “Great Cultural Revolution”, the assistance toward Africa was never reduced but increased. From the beginning of 1950 to the end of 1966, about 164 African students from 14 African countries studied in China, and 14 Chinese teachers had worked in Africa; then in the 1970s, about 648 students from 25 African countries studied in China, and 115 Chinese teachers had been sent to Africa, except for the period of 1967-1972 in which the Cultural Revolution developed. In this period, China not only received general students, but also invited some revolutionary parties’ members to study in China as to support Africa’s revolution against colonisation and for independence.

Then in the 1980s, with the détente between the East and the West, China-Africa educational co-operation developed more quickly. By the end of the 1980s, about 2245 students from 43 African countries had studied in China, and about 250 students and teachers from China had studied or worked in Africa.

Secondly, in the 1990s China-Africa education co-operation entered into a new stage. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the China-Africa relationship developed into a new stage, and both China and African countries shifted their policies toward each other. For China, a politics-oriented policy toward Africa was translated into an economy-oriented policy, and a two-track communication between China and Africa was encouraged. That is, apart from
government-to-government relations, people-to-people relations were also developed quickly in this time. In the educational field, some self-financed students from Africa were present in Chinese classes. For instance, in the 1990s, there were 1580 self-financed students of Africa in China, studying various majors. In this period, the number of African students to China that earned Master and Doctor degrees increased, thanks to Chinese government duly increasing the quota of Master and PhD students.

Meanwhile, some independent co-operation agreements and projects were signed between Universities. These agreements and projects were signed and carried on by universities themselves and they did not need the permission of the Chinese government before signing. Chinese universities had the right to develop their education co-operation with African partners, and generally the Chinese Education Ministry would endorse this co-operation financially or by policy. Chinese teachers working in Africa were more often sent by Chinese universities than by the Education Ministry that was the main institution that sent Chinese teachers to Africa before the 1990s. Additionally, Chinese universities also had the rights to do co-research with African partners and even co-build some laboratories and engage in other co-operation such as discipline construction and personnel training, and so on. By 2003, China’s universities had kicked off 43 projects on high-education and scientific research, and built 21 laboratories in African universities.

Thirdly, from the year 2000, a new age of China-African relations emerged, which also greatly influenced on educational co-operation. The first Sino-African ministerial meeting- known as the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) was held in 2000 in Beijing, and then in turn in Africa and China every 3 years thereafter. From 2006 onwards the ministerial meeting was upgraded into summit meetings, and a longstanding Sino-African co-operation mechanism was formed and developed. Helped by the Forum, Sino-African education co-operation was also developed into a new stage.

In the first Forum, both sides decided to establish the “African Human Resources Development Fund” by which China financially supported Africa’s personnel
training and educational development through providing African students with Chinese government scholarships, helping African countries construct laboratories and schools, sending teachers and volunteers to Africa, providing them with Chinese language teaching, and so on. And in reality, the volume of the financial support to Africa by the Fund is increased once every 3 years. By June 2013, China had provided over 45,000 people trainings for Africa, covering more than 20 fields including economics, science and technology, and environmental protection (Hu Jinxin, 2013). In addition, Chinese language teaching became popular in Africa. The first Confucius Institute, the main institute for Chinese language teaching abroad led by Hanban, was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2005. By 2014 there were around 42 Confucius Institutes in 29 African countries and 18 Confucius Classrooms in 13 African countries. With partial assistance from Confucius Institutes, two Chinese studies centres have been established in Egypt and South Africa.

In 2006, China issued the first *African Policy Paper*, in which education co-operation was highlighted; a second paper has just been published (December 2015). The Chinese government reiterated the importance of the African Human Resources Development Fund and promised “to determine key areas, expand fields, increase investment and improve effectiveness”. Moreover, it also promised to increase the number of government scholarship for African students and send more teachers to Africa. The policy paper stated that China will:

> Help African countries carry out the teaching of Chinese; implement education assistance projects, promote the development of African weak disciplines; and encourage bi-lateral exchanges and co-operation of educational and academic institutions

The academic co-operation between China and Africa has grown closer in recent years, and several long-term and large-scale co-projects are under implementation, including 20+20 Co-operation Plan of Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education, Think Tanks 10+10, China-Africa Think Tank Forum and China-Africa Research and Exchange Program, and so on (Obamba, 2013). Meanwhile, some non-governmental institutions and even some Chinese private enterprises are engaging in
China-African education co-operation. For example, the first China-African People’s Forum was successfully held in Nairobi in 2011. To address Sino-African education co-operation is one of this Forum’s missions. In the Forum’s China-African Civil Exchange and Co-operation Initiative issued in August 2015, it stated that:

*China’s civil organisations will help African countries to train and develop all urgently needed talents in fields of technology, engineering, health, agriculture and so on, through aiding the training in China programs, sending experts to and establishing training centres in Africa countries, and granting scholarships to African students.*

Although many education achievements in co-operation were made within a half-century, there are still several shortages. Firstly, the humanistic education co-operation between the two sides is limited. In the beginning of their educational co-operation, the humanistic education co-operation seemed to be more common than education co-operation in technological and engineering fields (for example, the first batch of African students from Egypt to China studied painting, philosophy and agriculture), mainly because at that time China’s education in technology and engineering (except for agriculture) was not developed, and China as a country with a long history and rich cultural heritage could provide international students with some humanistic educational training. However, although some humanistic education co-operation did occur at the early stages of China-Africa education co-operation, it primarily focused on language learning.

From the 1970s, with the increasing demands for industrialisation on both sides, some technological and engineering education co-operation became more important than humanistic education co-operation. Correspondingly, the majors of those teachers sent to Africa were more and more constricted within natural and applied sciences. For example, by the end of the 1980s, about 2245 African students from 43 countries had studied in more than 100 colleges and universities in China (He 2007), mostly majoring in agriculture, computer science, biology, chemistry, biochemistry, medicine, engineering, architecture, water conservancy engineering, food engineering, and some social sciences like economics and international relations.
And Chinese language learning was the main major of those in humanistic majors. Meanwhile, with the implementation of the “Go Abroad” policy, Chinese educational institutions also entered into Africa. By the end of 2003, China had 43 projects on scientific research carried out in 21 African countries’ universities. Just as the research fields suggest, educational co-operation mainly focused on science and technology for example on biology, computer science, physics, analytical chemistry, food preservation and processing, materials science, gardening, civil engineering and surveying, and so on.

Of course, since the 2000s, the Confucius Institutes in Africa took over much of the work of teaching the Chinese language to African people. They also introduced some Chinese traditional culture to them, however, this role played by them was beyond the needs of systemic humanistic education co-operation between China and Africa.

Secondly, the forms of education co-operation were limited. For a long time, the main form of educational co-operation was to accept African students to study at Chinese universities and at the same time send Chinese teachers, technicians and volunteers who taught foundational majors like math, physics and chemistry to Africa. In recent years, with the increasing demands in Africa for industrialisation and the development of education in China, the co-operative forms have become relatively richer. More and more co-operation regarding technological and scientific research emerged, and Chinese educational institutions began going to Africa, establishing laboratories, training centres and Chinese language teaching institutions, and especially, helping African countries build educational infrastructure including the construction of schools, providing teaching equipment and learning materials, and so on. However, up to now, the primary form of education co-operation is based on teacher- and student exchanges, co-operation in other forms is not as strong as China’s educational co-operation with western academic institutions.

Moreover, to some extent co-operation is like a one-way communication. The students from Africa who go to China are far more than Chinese students studying in Africa. Generally, the USA and Europe are the main destination for studying abroad for Chinese students, Africa is not a popular place for Chinese students to earn their
degrees. In addition, it is uncommon to see African teachers and scholars visit and do research in Chinese academic institutions, or at least the number is far less than that of Chinese teachers and scholars going to Africa. Clearly it is not absolutely a fit for “co-operation” which implies symmetric and two-way communication.

The Chinese government pays much attention to humanistic exchanges with Africa, and considers education co-operation as part of humanistic exchange between China and Africa. However, it is not clear what the weight or position of humanistic education co-operation in the whole education co-operation and in the humanistic exchange strategy is.

Thirdly, in Sino-Africa educational co-operation, the soft infrastructure building is less important than the hard infrastructure construction. It is more common that China builds houses and rooms for education and training, provides teaching and learning materials, sends teachers to teach technological and engineering courses for African people and so on, than facilitate exchanges on education ideas, approaches, systems and the differences between them. The education itself and areas such as philosophy, culture, and values exchanges through education co-operation are somehow absent in their educational co-operation.

Because of previously mentioned shortages and limitations, humanistic education co-operation in China-Africa education co-operation is not an important part and only on the edge of total education co-operation. In reality, it seems the humanistic education co-operation is somehow absent in the planning for both sides. Consequently, cultures, values and philosophies embedded in humanistic education “carriers” such as books, movies and artwork are not familiar to the audiences of the opposing sides, and each side lacks a third reference of culture to reflect or counterbalance or offset western cultural influences.

**Beyond pragmatism: approaches for cultural diversification by Sino-African humanistic educational co-operation**

Although pragmatism-oriented China-Africa education co-operation is important for both sides, it is just the time for both sides to start the humanistic education co-
operation as to resist and counterbalance the Western cultural hegemony, since this influence is deeply undermining the bases of both sides’ traditional, national or local cultures and their confidence in cultural independence and their ability to innovate in their modernisation. In order to make more progress in the humanistic education co-operation, some basic approaches should be taken by both sides.

First, a “great education” idea should be formed. ”Great education” in China-Africa humanistic education co-operation implies more governmental and academic institutions, more skilful mechanisms, more social institutions and corporations should be involved, and more talents are needed.

The humanistic education co-operation between China and Africa is not only the task of the education ministries of China and African countries, but also is dependent on other governmental institutions’ involvement. Clearly, cultural, technological, financial and foreign affairs ministries and some other related governmental institutions are also necessary to ensure the smooth co-operation. In order to keep sound and efficient communication among these ministries and official institutions, a scientific mechanism that maintains good communication and co-ordination among all related governmental institutions and even between governmental and social institutions should be improved.

Furthermore, the humanistic education co-operation should not merely happen between schools or universities, more academic and educational institutions should be engaged too. So as to push the humanistic education co-operation, the co-operation should be encouraged to take place between schools, colleges and universities, think tanks and training centres, and so forth. Additionally, besides governmental engagement, social institutions and even corporations should be encouraged to be involved. Social institutions and corporations can make and flexibly adjust their co-operative projects according to market demands and real situations. In China-Africa education co-operation, governmental institutions and state-controlled academic institutions are main actors, to some degree social and economic actors are absent, which makes the co-operation less effective than imagined and needed.
Additionally, talents in humanistic education co-operation are key factors, so more funds and materials should be put into talents cultivation and training for both sides.

Secondly, since colonisation (and with globalisation), Africa has been deeply influenced by western cultures, and African cultures and values are not to be applied into the political, judicial, economic and social systems. African cultures and their values are not the main part of political ideologies in African countries, and the local traditional cultures and values do not play the key role as the ruling ideologies in Africa, nor are traditional African cultures well integrated into the west-left colonial cultures, in fact African cultures do not function as a strong or efficient factor in nation building or for economic development, and some traditions such as tribalism has had a negative impact. Under this condition, as to divorce from colonial culture’s domination and promote national self-confidence and innovation, African cultures’ self-discovery and then self-consciousness are the basic and first step. According to this, China as a rising power that addresses cultural diversification in the world not only has the responsibility but also has great potential, through humanistic education co-operation, to help African countries discover their good traditional cultures and values and assist in modernisation. Additionally, as a state with a long history and rich experiences to sort, inherit and develop traditional cultures (although this is still a challenging and hard work for China), China can do much for African cultural self-discovery and consciousness. For this reason, China’s educational assistance should somehow financially support more for the African cultures’ sorting, developing and teaching within schools and without, co-training talents for African cultures’ discovery and sorting, and promoting African local and traditional cultural spread among young people through education and markets. Additionally, China and Africa can also work together to push the pan-African cultural discovery, through co-operation, making African people search for common African cultures and values, promoting African cultural integration and erecting African spiritual independence.

Thirdly, China and Africa can co-operate to write African history books and textbooks from African and developing countries’ perspective, gradually getting rid of West-oriented or West-cantered historical narration. Clearly, any independent nation should write its history from its own perspective. So if African countries want
to build their self-cultural confidence and consciousness, one of the first jobs is to form local and national views on their own histories, and this historical narration must be full of the African national heroes, values and moralities, the introduction of African national artistic works and great events, and mostly, the subjectivity of African nations in the historic narration. Other nations and groups (except for some typical countries like South Africa and Namibia where so-called “settler colonies” had made great contribution to the “state-building” in history), including Western colonialists, should be just on the edge of this narration, although they are very important involvers in African history. In this sense, China can financially help African countries to write and publish Africa-centered history books, build Africa-centered museums and art galleries, and train related talents, and so on.

Fourthly, both sides should translate and publish more books, journal and magazine articles for each other, show more movies and TV programs for each other in their respective domestic channels, and organise more joint cultural activities, and so forth. Frankly speaking, both China and Africa have more interest in translating and publishing many kinds of Western books and articles and introducing a large number of Western cultural works than they do each other’s. Consequently, in both China and African countries, Western culture is very popular, yet they do not know more about each other, or they know about each other to a great extent from Western perspective through Western media and works. Of course this is not helpful for the diversification of both sides and for the independence and renaissance of the national/local cultures in China and Africa. Although there are some cultural exchanges between China and African countries, for example, several Chinese TV series, like “The Beautiful Time of My Wife" and "We Get Married", which were introduced into Tanzania and Uganda (Yuan Jirong, 2015), due to their weak competitive power of entertainment industry in global arena and the low willingness of exchange, the case of cultural exchanges is still too few, and the area is too limited.

Conclusion

In the age of globalisation western culture (especially the Anglo-Saxon culture) is
dominant in the world and cultural diversity and equality are more like a vision than a reality, it is just the time for China and Africa to strengthen their humanistic education co-operation to boom national/local cultures and counterbalance the cultural hegemony of the West within and without. However, in this co-operation there are some matters that should be paid attention to on both sides.

First, for China, it should be aware that there are 54 countries in Africa and huge differences exist among these countries in terms of culture. For example, the cultures, philosophies, moralities, customs and religions are very different between countries in Eastern Africa and those in Western Africa; even in Sub-Saharan Africa, the culture of the East is different from that of the South or the West. In terms of this, China has to clearly understand more African local cultures and take more targeted co-operation with African partners. There is no one-size-fits-all way to co-operate with African countries in humanistic education.

Secondly, the humanistic education co-operation is to address the cultural diversity in both Africa and China, promote the renaissance of Chinese and African cultures and counterbalance the influence of Western culture in the world, therefore the China-African humanistic education co-operation should not aim at penetrating their own cultures into each other and enhance the cultural influence on each other. Cultural penetration is an activity of cultural imperialism. For China and Africa, co-operation in education should promote the self-awareness, self-confidence and independence of national/local cultures. China should not only make more African people aware of China’s culture through humanistic education co-operation, but should also help African countries to support their national and local cultures through this co-operation.

Thirdly, although the Sino-African humanistic education co-operation is to counterbalance Western cultures’ dominance and resume the confidence and independence of national/local cultures, it definitely does not mean the Western culture should be absolutely excluded in Chinese and African societies. Western culture, as one integral part of cultures in the world, especially in the time of modernisation, should be encouraged to be selectively introduced into developing
countries. The China-Africa humanistic education co-operation is not against the Western culture *per se* but against its hegemony. Accordingly, Western culture should never be the targeted enemy of China-Africa humanistic education co-operation that would contribute to the cultural diversification locally, regionally and globally.

**Endnotes**

1. In this article, the concept of “local culture” is used to refer to culture with specialised characteristics that is a key factor giving an ethnicity or people living in the same region a shared identity. In this sense, the “local culture” in this article can be understood as sub-national culture or regional (transnational) culture in terms of context, differentiated from “national culture” and “global culture”.

2. Li Hung Chang, the governor of Shili Province and Commerce Minister, leader of the first Chinese "westernisation movement", in the late Qing Dynasty of China had said in a report for his Emperor that "I think European countries have for decades entered to Southeast Asia from India, then entered China from Southeast Asia, breaking into the hinterland near the border, requiring frontier trade, which were not recorded by history, ... [for China] this is a major change of situation since three thousand years before." in Biography of Li Hung Chang, by Leung Kai Chiu, Hainan Press, July 1993.

3. The first "Westernisation Movement" in China, also termed as self-save movement or self-strengthening movement, is a top-down movement which happened in the 1860s-1890s, mainly introducing Western military equipment, machine products and science and technology in order to "enrich" China while maintaining a feudal ruling system within the country. It did not make China prosperous and powerful, but it did introduced some advanced western science and technology into China, and led to the emergence of the first batch of modern enterprises in China.

4. [We should] study assiduously the advanced science and technology in the world,

5. “As for gender ratio, the Chinese female Christians are obviously more than male ones. In the Christian community, about 69.9 per cent are women. As for the level of education, half of the Christians' education is in primary school level and below. In the Christian community, the number of Christians with primary school education or below accounted for 54.6 percent of the population”. Wu Guihua, What's the Number of Chinese Christians? in China National Religious Website, 2 April 2012, (online), Available: http://www.msb.com.cn/html/report/289230-1.htm

6. As a concept, "Cultural consciousness" is put forward for the first time by Professor Fei Xiaotong, a famous sociologist in China, in 1997 at a seminar at Peking University. He used this concept to find a way to deal with interpersonal relations. According to Fei, "Cultural consciousness" is referred to as the clear estimation of his/her/their own culture, and the full understanding on the development of the history and the future of the culture. In other words, it is the self-awareness, self-reflection, and self-creation to his/her own culture. See Fei Xiaotong, On Culture and Cultural Consciousness by Fei Xiaotong, Chinese Qunyan Press, January 2007.

7. The idea "Going Global" was first put forward by Chinese Pre-President Jiang Semin in 1996. On July 26th Jiang proposed in a meeting that "[We should] research how to organise state-owned enterprises to go global”.

Bibliography


China’s Engagement with Nigeria: Opportunity or Opportunist?*

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Abstract

This article answers the question: Does China’s engagement with Nigeria represent an opportunity or is it an opportunist? The article employs frame analysis of 31 articles collected from Thisday and Punch newspapers and questionnaires set up with Everything Journalism group on LinkedIn, to answer the question whether China’s is an opportunity or an opportunist in Nigeria.

The article identifies two dominant frames that underpin the framing of China’s engagement with Nigeria by the two newspapers; opportunity and opportunist. While opportunity frame is dominant in the newspapers’ article, respondents to the questionnaire suggest that China is not different from other emerging global powers, whose national interest is paramount in their engagements with Africa nay Nigeria.

* This article was first presented to the inaugural Africa-Asia Conference: A New Axis of Knowledge held at the University of Ghana in Legon, Accra, Ghana.

I am grateful to Adedeji Adeniran of the School of Economics at University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa, whose expertise proved vital in the graphs and tables on Nigeria’s trade with China.

** Emeka Umejei is a Doctoral Student on the China-Africa Reporting Project in the Department of Journalism at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Consequently, the article argues that in its engagement with Nigeria, China is both an opportunity and an opportunist. Therefore, the article concludes that while China’s engagement with Nigeria would provide opportunities, it is the responsibility of the Nigerian authorities to ensure that what China offers, is in tandem with its national aspirations.

Introduction

This article is divided into three broad sections including background, methodology and conclusion. The background provides an overview on China-Nigeria relations, trade, challenges; methodology includes theoretical approaches and results of analysis and conclusion, which, sums up the findings of the article.

Background to China-Nigeria relations

Nigeria and China commenced diplomatic relations in 1971 and by 1972, a six-man delegation led by Nigeria’s top government representative visited Beijing, where both countries signed an open-ended agreement on economic and technical cooperation and trade (Ogunsanwo, 2008: 192). In the aftermath of the open-ended agreement, other high profile Nigerian delegations visited China, culminating in the visit by General Yakubu Gowon, head of military government at the time, in 1974 (Ogunsanwo, 2008: 193).

Nigeria and China have enjoyed buoyant relations since the commencement of bi-lateral relations in 1971 (Ogunsanwo, 2008: 192). Since the advent of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, every democratically-elected president has visited China except for the current President Muhammadu Buhari, who was recently elected to office. In contrast, however, only one Chinese head of state, Hu Jintao, has visited Nigeria, though twice: 2004 and 2006 (Umejei, 2014). The friendly relations between both countries were reaffirmed at the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, where leaders of both countries pledged to sustain bi-lateral relations and strategic partnership (Fmprc, 2015).
China-Nigeria trade

China frames its engagement with Africa on mutual benefits, shared values and win-win co-operation (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2012; Kurlantzick, 2007). Consequently, China has invested heavily in Africa; China is Africa’s largest trading partner surpassing traditional partners, Europe and the United States of America (USA). Two-way trade between Africa as a whole and China has grown from US$ 10.6 billion in 2011 to more than US$ 200 billion in 2012 (Taylor, 2012; Moyo, 2014) and is forecast to reach US$ 300 billion by the end of 2015 (ChinaDaily, 2015). The trend is also the same for China-Nigeria trade, which has seen growth from US$17.7 billion in 2010 (Egbula and Zheng, 2011: 6) to US$ 23.5 billion by first quarter of 2015 (Okafor, 2015). Similarly, levels of Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Nigeria are the second-highest in Africa after South Africa (Egbula and Zheng, 2011: 6) and by 2010 Nigeria was China’s fourth biggest African trading partner and second largest Chinese export destination in Africa (Egbula and Zheng, 2011: 6).

However, the structure of trade between the two countries is marked by differences in exports; China exports a diversified range of manufactured goods such as machinery, textiles (see figure 2) and equipment to Nigeria, while Nigeria’s exports to China are oil and gas products (see table 2). In 2014, petroleum products and natural resources comprised 57 per cent of Nigeria’s (see figure 3) export to China while China’s export to Nigeria comprises majorly of textile materials and machineries. Similarly, China’s textile export to Nigeria jumped by 222 per cent from 2010 to 2014 (see table 2).

The export of cheap Chinese textiles to Nigeria has also adversely affected local textile manufacturers in Nigeria (Eneji et al, 2012: 133), a position recognised by Sanusi Lamido, Nigeria’s former Central Bank Governor (CBN), who argued that Nigeria, with a population of 160 million, spends vast resources importing Chinese consumer goods which would benefit the local economy if they were produced locally (Sanusi, 2013).

In the 1980s, Nigeria had about 175 textile plants with a total of 250,000 employees,
but the import of cheap Chinese textiles left only 26 of them in operation as of October 2007, employing only 24 000 people (Obiorah, Kew & Tanko, 2008:280). The collapse of textile manufacturing sector in Nigeria has resulted in closure of many textile companies, accompanied with rising unemployment in the country (see Figure 4). Consequently, Kola Jamodu, former president of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) emphasised that the incursion of the Chinese nationals into small and medium enterprises such as retail trading, textiles and electronics is problematic and urged the federal government to call the Chinese to order (Umejei, 2014: 26).

On the other hand, the trade deficit in China-Nigeria trade(see Figure 1) has been a recurring pattern since Nigeria signed an open-ended economic and technical co-operation with China in 1972 (Ogunsanwo, 2008: 194). Consequently, Nigeria’s trade deficit with China has continued to rise on a disproportionate scale reaching more than 180 per cent from 2012 to 2014 (see table 1). Despite trade imbalance between China and Nigeria, cheap Chinese products continue to meet the needs of many average Nigerian homes that are unable to afford quality products (Obiorah, 2006). Consequently, China is an opportunist when the importation of cheap Chinese textiles and machineries result in the collapse of local companies in Nigeria but it provides for opportunities to the satisfaction of consumer needs in Nigeria.

Challenges in China-Nigeria relations

China-Nigeria relations have recorded some sore points since the commencement of bi-lateral relations in 1971. The first disagreement was recorded in 1979 when Nigeria opposed China’s support for the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels in Angola, which was against Nigeria’s support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Ogunsanwo 2008: 195). However, this was a political disagreement which did not alter trade relations between the countries (Ogunsanwo, 2008).

In 2006, Nigeria and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the establishment of a strategic partnership, making Nigeria the first African country to sign such a pact with China (Taylor, 2007: 631). The partnership formed part of the
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) drive implemented during the former president Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration to encourage Chinese investors to do business in Nigeria. A key outcome of the buoyant relations was the oil-for-infrastructure deal, in which Chinese companies were offered right-of-first refusal for oil processing licenses (Mthembu-Slater 2009; Taylor, 2007; Obiorah, 2006). The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was allocated an Oil Processing License in return for investing US$ 2 billion to rehabilitate the northern Nigerian city of Kaduna’s failing oil refinery (Mthembu-Salter, 2009: 2). The deal was, however, terminated when President Umaru Yar’Adua was elected to the presidency of Nigeria in 2007, an action which left a scar in China’s engagement with Nigeria (Mthembu-Salter, 2009:9).

Similarly, in 2007, the Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC), a Chinese company, launched Nigeria’s communication satellite, NigComsat, at the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre, with a lifespan of 15 years (Umejei, 2009). According to the terms of agreement entered into between Nigeria and GWIC, NigComsat was to be technically maintained by GWIC until May 13, 2009, when it would be officially handed over to the Nigerian government, but it failed in orbit in November 2008 after running out of power (Ogunsanwo, 2008: 201). These incidents have left cautious optimism in the engagements between both countries.

**Chinese companies in Nigeria**

According to the Nigerian Investment Promotion Council (NIPC) registration document, there are 208 registered Chinese companies doing business in Nigeria as of 2013 (Umejei, 2014:23). The major Chinese companies in Nigeria are mostly state-owned enterprises. Some of these are Sinopec (oil and gas), CNPC (oil and gas), SEPCO (electricity power construction), CCECC (construction and real estate), CSCEC (construction and real estate), CNOON (offshore oil and gas), Sinoma (cement engineering construction), CGC (construction), Huawei (telecoms) and Zhong Xing Telecommunication (ZTE) (telecoms). In the Nigerian telecoms sector, ZTE and Huawei dominate (Egbula & Zheng, 2011:12).
Table 1: Nigeria’s trade with China ($000)

<table>
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<tr>
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Table 2: Nigeria’s unemployment statistics

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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

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Table 3: Nigeria’s import from China

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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL (All products)</th>
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<th>Textile and leather machinery</th>
<th>Electrical power machinery and parts</th>
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<td>95412.588</td>
<td>472658.123</td>
<td>407722.638</td>
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</table>

Source: UNCTAD database
Table 4: per cent petroleum products of Nigeria’s export to China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Petroleum/solid minerals</th>
<th>per cent of total export</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1999</td>
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</table>

Source: UNCTAD database
Figure 1: China-Nigeria trade

![China-Nigeria Trade](image)

Figure 2: Composition of Nigeria’s export from China

![Composition of Nigeria’s Import from China](image)
Figure 3: Nigeria’s Petroleum products export to China

Figure 4: Unemployment statistics in Nigeria

Source: World development indicator, World Bank
Theoretical framework

The article draws on framing theory in which the news frame is the “central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Tankard, 2001: 100). The advantage of framing is that it has the potential to get beneath the surface of news coverage and expose hidden assumptions (Tankard, 2001: 97). In other words, framing, “recognises the ability of a text to define a situation, to define the issues, and to set the terms of a debate” (Tankard, 2001: 96).

Therefore, dominant frames signify a set of social meanings that help to define social relations within a particular social context (Durham, 1998: 102). In his exploratory study of the media framing of China among East African newspapers, Wekesa (2013) concludes that the image of China in East Africa is under the “inter-play of both negative and positive media frames” (Wekesa, 2013: 35). Similarly, Gamson and Modigliani (1989), in their study of nuclear power for over a period of more than 40 years, show how various pro-and-anti nuclear power groups contested to define the issue of nuclear power to suit their interests. Hence, in a study of the New York Times’ coverage of the crashed TWA flight 800, Durham (1998) argues there is always competition between various interest groups to produce dominant frames in news stories.

Methodology

A total of 31 articles comprising news, features, and opinions were collected from Thisday (21) and Punch (10) newspapers between September and December 2012. The two newspapers were used for the study because they are two of Nigeria’s leading newspaper without ethnic or ideological biases (Ette, 2012).

The study comprises framing analysis and questionnaire set up with Everything Journalism group on LinkedIn. The Everything Journalism group on LinkedIn comprises 2770 members, including journalists, journalists turned Public relations executives, publishers, media scholars. Everything Journalism is a community, where members share space and practice; shared identities; shared resources; and
enjoy interpersonal relationship, which makes it viable for the study (Baym, 2010:75).

Basically, there are two approaches to framing analysis: deductive and inductive methods. In deductive approach frames are operationalised prior to the analysis of texts, to verify the extent to which they occur in the news and are suited to large samples. The inductive approach involves analysing media content with an open view to identify possible frames, an approach well-suited to small samples (De Vreese, 2005: 53). This article will adopt an inductive approach to identifying frames in a relatively small sample of articles from Thisday and Punch newspapers. The unit of analysis is individual editorials, news, opinion and feature article because frame analysis favours whole articles as main discourse unit (Martthes, 2009: 355).

First, the article applied framing analysis to a sample of 31 articles including news, feature and opinion obtained from Thisday and Punch newspapers between September 2012 and December 2012. The article further sets up a questionnaire with the Everything Journalism group on LinkedIn.

The questions are:

1. Do you view China's engagement with Nigeria as providing opportunities for Nigeria and Nigerians?

2. Do you view China’s engagement with Nigeria as opportunistic?

**Results:**

Two overarching frames emerged in the framing analysis of the text obtained from both newspapers: Opportunity and Opportunist. The two frames reflect the broad bifocal prism through which China-Africa relations are depicted in the academic literature on the subject (Umejei, 2014). The opportunity frame is underpinned by thematic points such as Investment and Aid, Partner for Development and China as a model of economic success, while Opportunist frame has Neo-colonialism, Exploitation and ‘sub-standard’ China.
Opportunity

There are 19 articles in this category that frame China’s engagement with Nigeria as an opportunity for a better Nigeria. The frame is underpinned by three thematic points including investment and aid, partnership for development and China as a model of economic success.

Investments and aid

In the article, *China in the heart of Africa*, an opinion article published in Punch, Kingsley Ighobor emphasises that China is following its commitment to Africa with action by way of aid and investments: “The Chinese government is eager to cement China’s dominance by burnishing its image through initiatives such as a US$ 20 billion credit to African countries to develop infrastructure and the African Talents Programme, which is intended to train 30,000 Africans in various sectors”. The sentence speaks to China’s propaganda that its engagement with Africa will aid both infrastructural and economic development in Nigeria and other African countries (see Brautigam, 2009:53).

China as a model of economic success

Articles in this category employ the Chinese propaganda that often frames the Chinese model as a viable model of success that Nigeria and other African countries should emulate to achieve economic and infrastructural development.

In the opinion article, *Forbidden City (1)*, Segun Adeniyi, a former senior special assistant to the late President Umaru Yar’Adua, who doubles as a columnist and chairman of Thisday editorial board, paints a glowing picture of China: “It is obvious the ancient Chinese was a prosperous society, then they became so poor they were far more wretched than us in Africa, and now they are prosperous again. How did China do it?” Implicit in Adeniyi’s statement reinforces Chinese official rhetoric, which claims that China has been able to lift more than 300 million people out of poverty and hence, African countries should adopt the Chinese model (see Kurlantzick 2007: 57). Similarly, an opinion article in *Thisday* by Deng Boqing, former Chinese ambassador to Nigeria, sustains this view: “Since China adopted the
reform and opening up policy in 1978, the Chinese economy has registered an average annual growth rate of nearly 10 per cent, which tripled the world average at the same period.” In another opinion article, Lessons from India and China, Dele Momodu, a Thisday columnist was emphatic that Nigeria needs to emulate China if it wants to achieve economic development. He noted, “China has climbed to the number two spot in the world. Some will even accord them the status of the world’s number one nation. You can call them names but the Chinese have shown that there is dignity in labour.” Therefore, Nigeria ought to adopt the Chinese model to attain economic prosperity and development. This view also speaks to Chinese official propaganda that its model is most suited to Africa’s development and prosperity (see Kurlantzick, 2007).

**Partner for development**

The articles in this category construct China as an important development partner to Nigeria. In the news article, Jonathan Urges Chinese Firm to Finance Road Projects published in Thisday, the Nigerian government appealed to Chinese construction company, (CGCOCC) to help solve Nigeria’s infrastructural challenge by investing in road construction in the country. In the article, former President Goodluck Jonathan, who was represented by the Minister of Works, Mike Onoelemen, was quoted as saying, “If your proposals are acceptable to us, we will present them before the economic council.”

“We need more infrastructure than any other country in Africa. With 170 million people, you can never go wrong; if you invest in Nigeria’s infrastructure and project finance, you cannot go wrong as recovery of your investments is certain”. This article reinforces the view that China is in Africa to help bridge the infrastructural deficit on the continent and Nigeria is one of such countries that is in dire need of infrastructure. Therefore, China is a partner for development in Nigeria and Africa in general (see Brautigam, 2009).

**Opportunist**

Articles in this category are negative about China’s engagement with Nigeria. The
articles frame China-Nigeria relations as unequal and exploitative, with China as a global power dumping sub-standard products on Nigeria. This frame is underpinned by themes such as new colonialism, exploitation and dumping of substandard products.

**Neo-colonialism**

The articles in this category construct China as a neo-colonial power seeking to dominate Nigeria’s economy for its own gain.

In the news article, *CNPP Faults FG’s US$ 1.1 billion Chinese Loan*, published in *Thisday*, the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) said China is consciously goading Nigeria into Chinese neo-colonialism. The use of such a sentence that Nigeria may be heading “towards an unconscionable debt squad and Chinese imperialism” by Osita Okechukwu, chairman of the CNPP, speaks to the charge that China’s engagement with Africa is neo-colonialism disguised as partnership (see Gaye, 2007; Sanusi, 2013). Other words such as “anti-democratic, exploitative, anti-people” used to describe China’s engagement with Nigeria by the CNPP leader constructs China as a global power that does not respect democratic ethos and whose economic interest supplants all others interests (see Gaye, 2007).

The CNPP position strikes a chord with Lamido Sanusi’s that “China takes from us primary goods and sells us manufactured ones; this was also the essence of colonialism” (Sanusi, 2013). It also speaks to the concern expressed by multi-lateral organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank that the massive loans by China to African countries could encourage the accumulation of too much debt and strangulate economic growth (Taylor, 2012).

In an opinion article, *Mandarin in Lagos*, published in *Punch*, Abimbola Adelakun contends that introducing Chinese in public schools in Lagos state amounts to a one-way traffic, which reflects late President Julius Nyerere’s view on China-Africa relations: “it is the most unequal of equal relationships” (Umejei, 2013). Adelakun, a columnist for Punch newspaper emphasises that language is a means of domination and introducing Chinese language in Lagos public schools without replicating same
in China “will not bode well if this is a cultural exchange that places a preponderance of power on the part of China”. She argues, “It’s important to scrutinise the motive of China behind teaching Nigerian children their language and culture and mediate this so as not to place the kids at a disadvantage”. The fear of domination underpins Adelakun’s opinion article which resonates with Sanusi’s (2013) caution that China may become Africa’s new coloniser (Sanusi, 2013).

In the opinion article, *Chinese scramble for Nigeria?* Punch columnist, Patience Akpa-Obong emphasises that China’s approach to its relations with Nigeria is not different from the early European missionaries, who did not leave Africa empty-handed. She emphasises: “it’s time that the Nigerian government reassessed its infatuation with China to ensure that it is truly an equal partner. If not, then it should have the courage to renegotiate the terms of engagement or simply bid its own Mr. Chen: “Zaijian!” or, “sanga sung,” if you want to say it in Efik! Patience” article speaks to Gaye’s (2007) argument that China is not a philanthropist in Africa but in quest for its own selfish agenda (Gaye, 2007).

However, Professor Remi Sonaiya’s Punch opinion article was more scathing; with a screaming headline, *China in Africa, beware!* Sonaiya’s article was detailed and analytic of cover of the book, *La Chinafrique: Pékin à la Conquête du Continent Noir*, which depicts an African soldier, with his left hand clutching a gun and his right, a green and yellow umbrella over the head of a Chinese man. Sonaiya, a professor of French language introduced the story with a textual analysis of the photograph that accompanied her article. Sonaiya warns that history may be repeating itself with the Chinese as the new colonisers. The phrase “Africa might be entering another period of enslavement” speaks to the fear that China is another colonial master in Africa. Sonaiya’s opinion is tandem with the view that China is not different from the European slave masters and would, if not regulated, emerge the new colonisers of Africa (see Sanusi, 2013; Gaye, 2007).

**Exploitation**

In the news article, *Controversy Trails Death of Two Workers in Chinese Firm*, published in *Thisday*, Mathew Imhonbhoio, despite autopsy result that confirmed his
brother died of asphyxia, was convinced there was a conspiracy surrounding his brother’s death because to him, “The corpse did not look like someone that drowned because he bled from the ears, mouth and nose. Something just looks fishy two full grown men drowning at the same time in a pool that is not deep”. The usage of such phrases as, “something just looks fishy” by Matthew Imhonbhio, an ordinary Nigerian, to construct China is reflective of the scepticism with which ordinary Nigerians view China. It also reflect the widespread scepticism with which ordinary Nigerians view China’s engagement with Nigeria but such scepticism often do not form part of policy formulation because the ruling and economic elites profit from the relations (Taylor, 2007: 632).

‘Substandard’ China

The articles in this category frame China as dumping substandard products on Nigeria. In the news article, SON, Chinese Firm to Tackle Fake Products, DG of SON, Joseph Odumodu was quoted as saying, “80 per cent of the fake products that come into Nigeria were coming from Asia, with China as major culprit.” This reinforces the perspective that China is dumping sub-standard products on Nigeria. It also speaks to the perspective that China, a global power, is emasculating Nigerian manufacturers by dumping cheap and sub-standard products on the country (see Obiorah, Kew and Tanko, 2008; Obiorah, 2006; Sanusi, 2013).

Interviews

The respondents reflect a common pattern in which China-Nigeria relations is viewed from the bi-focal prism of opportunity or an opportunist. However, the views of the respondents is underpinned by the emphasis that China is not different from other emerging global powers whose foreign policy is underscored by the pre-eminence of national interest. Implicit in the respondents’ views is that it is the responsibility of the Nigerian government to evolve regulatory policies that will ensure that its engagement with China results in a transfer of skills, technology, employment generation and economic development.

The respondent below reinforces this view:
I view China's engagement with Nigeria as providing opportunity as well as taking advantage of Nigeria. But that is what other nations attempt to do everywhere else. It is the responsibility of the host nation to prevent foreign country from plundering their economy, while at the same time benefit from the engagement.

The respondent below argues that while China’s engagement with Nigeria, as other African nations is driven by its quest for natural resources to meets its technological advancement (see Gaye, 2007; Sanusi, 2013), it is critical that the Nigerian government ensures it is beneficial to its own development:

China's engagement with Nigeria, and other African countries for that matter, is primarily driven by that country's need to source the resources to continue powering its economic growth, particularly in the light of the peculiar challenges represented by its extremely large population. It is also driven by China's desire to establish itself as a great power by spreading its influence as widely as possible across the world. The critical element in all this is the need for the Nigerian government to play its role by ensuring that all parties play by the rules and that the engagement does not become exploitative.

The respondents below argues that every country is involved in some form of economic diplomacy, which means that China is not any different but added that it is dependent on Nigeria to ensure that China does not exploit it:

Every nation plays some form of economic diplomacy. The Europeans played it, the American are playing it and the Chinese are following in their steps. Exploitation only comes into play when the host country lacks the structure and attitude that ensures that a healthy and win-win engagement is maintained. Does China exploit America or Europe exploits China? The core issue is having a known and enforceable structure and an attitude that does not allow exploitation. Where these two items are lacking, a businessman/ nation will do business his own way no matter the label that is given to it.

The respondent below takes a different path. He argues, “I don't see China genuinely interested in helping Nigeria. They are here for economic reasons so the onus is on
Nigeria to introduce policies that would also make them benefit from China.” This perspective is in tandem with Sanusi’s argument that China is another colonial master in Africa (See Sanusi, 2013).

However, another respondent views China-Nigeria relations as win-win and mutual:

*It's a win-win situation. I'd rather not use the term 'opportunistic' even though most nations are primarily guided by the so-called enlightened self-interest.*

While the respondent below emphasises that China is not different from other global powers, he however, argues that weak institutions in Nigeria give China the edge to exploit Nigerians:

*China’s interest in Nigeria is no different from that of America or European countries. There is no doubt that when foreign investors invest in Nigeria, they create opportunities for Nigerians. The question now is, do we as a country have labour laws backed by strong institutions to enable the Chinese play the game by the rules so that the result is a win–win situation? The answer is no. Here is the reason why we are afraid of their aggressive drive to dominate our market. We know our weakness and that empowers them; hence we see them as opportunists and exploiters.*

However, another respondent argues, “*It is not China's fault that we have economic and infrastructural challenges, it is up to us to determine if we need their assistance or not.*”

The respondent below argues that China’s engagement with Nigeria represents opportunities:

*I will say China's engagement with Nigeria (and by extension elsewhere in Africa) is a sure-fire way to find jobs for its teeming unemployed population, though the ones so qualified.*

And finally the respondent below argues that China contributes hugely to job creation in Nigeria and thereby creates opportunities for teeming unemployed youth in the country:
See, Chinese companies are contributing immensely in job creation in Nigeria. So, I have absolutely nothing against any business person. I’m only concerned that somehow, foreign business ideas and or preconceived ideas (not particularly of the Chinese alone), are being applied to do business in Nigeria without checks and with our nationals in near slave labour. Having said this, I believe that the Chinese business presence in Nigeria provides us a golden opportunity to understudy them.

**Conclusion and remarks**

Results from frame analysis and interviews have shown that while China is viewed from a bi-focal prism of opportunity or an opportunist, it is not different from other global powers seeking national interests in Nigeria and by extension, Africa. This is emphasised by Alden and Large (2011:31),

*The basic character of trade flows - Africa exporting raw materials and China exporting manufactured products- replicates Africa’s economic relations with other external powers.* (Alden and Large, 2011: 31)

For instance, the African Union (AU) is yet to evolve a policy framework for engaging with China but on the contrary, in 2006, China launched an African Policy Document that guides its engagement with the continent (Focac, 2006). Therefore, it becomes expedient to argue that Africa’s “loose approach to its engagement with China has aided China in exploiting individual African countries, which leaves Africa with the short end of the stick” (Umejei, 2014: 17; Taylor, 2012).

In the case of Nigeria, despite knowing that flooding Nigeria’s markets with cheap Chinese products undermines Nigerian commercial operations and leads to huge unemployment in the country “much of this concern has not yet been fed into policy-making at the state level because Nigeria’s ruling elite are charmed by the prospects that China’s rapid economic growth holds” (Taylor 2007: 632). Similarly, the perennial trade deficit (see Figure 1) in China-Nigeria trade is yet to gain traction with Nigeria’s policy makers in Abuja who ought to evolve requisite policy framework to ensure Nigeria does not become a dump ground for Chinese products.
While it may seem right to emphasise that China exploits the lacuna in policy framework in Nigeria to its advantage, it is valid to argue that it is the responsibility of the Nigerian government to evolve policies that will ensure its engagement with China is tandem with its national goals and aspiration. Therefore, it becomes evident that China is not the problem but the Nigerian government which is yet to evolve a requisite regulatory framework that will ensure mutuality and win-win in its engagement with China.

In other words, until Nigeria and other African countries engaging with China find it worthy to regulate their engagements with China towards achieving national development and economic growth they would remain at the receiving end of China-Africa relations.

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Tokunbo and Chinco economies in Nigeria: rethinking encounters and continuities in local economic transformations

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Abstract

As encounters and interactions of Nigeria with Western and Asian economic powers intensify and deepen, the Nigerian economy continues to undergo transformations. This paper explores and compares Tokunbo and Chinco economies in this transformation process. As products of processes and patterns of incorporation of Nigeria into the world-economy, Tokunbo refers to an economy that relies on trade in second-hand, imported goods from the West while the Chinco economy is a recent creation through the influx of cheap China-made goods. They are parallel economies existing alongside, but mostly dominating, the local economy whose capabilities have been largely eroded as a result of decades of being in a protracted static position as a periphery nation. Their emergence is intricately connected to the overpowering juggernaut of global capitalism and the opportunistic tendencies and resolve of local entrepreneurs and transnational traders to participate in, as well as benefit from, the deepening incorporation of local market into the world-system, even if it means doing so as low-end actors. Also, while they are characteristically distinguishable, their logic and destabilising consequences are the same in a periphery nation. This calls for a rethink and critical reflection on the value of transnational processes which is currently intensifying in the face of global systems.

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expansion, particularly the sort of trans-nationalism that is being facilitated by China’s interest in African countries.

...our uneven relationship with Europe, and now including North America, remains basically unchanged. We continue to be trading posts which supply primary products in exchange for processed goods. ...These trading posts are run and maintained by our citizens. ...The activities of these agents constitute impediments to Black African development.

General Olusegun Obasanjo, 1977 (Obasanjo, 1977:19)

When faced with cheaper Chinese-produced imports, African textile and clothing manufacturers, the backbone of employment for many economies, shed jobs by their tens of thousands. It was for many observers... merely a new twist on an age-old story for Africa, the stripping of its resources by a foreign power to the benefit of a few fabulously wealthy leaders while ordinary Africans were left with a barren heritage.

Chris Alden, 2007

A nation that cannot determine its needs, based on an ability to control the internal and external environments, exists only as a “second-hand” economy – an inferior nation constructed from the perspective of others, which continues to exist only as long as the others determine its existence.

Akinpelu Olanrewaju Olutayo, 2013 (Omobowale, 2013a)

Introduction

The making of contemporary Africa societies has been shaped by the context of encounters with foreign economic powers. From the colonial to the post-colonial period, the encounter with the West (mainly Europe and North America) was prevalent. However, a new dimension has since been introduced following China’s rising power in the global economy (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011; Songwe and Moyo,
As the opening quotations suggest, the encounters have affected Africa’s economy in many ways. Moreover, with the increasing interest of world powers in Africa and her resources (Power and Mohan, 2010), far-reaching implications are to be expected. The study comparatively explores the ways in which the West and China are restructuring Nigeria’s post-colonial economy through the legacies of Tokunbo and Chinco goods.

As products of processes and patterns of incorporation of Nigeria into the world-economy, Tokunbo refers to an economy that relies on trade in second-hand, imported goods from the West while Chinco economy is driven by the influx of cheap China-made goods. Tokunbo and Chinco are parallel economies that co-exist and compete with the local Nigerian economy. In carrying out the study, the following research questions were raised. What is the origin and character of Tokunbo and Chinco economies? In what ways are they different and what do they share in common? What roles do local entrepreneurs play in driving these economies? How have these economies changed the terrain of consumption in Nigeria? Finally, what implications do they have on the local economy? The study engaged these and other related questions using mainly secondary data sources, including published materials, news articles and blog posts.

In section two, the study frames Tokunbo and Chinco economies within the context of world-systems theory while sections three and four focus on their origins, meanings and distinct characteristics. In section five, some parallels are drawn between Tokunbo and Chinco as economic forms with comparable operating logic and consequences at the local level. Specifically, the section highlights how the two are linked in critical ways by process of global capitalist incorporation, dynamics of competition, participation of local entrepreneurs and by their dependence on the contexts of poverty and underdevelopment. In the final section, some conclusions are made about the implications of the economies in Nigeria and Africa as a whole.

The West, China and Nigeria in the world systems: a global perspective on local economic dynamics

This section theoretically situates the emergence and dynamics of Tokunbo and
Chinco economies in Nigeria using the world system theory (WST). WTS is a historico-structural and macro-level theory which explains the structures of national economies in terms of specific contradictions inherent in the capitalist world-economy (Massey, et al, 1993; King, 2012). WST represents the world as an expanding whole that is dynamically structured, highly stratified, and interdependent through a system of unequal exchange. The world-economy is the arena within which social action takes place and where social change occurs (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1982).

World-systems theorising emphasised the endless accumulation of capital: an “[e]ndless accumulation...[in which] people and firms are accumulating capital in order to accumulate still more capital, a process that is continual and endless” (Wallerstein, 2004:24). The production process in the capitalist world-economy is split among structurally placed and interdependent areas. These areas are unified by their participation in accumulative and unequal exchange relations. Three structural positions exist: core, periphery and semi-periphery positions. “Core” and “periphery” positions occupy extremes of the relational process while “semi-periphery” mediates between them and shares both core and periphery features. The origin of core and periphery is economic and they “designate complementary parts of the world economy that gives rise to the differentiation of strong and weak states in a derivative way” (Munch, 1994:95).

What is normally designated as core, periphery or semi-periphery is production process (Wallerstein, 2004). In the core, production process is characterised by a high level of technological development, complex manufacturing, technological innovation, and high labour. The periphery areas, on the other hand, have low technology, production of simple agricultural products and mineral resources, and low labour cost (Munch, 1994). As a result, the core is structurally placed to dictate terms of trade in ways that allows surplus-value to flow from weaker, peripheral regions (Wallerstein, 2004). Unequal exchange comes about because periphery states, given their nature of production process, have to sell low-priced products involving low-cost labour (mainly raw materials and resources) in order to receive high-priced manufactured goods from core states (Munch, 1994). The semi-
periphery areas shares both core and periphery features. States occupying the semi-
periphery are exploited exploiters, both appropriating resources from the periphery
while at the same time experiencing their own appropriation from core areas. As
Wallerstein (2004) posits:

...semiperipheral states... have a relatively even mix of production
processes... Under pressure from core states and putting pressure on peripheral
states, their major concern is to keep themselves from slipping into the periphery
and to do what they can to advance themselves toward the core (Wallerstein,
2004:29).

The major force of transformation at local and global levels is the endless
exploitation of periphery states by core states. In other words, capitalist
accumulation at world level determines development and change, not only at its own
global level but also at the levels of states and societies (Munch, 1994).

The incorporation of Nigeria into the world-systems started centuries ago. Within the
modern capitalist world-economy, however, the periphery position of Nigeria can be
traced to British colonialism. Colonialism created an economic system that
intensified the peripherisation of Nigeria by entrenching a production process of
primary production, low technologies, minimal mechanisation, and exportation of
raw resources (Joseph, Taylor and Agbaje, 1996). By the 1980s, the West-controlled
international financial institutions promoted economic adjustment policies that
shifted the production process away from agriculture to oil extraction and
exportation (Ezeala-Harrison, 1993; Okolie, 1995). Consequently, Nigeria became
solidly attached to, and dependent on output from states with “core” production
processes, mainly from the West but also from Japan, Taiwan and now China.
Nigeria’s dependency on importation can be traced to the economic changes of this
period (Omobowale, 2013a, 2013b).

As argued in the next section, the development of Tokunbo (or second-hand) and
Chinco economies are connected to the position occupied by Nigeria in the world-
economy in relation to the West and China. While the core status of countries in the
West is rarely contested, China’s position in world-systems has been made
ambiguous by narratives that project the Middle Kingdom as socio-economic and political equals of Africans (Chen and Wang, 2011; Tang, 2011). Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny China’s semi-peripheral status. In essence, China operates in core position to Nigeria and serves the West in periphery capacities. As Large (2008: 52) observes, “…China offers an impressive, if highly mixed, demonstration of a developing yet already significantly advanced economy.” Since this millennium began, China’s core features have rapidly become interconnected with Nigeria’s periphery, especially through the pattern and crippling consequences of growing investment in, and massive exportation of finished goods into Nigeria (Akoh, 2014; Egbula and Zheng, 2011; Udeala, 2010; Large, 2008; Taylor, 2007). Today, there is a “Chinese factor” that cannot be neglected in the current structure of Nigerian local economy.

Tokunbo and second-hand economy in Nigeria

Tokunbo economy in Nigeria has its roots in the economic reforms of the 1980s. Based on the importation and circulation of second-hand goods from the West, Tokunbo is an economic form that emerged as the country shifted gradually from production to commerce following the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) from 1986 (Guyer, et al, 2002). According to Omobowale (2013a), Tokunbo evolved in response to the colonial experience of the Yoruba-speaking people of South-Western Nigeria. Literally meaning ‘from across the seas,’ Tokunbo was originally a name given to children conceived in Europe and North America. Among the Yoruba, Tokunbo is a special name appropriated to signify the membership of the name-bearer and his/her family in the elite class. Given the prestige the name conferred on the bearer, the appropriation of the word Tokunbo for imported second-hand goods was pragmatic for easing the population into a new state of depravity in the SAP years. As with other linguistic constructs, Adegoju (2007) contends that Nigerians often invent or reconstruct terms and deploy them as a means of configuring or concealing depravity and everyday problems, from work to social life and politics.

In the mid-1970s and early-1980s, the use of imported second-hand goods was not
commonplace, and their procurement was often criticised publicly as “scraps” (Ikporukpo, 2002). Before the collapse of commodity market in the 1980s, oil revenue allowed public servants and middle class citizens to buy new cars. Also, industrialisation was slowly taking off to cater for the consumption needs of the population, including the textile industry which employed a very large proportion of the labour force and produced local fabrics that were traded in and outside Nigeria (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008; Denzer, 2002). In the wake of the first ever currency devaluation, life in Nigeria was “maddeningly difficult” (Guyer, et al, 2002). The imported second-hand goods that were condemned as “scraps” gradually became the norm (Ikporukpo, 2002). At the height of SAP maladjustment in 1991/92, many cars on the roads of Nigeria’s biggest cities were imported second-hand, with public transport in Lagos city depending greatly on reconstructed imported Mercedes-Benz 911 known as Molue (Osinulu, 2008). From 1995, there was a dramatic rise in the importation and patronage of second-hand clothes (Denzer, 2002). While noting that imported second-hand clothes have been in use since the colonial times, Denzer (2002) observes that the poor, who represented the main patrons of used clothes, faced increasing competition from middle class and wealthy buyers under SAP. Apart from cars and clothes, goods such as electronics, kitchen and household wares, chairs, auto spare parts, shoes, bags, farm equipment etc. were also circulating in the second-hand economy. Although imported second-hand goods have different nomenclatures, they were collectively known as Tokunbo.

Omobowale (2013a) agrees that the economy within which Tokunbo goods are circulating is an aspect of the “glocal” experience which reveals the changing dynamics of local consumption within the global second-hand context. The symbolic-rational meaning that creates and reinforces the value-attachment to Tokunbo goods among Nigerians continues to be central to its popularity. Indeed, there is a shared understanding among everyday people that real distinction exists between imported second-hand Tokunbo – and local second-hand – derisively referred to as aloku – (Omobowale, 2013a). Local entrepreneurs therefore leverage on this to thrive and prosper in the context of currency devaluation and generalised social depravity (Ikporukpo, 2002).
In addition to the rise and expanding networks of special second-hand importation merchant class that resulted, durable livelihoods have been built around Tokunbo economy in many Nigerian cities. From Otigba, Yaba and Aswani markets in Lagos to specialised markets in Ibadan, Kano, Aba and other major urban centres, Tokunbo economy continues to thrive by connecting local consumers with “used” materials of Western modernity. However, the negative consequences of this “popular economy” (Guyer, et al, 2002) on local economic structure has been pervasive. For one, government’s anti-Tokunbo stance has failed to curtail imports of second-hand goods (Ikporukpo, 2002), with operators of auto assembly plant finding it increasingly difficult to compete against culturally-valued economy of used things.

The importation of Tokunbo electronics and ICT hardware have also been linked to the prevailing context of e-waste in Nigeria within a rapidly globalising world (Omobowale, 2012, 2013b). Also, garment makers complain that Tokunbo clothes trade has diverted a significant share of business from them (Denzer, 2002). At industry level, some argue that SAP dug the grave that consumed the local textile industry as it opened African economies to second-hand clothing, resulting in a decline in domestic market for African textile manufacturers (Sautman and Hairong, 2008). This contradicts the position which blames China’s de-industrialisation policy for the demise of the textile industry (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008). Regardless of whether these objections can be sustained, Tokunbo economy remains a most visible legacy of Nigeria’s encounter with Western power, modernity and capital in the twenty-first century.

**Chinco economy in Nigeria: a context of Chinese presence**

The use of Chinco in everyday interaction is connected to China’s ascendance in Nigeria. As with the Tokunbo, Chinco is a product of a combination of experience and imagination in everyday interaction of Nigerians with China and China-made goods. Realistically, the spread and popularity of Chinese goods can be traced to changes of the past decades. Although the Chinco economy, as conceptualised in this study, is due to transformations of the last decade and half when “things from China” became pronounced among Nigerians, particularly China-made cell phones. During Olusegun Obasanjo’s tenure as president of the Fourth Republic, Nigeria witnessed
the institutionalisation of far-reaching economic reforms that led to the deregulation of the telecommunication industry in the early 2000. Private telecoms operators pushed to liberalise access to mobile services by expanding network reach and distributing SIM cards to millions in rural and urban areas. Unfortunately, the gap in access to cell (phones) devices remains wide. Popular brands such as Nokia, Samsung, Sony, and LG were expensive for the largely impoverished population. Also, the quality of service was very poor and network did not reach many communities, even in the cities. So, Nigerians increasingly relied on more than one cell phone/networks to stay connected. What is more, as the Internet services was stabilising, affordable cell phones were useless to those seeking to explore the net. Thus, Chinco phones entered the Nigerian market at a time of great need.

But what does Chinco mean? In the Nigerian context, Chinco represents at least two ideas. First is the idea of Chinco as identity. Chinco in this sense merely names people perceived to be of Chinese origin. Its imposition on certain foreigners is dependent almost entirely on physical appearance and popular intuition about where the foreigner in question is most likely to have come from. Since the identity is often imposed subjectively, Chinco identification could overlap with the identities of other “Chinese-looking people,” including Japanese, Taiwanese, Koreans, etc. While noting that indiscriminate imposition of Chinese identity is common in African countries, Alden (2007) underlines that it constitutes a source of generalisation and stereotyping surrounding China and Chinese on the continent. As a type of economy, Chinco is an emergent form of alternative economy in Nigeria – a unique economic form consisting of ceaseless circulation and trade in China-made goods. The range of goods flowing through this economy is diverse, from items such as shoes, bags, sunglasses, textiles, drugs and food products to small and heavy machineries and electronics. While China-made goods are found all over the world, Chinco is an economy of glocality that relies on the importation and widespread use of goods with distinct characteristics.

In everyday conversation, Chinco is projected ambiguously with varying degrees of negative and positive attributions. In its negative representation, Nigerians invoke words such as “cheap,” “fake,” “not durable,” and “low class.” Chinco economy is
also linked with faking and counterfeiting (Okereocha, 2014). An example of such negative characterisation is noticeable in the work of one artist. In describing her artwork titled “Chinco’ no dey last” (meaning literally “Chinco is not durable”), she explains thus:

Chinco is a metaphor for most things imported into the country that never have lasting values. So it gets broken, or goes bad, we as Nigerians, go back to replace it because it is “Made in China,” and it doesn’t last (Odytyna, 2013).

With specific reference to China-made phones, another author writes that:

They call them Chinco phones, a derogatory word used to denote their origins from China... Every consumer who has used one of these phones have their own story to tell – repeated experiences of loss of memory, data, virus attacks and other anomalies are common from users (Prince, 2011).

Besides, Chinco phones are notorious for causing social embarrassment to the user. As shown in the following quotation, it is also an economy that people perceive as targeting the poor segment of the society, and is thus considered inferior and lowly:

Chinco phones address the bottom of the economic pyramid... They are dirt cheap and this reflects in both the hardware and the software. The hardware often have odd designs. You just KNOW that this is not Nokia or Samsung. But when you switch on a Chinco phone, the audio that greets you confirms further the identity of the device you are holding. Loud, un-refined, high-pitched, ear-jarring audio. ...[O]nce the phone is fully booted, the user interface and OS completes the verification process (Mobility, 2012).

Yet, as a result of the prevailing social and economic conditions in the local receiving context, the utility of the goods that circulates within Chinco economy also invokes positive characterisation. When participants – consumers or commodity dealers alike – explain what the attractions of Chinco are, it is commonplace to come across descriptions such as affordable, innovation, and responsiveness to local needs (Prince, 2011; Mobility.ng, 2012). In terms of innovation, it was through the cell phones that are circulating within Chinco economy that many Nigerians encountered
phones with terrestrial TV and dual/four-SIM capability for the first time (Mobility.ng, 2012). According to a cell phone dealer in Kano, Chinco phones are in high demand than “original phones” because of innovations such as dual SIM capability (Prince, 2011). It has also been argued that Chinco products add a level of prestige and self-respect and offers alternatives of new goods to the hitherto dominant second-hand imports (Kalu, 2012; Alden, 2007). Meanwhile, it was becoming too expensive for local businessmen to trade in imports from Europe (Mbachu, 2006). These positive characterisations have contributed to the growing popularity of Chinco economy among the local population.

Local economic dynamics and the political economy of “Chinco problem”

In cities and rural areas of Nigeria, Chinco goods have high visibility. A sense of its increasing proliferation can be noticed in the growing number of low-level economic actors venturing into trade in China-made goods. In the South-western cities of Lagos and Ibadan, ‘wheelbarrow livelihoods’ that are exclusively dedicated to retailing of China-made phone accessories, rechargeable lamps, power packs, textiles, shoes etc. have emerged. On the internet, enthusiasts of Chinco are starting to appear. Mainly interested in Chinco phones, these enthusiasts, operating through blogs, write posts to advice prospective users of smart phones with little budgets on how to detect “good” or “bad” Chinco phones by issuing specific diagnostic instructions (see Miracle, 2012).

Nigerian and Chinese business people are key actors driving Chinco economy. In 2013, Liu Kan, the Consul-General of the Chinese consulate in Lagos, said that 20,000 Nigerians were issued visas to China, with those travelling for business transaction constituting the majority (Within Nigeria, 2014). In the south-eastern Nigeria, local entrepreneurs in Nnewi market are in the middle of a trade network that linked nodes in different parts of Nigeria and Asian countries (Bräutigam, 2003). Similarly, the Chinese diaspora in Nigeria is high and growing with estimates ranging from 20,000 (Morning Whistle, 2012) to 50,000 (Burgis, 2010). Many engage in trading, although there are construction workers and employees of oil firms among them. Whether competing or co-operating, Nigerians and Chinese
participate in a cross-border trade that facilitates the spread of China-made goods in Africa’s most populous country (Lan & Xiao, 2014).

Nevertheless, Chinco economy has been under serious attack from different quarters of the Nigerian society. The onslaught against the economy is driven by actors with varying degree of formality and interests, including state agencies, local traders, business concerns, and the academia. The narratives sustaining the offensive have multiple sources, although most derive from everyday idea about Chinco and “substandard” or “fake” things, and from sentiments around the perceived threats to local businesses, labour and economy.

Among local traders, the view that there is a “Chinese problem” in the marketplace is shared, and anti-Chinese sentiments is common. Akinrinade and Ogen (2008) argue that China has been pursuing a policy of de-industrialisation in the Nigeria, maintaining that there exist forces of exploitative Chinese neo-liberalism masquerading as South-South co-operation. Chinco is believed to be based on poor labour practice, and the goods circulating within it are perceived to be in competition with local goods, having consequences for the survival of local factories (Adisu, et al, 2010). The Chinese have also been accused of stealing job opportunities from the local population (Burgis, 2010; Morning Whistle, 2012) and criticisms of “dumping” is common (Michael, 2014).

Particularly, local traders in Onitsha believe that Chinese traders have an agenda to “finish them” (Kantai, 2010). In Lagos, the president of a group called Phone and Allied Products Dealers Association of Nigeria (PAPDAN) granted an interview where he complained that the influx of substandard China-made phones is eroding customers’ confidence and constitutes a threat to national economy (Consumer News Nigeria, 2012). The frontrunner of the association of about 3,000 members criticised the Chinese for participating indiscriminately in the economy and “tak[ing] everything from the locals.”

The discontent of government agencies is often clad in legalistic terms. Like the traders, Nigeria high-ranking officials claimed that Chinese goods are substandard and constitute a threat to local economy (Prince, 2011; Mbachu, 2006). The context
of involvement of Chinese nationals in illegality has also been used as justification for denouncing and clamping down on Chinco economy. At the popular Otigba market (also known as computer village) in Lagos, government enforcement agencies, acting in the interest of the public, routinely embark on raids intended to check the influx of fake/counterfeit products supposedly imported from China (Ubabukoh, 2012). Trading associations such as CAPDAN (Computer and Allied Products Dealers Association of Nigeria) have always resisted such clamp downs by questioning the legitimacy of the raids (Ubabukoh, 2012). Meanwhile, other interests are collaborating with government agencies to campaign against Chinco products. For example, Nokia succeeded in mobilising institutions, relevant government agencies and the media in a bid to curb the growing “menace” of substandard Chinese phones. The Nokia “crusade” followed other repeated attacks by other cell phone manufacturers who alongside Nokia, had lost huge revenue to the “Chinco threat” (Prince, 2011).

The foregoing indicates that the Chinco phenomenon has a political economy of its own. As a result of the growing popularity of the economy, Chinco often brings competing interests face to face. In the process of balancing the profit of businesspeople with public policy concern that aims to liberalise access to consumer goods while ensuring consumer protection, Chinco economy pitch government agencies and producers or distributors of popular consumer brands against those trading in Chinese-made goods.

Tokunbo, Chinco and the local receiving context: exploring parallels

Tokunbo and Chinco economies share interesting parallels that should be highlighted. In the previous sections, differences revolve around geographical origins, historical period of emergence, and the type of goods circulating within the economies. However, there are also important similarities between the two economies. First, both are manifest legacies of the incorporation of Nigeria into the world-economy, and are by extension critical significations of glocal processes (Robertson, 1995). The exposure of Nigerian societies to things of western modernity in the colonial and post-colonial periods, and the forceful opening of the
economy to West-controlled world-economy, were critical in the production of *Tokunbo* economy. In a bid to sustain elite tastes and preferences for foreign goods, Nigerian civil servants switched and began to attach value to *Tokunbo* from countries of the former masters (Omobowale, 2013a). The national economy worsened as SAP deepened in the 1980s and 1990s. Local capacity to produce locally responsive consumer goods and compete in the global marketplace declined along with it. At the turn of millennium, Nigeria was still largely impoverished and lacked adequate, efficient, and cost-effective productive capacity to meet the consumption demands of her growing population. Of course, Chinese capitalism was already global in the late 1990s, but in the case of Nigeria, *Chinco* economy succeeded in circulating goods that satisfied unmet needs for the consumption of current modernity. Clearly, the emergence and rootedness of both *Tokunbo* and *Chinco* were aided by the way in which Nigeria’s production process was peripherised in the world capitalist economy. Second, *Tokunbo* and *Chinco* are parallel economies that co-exist and compete with the local economy. In this role, *Chinco* and *Tokunbo* economies sometimes complement local economic structure in providing the access of consumer to goods that would ordinarily be out of reach for majority of the population. At the same time they are competing against local manufactures. It should be noted that the competition is not just between the foreign economies and the local as both *Tokunbo* and *Chinco* goods are also in competition.

Third, local Nigerian entrepreneurs are important drivers of *Tokunbo* and *Chinco* economies. As importers, distributors and retailers, Nigerians connect local consumers with multiple centres for consumer goods in the West and East, and are partaking actively in transnational value chains that link Nigeria with the world of things and capital. Given the longstanding involvement of Nigerians in cross-border trade (Agozino and Ayanike, 2007; Curtin, 1984; Cohen, 1969), the participation of local entrepreneurs in facilitating importation-based economies is not a surprise. However, while historic entrepreneurs exchanged commodities based on value rather than capital, local drivers of *Tokunbo* and *Chinco* economies are driven by the exigency of capital and profit in an increasingly lopsided capitalist world-system. Also, unlike past cross-border traders who operated within fluid and ambiguous
borders, contemporary traders are operating trans-continentally across clearly defined boundaries and mobility rules, which often demand the invention of extra-legal means in order for them to function. So, whether smuggling Tokunbo goods through illegal routes or importing Chinco manufactures in the shadow of the state (Mathews & Yang, 2012; Adesina, 2002), local entrepreneurs are intensifying the entrenchment of multiple economies in Nigeria, thus deepening the incorporation of local market into the world-system.

Finally, Tokunbo and Chinco are essentially economies of poverty and underdevelopment. As shown in previous sections, both economies emerged and continue to thrive in an environment of socio-economic and general structural imbalances. They depend on institutional and policy failures, as well as on the failings of local economy to meet and satisfy consumption demands in an interconnected, free and rapidly transforming world. The four parallels that underline that fundamental continuities are inherent in the relationships between nations with core production processes and their periphery counterparts, even when the actors involved are changing.

**Conclusion**

The contexts of Tokunbo and Chinco are new frames for comparatively exploring the consequences of the West and China in the Nigerian society. As argued in the article, the pattern of incorporation of Nigeria into the world capitalist economy contributed to the emergence and proliferation of Tokunbo and Chinco economies. While Tokunbo and Chinco are evidently phenomena of glocality, the popularity of the goods that are circulating within both economies are clearly connected to the process of “globalisation from below” – a reality “in which ‘small’ players, as opposed to mega-corporations, make use of the opportunities offered by globalisation” (Mohan and Zack-Williams, 2002:21) to meet local consumption needs. This much may be deduced from the embeddedness of Tokunbo and Chinco in day to day exchanges, and from the energetic participation of small scale entrepreneurs from Nigeria and China in both economies. Meanwhile, although both economies are characteristically distinguishable, their logic and destabilising consequences are the same in the
periphery nation.

No doubt, the role of the economies in the lives of ordinary people imbues them with a degree of importance that cannot be downplayed – see Zi (2015) for similar conclusion on Chinese “Fong Kong” goods in Botswana. However, in Nigeria and the rest of Africa, the proliferation of the economies is symptomatic of the much larger problem of underdevelopment and intractable dependency syndrome on the continent. As signature economies, Tokunbo and Chinco are legacies of colonialism and dependent development on the continent. To this extent, the question of whether the West and China can indeed uplift Africa and improve the lives of Africans in the long-term will remain a subject of debate.

Endnotes

1. Other popular identities invented for foreigners in Nigeria include Kora (Middle Easterners and Indians) and Oyinbo (Westerners/Caucasians).

2. Correct name on dial screen, the phone was actually calling another person (Prince, 2011).

3. Some Ibo traders believe that the spate of kidnapping of foreigners has been their saving grace, saying that “If it wasn't for the kidnappers, we would not be talking like this today. The Chinese would have run us out of business!” (Kantai, 2010)

4. Chinese traders, about 45 in total, including 11 women, had run-ins with the Nigerian authorities over illegal textile trading (Morning Whistle, 2012). The Chinatown located in Lagos had problems relating to textile smuggling, counterfeiting and storage of poor quality fabrics (Mbachu, 2006).

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“Tokunbo and Chinco economies in Nigeria: rethinking encounters and continuities in local economic transformations”


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Forum: The power of language: globalising the “Chinese Dream”**

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Abstract

Since Xi Jinping assumed the presidency in March 2013, he has made the slogan “Chinese dream” a central subject in most of his public speeches, both at home and abroad. However, so far nowhere has the catchphrase arguably received as much appeal as in Africa. Creating the vision of an African Dream within the framework of the Chinese Dream raises the question of what specific agenda the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pursuing. In this paper, I argue that the Chinese and African Dream can be understood as narratives that are strategically used by the CCP to enhance its discursive power in the international system. Examining the construction and projection of the African dream, offers new insights on the Chinese government strategy to manifest its own narratives in China-Africa relations.

*Forum contributions are discursive and topical articles written by authors to encourage debate or share new information and ideas. Forum articles do not form part of the peer-reviewed section of the AEAA but contribute by extending the academic discussion beyond the limits of a review process.

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Introduction

After assuming the presidency in March 2013, Xi Jinping used the term “Chinese Dream” several times in his keynote speech at the National People’s Congress (NPC). Since then, the slogan is a central subject in most of his public speeches. However, Xi does not only aim to promote the Chinese dream within but also outside of China. It has equally become a fix term in his speeches overseas. Additionally, the Chinese president has started to speak of a world dream and also tries to tailor different dreams according to the specific country or region he visits, such as speaking of an Indian Dream, a European Dream and an African Dream. However, nowhere has Xi’s catchphrase received as much appeal as in Africa. But what do the Chinese Dream and African Dream actually mean? How can we make sense out of these terms? While much has been written on how to understand the Chinese Dream, less attention has arguably been paid to the establishment of other “dream narratives” such as the African dream. In general, what has been neglected so far in the literature is the importance of formalised language in Chinese foreign policy.

As Michael Schoenhals (1996: 5) rightly asked: “Why is it that the art of doing things with words so dear to China’s homo politicus has not received the same attention as, for instance, the ‘art of guanxi’?” Formalised language plays an important role in Chinese politics and functions as a form of state power. By determining “(in) appropriate” formulations, the Chinese government attempts to regulate what is being said and written — and by extension what is being done within the Chinese political system (Schoenhals, 1992:3). Those formulations or official terminologies are known as tifa, “ways of putting things”, and are regarded as particularly useful for promoting its ideology. Understanding the substance behind the CCP’s formulations — thus the vocabularies it uses and why — is fundamental for making sense of the “topsy-turvy world of Chinese politics” (Qian, 2012).

While this political practice is common in China’s domestic sphere, it is only recently that the CCP has started to deploy diplomatic formulations in a more sophisticated way for foreign audiences (Callahan, 2007: 786). Along with China’s
rise, there has been growing fear and suspicion of a “China threat” among the international community. In response, to convey China’s benign intentions and a positive image to the world, the former President Hu Jintao put forward the formulation “peaceful development” as China’s foreign policy strategy. Though the Chinese leaders seek to assure that China’s rise brings opportunities and benefits rather than threats to peace and stability, the voices of scepticism have remained. Therefore, in recent years various scholars have highlighted the necessity to strengthen China’s “discursive power” in order to counter the Western “discursive hegemony”. According to Zheng Yongnian (2013), China currently has no discursive power on the international stage. Rather than letting the West dominate the discourse on China’s behaviour, he claims that the Chinese government needs to establish its own “discourse system” to explain China’s international behaviour properly. Similarly, Zhang (2014), former interpreter to Deng Xiaoping, argues that China should not leave the discursive power to the West but must rather use its own language to answer big questions such as “where it came from” and “which path it should take.”

The communist leaders are well aware of the struggle to communicate with global audiences and promote a positive image internationally. Therefore, they attach great importance to strengthening its international communication capability. The former head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO), Cai Mingzhao (2013) argued in a published article in People’s Daily Online that China must construct its own international discourse with new concepts and formulations to spread China’s voice rather than being forced to discuss itself in a discourse established and controlled by others. Cai’s article was written in light of Xi Jinping’s speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in August 2013. Xi has repeatedly demanded in various speeches that the stories of China should be told well and the voices of China spread widely internationally. Strengthening China’s international voice and winning discursive power globally has therefore become a significant part of Chinese foreign strategy. However, most scholars have mainly focused on related topics such as public diplomacy and soft power (Zhao, 2011). The latter term has become a very popular concept among Chinese political leaders. Since Hu Jintao’s
keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in October 2007, the Chinese government particularly emphasises Chinese culture as its main source of soft power (Xinhua, 2007b). While the culture-based notion of soft power is a central component of China’s strategic development of its “comprehensive national power”, it remains unclear how this can be achieved. What is missing in the Chinese discourse on soft power is how it can be turned into attainment of specific foreign policy goals (Li, 2008). Or more specifically, how can cultural soft power be translated into enhancing discursive power?

Roselle et al. (2014) argue that soft power has become a catch-all term that has lost explanatory power. For instance, the concept does not identify the processes through which soft power operates and it does not explain under what conditions soft power resources can be used to support foreign policy (ibid., 74). Therefore, the authors suggest strategic narratives as a new concept, which seeks to explain how communication, persuasion and influence operate in international affairs. Further, they state “strategic narrative is soft power in the 21st century” (Roselle et al., 2014: 71).

Narratives are “frameworks constructed to allow people to make sense of the world, policies, events, and interactions” (Roselle, 2010: 6). Political actors use narratives strategically to achieve a desired purpose or intention such as explaining a particular worldview and their own role in the international system, identifying enemies and allies or contextualising historical events (Antoniades, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2010). Thus, it can be viewed as an instrumental tool for great powers to shape the international system as well as influence the behaviour of other actors. Analysing narratives helps us understand how actors interpret the world in which they live, and at the same time allows us to trace how political actors strategically shape agendas, policy choices, the discursive environment and the international system.

**Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream**

Xi Jinping made his first reference to the concept of the Chinese Dream shortly after he took office as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. In November 2012, he visited the exhibition “The Road Toward Renewal” at the National
Museum of China together with the other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee (Xinhua, 2012c). In his keynote speech he said: “Nowadays, everyone is talking about the ‘China Dream.’ In my view, to realise the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history” (Xinhua, 2012b).

The expression of realising “the great renewal of the Chinese nation” is nothing new in the Chinese official language. Rather, the term “rejuvenation” is deeply ingrained in Chinese history and is inseparably intertwined with the “century of humiliation” narrative (Wang, 2014b; Callahan, 2010), which refers to the period from the start of the First Opium War (1839) to the victory of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War (1949). China was forced to open its doors by the imperialists and colonialists, who allegedly left the country a legacy of political turmoil and chaos. This historical memory is still prevalent in Chinese politics today. According to Callahan (2010), the humiliation narrative is applied for various strategic reasons: Firstly, it creates a negative presentation of the out-group (foreign imperialist) and a hostile foreign enemy for the in-group (Chinese people). Secondly, China is presented as an “innocent victim” of international bullying, which potentially underlines the credibility of the Chinese government’s argument that, as an “inherently peaceful” civilization, China has never invaded a country — and never will (ibid., 22). Thirdly, the narrative enhances the notion that the reason China is struggling today is because the country has to come to terms with the past. Moreover, it strengthens the CCP’s role in leading the nation to independence, putting an end to one hundred years of suffering and hardship (Schneider, 2014:153). Out of this context, the CCP has made national rejuvenation the grand mission of the country and aims to revive China’s historical position and glory (Zhang, 2012). Introduced by Sun Yatsen, the concept of rejuvenation has been used by different generations of Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao (Yan, 2001). Xi Jinping has not deviated from the tradition but has recontextualised the great rejuvenation narrative in the discourse of the Chinese Dream.
Constructing the African Dream

Besides Russia, Xi Jinping selected the three African countries Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of the Congo for his first overseas trip abroad as China’s new president. Arguably, this reflects the great importance the new Chinese leadership is placing on the relationship with Africa.

During his speech in Tanzania, Xi Jinping not only mentioned the Chinese Dream but also spoke of the so-called “African Dream”, which entails “gaining strength from unity and achieving development and rejuvenation” (Xi, 2013). According to Xi, China and Africa are bonded by the dream they all hold on to. Further, he specifies: “The Chinese and African people should enhance unity, cooperation, mutual support and assistance so as to make our dreams come true” (ibid.). Except for the term “dream”, all the words used here by Xi Jinping are commonly applied in the context of China-Africa relations, in particular when addressing developing countries. When referring to “bonded by dreams” and “our dreams”, Xi strategically creates a we-group and thus includes the audience and China. He has used a large number of “we” pronouns and also the term “brother” throughout his speech and hence has established a unified relationship between China and Africa.

When talking about the Chinese and African Dreams, Xi further states:

We should also work with the rest of the world to realize the dream of the world for enduring peace and common prosperity, and make new and even greater contribution to the noble cause of peace and development of mankind (ibid.).

Xi uses exactly the same eight Chinese characters for “enduring peace and common prosperity” (chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong), as Hu Jintao did to describe his concept of a “harmonious world”. It was at the summit meeting on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations in 2005 when Hu made a speech calling for building a harmonious world with enduring peace and common prosperity (Hu, 2005). It was not until 2007 that the expression “chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong” was officially incorporated into the CCP party congress political report, characterising the concept of a harmonious world (Guo & Blanchard, 2008: 3). As
stated by Hu (2005), “all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” Comparing the above quote of Xi to Hu’s statement, it is striking to note that both use the same phrase except that Xi has replaced the goal of a harmonious world with his new “Chinese Dream” slogan.

Another noteworthy term that Xi put forward in his speech is the “community of common destiny”. As pointed out by him:

China and Africa have always been a community of common destinies. Similar historical experiences, common development tasks and shared strategic interests have bound us together (Xi, 2013).

The expression “community of common destiny” was initially presented by Hu Jintao in his report at the 17th CPC National Congress in 2007 to portray the relationship between China and Taiwan (Xinhua, 2007a; Xinhua, 2007b). However, Xi has recontextualized the term and made this “old” phrase his new diplomatic strategy, emphasizing China’s special relationship with other states, in particular with its neighbouring and developing countries (Kan, 2014). Behind the narrative of “community of common destinies” lies the logic that China’s goal of economic and peaceful development depends on a favourable international environment. According to Hu et. al., China can only obtain its greater development if the world becomes fully developed (2014: 9). This applies to economic growth, prosperity, and stability. This mind-set is also reflected in rhetoric such as: “China's development cannot be isolated from the world’s development and vice versa” (Xinhua, 2014) or “the Chinese dream cannot be realized without realizing the world dream” (Wang, 2014a).

**Promoting the Chinese and African Dreams**

The increasing promotion of Xi’s notions of both the Chinese and African Dreams to a foreign audience is also evidenced by the inclusion of the slogans in speeches given by Chinese foreign policy officials. Taking a speech held by Lu Shaye, the Director-General of the African Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as an example, I will by only highlighting the relevant passages of the text how these two narratives are projected onto the international audience.

In July 2013, the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and the Chinese embassy organized a two-day seminar entitled “Chinese Dream – African Dream: Achieving Common Development through Joint Effort” in commemoration of the 50 years of Sino-Tanzania diplomatic relations. On this occasion, Lu Shaye gave a speech.

Referring to Xi Jinping’s trip to Africa back in March, Lu recalls the words Xi made on the Chinese Dream and African Dream. Lu reproduces Xi’s words exactly as he uttered them in his Tanzania speech. He continues to explain the core of the Chinese Dream, namely: “prosperity of the country, rejuvenation of the nation, and happiness of the people” (FOCAC, 2013). Claiming that it is well received among the Chinese population, it is also providing a “source of inspiration”, probably meaning to inspire other countries to pursue their own dreams. In order to foster this idea, Lu states:

“the Chinese Dream is in consistence with the beautiful dreams cherished by people of other countries and, in particular, highly consistent with the African Dream” (ibid.).

Stressing the particular similarities between the Chinese Dream and African Dream, he highlights the following four points:

“First, the Chinese Dream and the African Dream are both for peace” (ibid.).

Referring to their shared colonized past, both China and Africa therefore “pursue stability and peace in their dreams.” As has been mentioned above, Xi’s notion of the Chinese Dream has not led to the disappearance of slogans of the former leadership but are used as a complement for achieving the Chinese Dream. In line with that Lu states,

“we will unswervingly pursue the path of peaceful development. This is China's solemn commitment to the world, and the only choice we have to realize the Chinese dream.” [...] “Our joint efforts to realize our dreams [...] will [...] add to
the efforts of building a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity” (ibid.).

Lu continues with the second point: “[...] Chinese Dream and the African Dream are both for development” (ibid.). Since Deng Xiaoping’s “open door” policy in 1978, the CCP has placed high priority on economic development. According to the CCP’s constitution, “[...] the Communist Party of China must persist in taking economic development as the central task, making all other work subordinate to and serve this central task” (Xinhua, 2012a). Although China is seen as a leading economic power by the world, the Chinese leadership still emphasizes that it is a long road to eradicate domestic poverty. The Chinese government does not only regard continued economic growth as vital to maintain social stability but also considers it to be one of the most important sources of legitimacy for the CCP’s leadership.

Lu argues that Africa’s similar tasks of improving the socio-economic welfare for the population and achieving sustainable development will give them more common ground to work together. Thus, he highlights the common goal of development, which at the same time creates opportunities that will benefit both sides.

“Third, the Chinese Dream and the African Dream are both for greater strength through independent efforts” (ibid.). Adhering to its principle of independence and self-reliance, the origin of which dates back to the Mao era, it is stressed that sustained self-effort continues to be an important aspect for China’s foreign policy (Keith, 2011). Thus, from the Chinese perspective, independence means to make one’s own choices and choose one’s own development path without interference from outside.

Trying to point to analogies, Lu states that the “African Dream, similarly, puts emphasis on strength through unity” (FOCAC, 2013), highlighting Africa’s effort of regional integration and speaking with one voice at the international stage. However, unity does not directly or necessarily relate to the principle of independence. Thus, the connection between the Chinese and African Dream Lu tries to create does not appear very obvious but rather clearly reflects China’s foreign policy principle and
thus its own understanding of the Chinese Dream. Lu explains: “By upholding independence and self-reliance, China and Africa can better understand and respect one another” (ibid.).

Lu states in his fourth point: “[...] the Chinese Dream and the African Dream are both for rejuvenation” (ibid.). As has been previously stated, the rejuvenation narrative is always linked to history. In this context Lu referred to the notion of the “Chinese civilization.” The expression “great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization” is commonly used within Chinese official jargon. According to Zheng Bijian, the former vice president of the Central Party School of the Communist Party, “the profound essence and meaning of China's peaceful rise is the great rejuvenation of Chinese civilization” (Study Times, 2006). In other words, applied to the idea of the Chinese Dream, realizing the dream essentially means the revival of the Chinese civilization.

Instead of trying to find similarities here, Lu simply uses the Chinese narrative of rejuvenation and civilization and applies it to Africa, stating: “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and Africa ultimately relies on the rejuvenation of our respective civilizations in all fields [...]” (FOCAC, 2013). At the outset of his speech, Lu stresses that the Chinese and African Dream are consistent. This consistency, however, is primarily created by the CCP. Following the deliberation on what the Chinese Dream and African Dream encompasses, Lu’s speech reveals that the “dreams” basically consist of various strands of the CCP’s narratives. As reflected in his speech, China’s foreign policy continues to hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, as it is regarded as the means to achieve national prosperity and rejuvenation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the essence of the African Dream is basically a projection of China’s own principles and hence the projection of the notion of its Chinese Dream onto Africa under the guise of the African Dream.

**Communicating the Chinese and African Dream narrative through the media**

To understand how narratives are strategically employed by actors internationally, Miskimmon et al. (2013) highlights the importance of the media ecology as an arena
within which narratives are disseminated and messages are constructed. The diffusion of communication technologies—ranging from TV broadcasting to the new role of the Internet—allows actors to reach a broader audience and thus communicate their own views on various issues easily. Nowadays, one can observe the development of participatory, multimodal and multilingual media ecologies, comprising of overlapping local, national and transnational distribution of competing narratives (ibid., 11). The new media ecology offers new and vast opportunities for foreign policy actors to gain influence globally and challenge the established narratives of others. At the same time, actors compete to shape the infrastructure of those media ecologies in order to ensure that their narratives reach a wide audience. Hence, successful narratives are also a matter of institution building and technology transfer (Miskimmon et al., 2013: 148).

Media plays a significant role in mediating the Chinese Dream narrative. Over the years, the CCP has not only developed an awareness of the importance of the media as an essential component of its “governing capacity”, but has also created sophisticated strategies to manage the greatly transformed media for consensus and persuasion (Zhang, 2011). Thus, given that media and other new communication technologies are essential to strengthen legitimacy and maintain power within its borders, it is also used to engage with foreign audiences.

In 2009, the Chinese government launched its media “going out” project by investing 45 billion yuan ($6.6 billion) to expand the presence of its main media outlets globally (Akkermans, 2009). The determination to create its own media empire to contest with established international media originates from its belief that Western media outlets portray China inaccurately and in a non-objective manner (Lu, 2012: 104). Recognizing the importance of international media as an important platform to shape the discourse on China, in recent years, the CCP leadership has repeatedly underlined the importance of strengthening Chinese media’s “international communication capability”. Thus, the purpose of the Chinese media expansion in global communication is twofold: First, to change the narrative on and counter the negative image about China shaped by foreign media, secondly, to present its own views internationally by projecting their own terminologies and
concepts that better explain the Chinese way of thinking. Similar to the notion of “peaceful development” and “harmonious world”, the CCP has promoted the Chinese Dream narrative heavily in the media targeting foreign audiences. In a lengthy article in *People’s Daily*, the chief of the CCP propaganda department, Liu Qibao, has unveiled the government’s Chinese Dream campaign abroad, which earmarks more resources towards disseminating the idea of the Chinese Dream in the media. Liu argues,

*We should take a proactive approach to spreading and interpreting the Chinese Dream, to help the international community better understand it* (Li, 2014).

The Chinese leaders clearly attempt to strategically employ the media to construct and project the Chinese Dream narrative. So far, its strategy has been successful in the sense that the slogan has drawn extensive international attention and has been analysed and dissected extensively by the global media and China watchers.

Targeting a worldwide audience in the digital era, the CCP has recognised the strength of the Internet as a dissemination device to enhance its external communication. It is common in the Chinese media to establish special coverage or reports on specific topics or events such as the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee or overseas visits by the Chinese president or premier. Accordingly, multiple state-run media websites such as Xinhua or CCTV have set up special coverages on the Chinese Dream in English for foreign audiences. Moreover, quotations, interviews or opinion articles of foreign political and economic leaders’ as well as diplomats’ and academics’ on the Chinese Dream are widely publicised in order to boost the idea of the Chinese Dream.

Similarly, the CCP has made extensive use of the media, not only through broadcasting but also media co-operation, to circulate the vision of an African Dream. For instance, a special website titled “Chinese Dream joins hands with African Dream” both in Chinese and English has been launched by the *People’s Daily* Online, which belongs to the leading and most influential newspaper in China and is regarded as the official mouthpiece of the CCP’s Central Committee (*People’s Daily* Online, 2013a; *People’s Daily* Online, 2013b). Though the English version
seems to aim at projecting the general notion of an African Dream, the presentation of the Chinese version shows that the initial idea of this special website was to report on the media seminar “Chinese Dream and African Dream” in September 2013, which was held in Beijing. An African media delegation was invited to visit the People’s Daily Online, but was also joined by Chinese high officials. However, this seminar was not a non-recurring event but a yearly occurrence, which focused on promoting the communication and co-operation between Chinese and African media (People’s Daily, Online 2013c). According to the People’s Daily Online,

*After visiting China, the African media can report a real China to the African people, and let the African people know more about China. Such visits also make contributions to the friendly communication and cooperation between China and the African media.* (ibid.)

Given the negative reporting and criticism by international media on China’s involvement in Africa such as exploiting Africa’s local industries and natural resources or taking a neo-colonialist approach, close media co-operation has become one of the priorities for China’s African policy in order to “enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other” (People’s Daily Online, 2006). Over the years, the Chinese government has not only invested heavily in information technology and telecommunications infrastructure in African countries (Grassi, 2014: 2), but it has also fostered the institutionalisation of media co-operation such as the Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation or China-Africa Press Exchange Centre. Moreover, the Chinese government provides training and programs for African journalists. Every year about 30,000 short training courses and 18,000 scholarships are offered (Grassi, 2014:6). This is clearly another strategy the Chinese leadership has adopted in order to challenge the Western discourse hegemony.

Strikingly, during the media seminar Zhang Yong, People’s Daily Vice Director of External Communication Department, states that “the People’s Daily is the reporter and recorder of the Chinese Dream. The development of the People’s Daily is part of the Chinese Dream” (Zhang, 2013). Clearly, the People’s Daily plays a significant
role in promoting the idea of the Chinese Dream, but at the same time the “development” of the People’s Daily’s in the sense of furthering its co-operation abroad and expanding its field of influence is regarded as an essential component to realize the Chinese Dream concept. Notably, the Chinese narrative itself has been expanded to the media sphere.

At the seminar on “Enhance China – Africa Media Co-operation for Shared Dreams” in Nairobi Liu Guangyuan, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, stresses in his speech: “To realize the dreams of both China and Africa, our media must play a significant role” (Liu 2013). His primary aim is to “break the monopoly of the current international discourse”. Expressing discontent about the current global media landscape, which is mainly dominated by a few developed countries, Liu claims that developed countries (they) behave in an unjust way toward developing countries (we) by creating distorted pictures of “us” and thereby establishing in- and out-groups. At the same time, he depicts developed countries as the “enemies”, claiming that they hold a monopoly over the media discourses and calling it a hypocritical system which Africa and China should refuse to be part of.

While the initial idea of the Chinese Dream primarily involves economic and social development, Lu has expanded the Chinese Dream narrative and has incorporated the media as an essential component of their “dreams”. Building on the “unfair treatment by the West” argument and “common identity as developing countries” narrative, Liu uses the “dream” narrative to set an overall goal that they both want to realise and this can only be done by further strengthening the media co-operation between China and Africa.

**Conclusion**

In line with his predecessors, the promotion of the concept of Chinese Dream is an effort by Xi Jinping to build his own legacy and it has already become a distinctive characteristic of his own leadership. However, close analysis of the construction of the Chinese Dream makes it clear that the basic principles and ideas of the Chinese Dream are not entirely novel but are linked to a number of past Chinese foreign policy narratives. His slogan differs in terminology but not in substance from the
previous principles of the CCP after all. Moreover, the CCP has not deviated from the previous concepts of peaceful development and a harmonious world but has recontextualised them into Xi’s overall goal to realise the Chinese Dream.

In its on-going strategy to change the discursive environment to counter the negative perception which has emerged with China’s continued economic, political and military development, Xi Jinping has expanded the notion of the Chinese Dream to a world dream, highlighting that every country or region has its own dream that needs to be pursued. Particularly striking is the establishment of an African Dream, which he closely connects and relates to the mantra of the Chinese Dream. The CCP seeks to create a collective dream by pointing out the similarities between the two regions. Though both of them share similar historical encounters and strive for economic prosperity, the construction of the African Dream is in essence based on the CCP’s own understanding of the Chinese Dream.

The Chinese government has strategically made use of the media as a channel to disseminate the Chinese Dream and African Dream concept. The strategy it applies is twofold and intertwined: firstly, the CCP shapes the media environment within which Chinese and African Dream narratives are disseminated. Secondly, the idea of the Chinese and African Dreams is used as an argument to further strengthen the media co-operation between both China and Africa.

While focusing on the formation and projection of the Chinese and African Dream, due to the limitation of this paper, I have not investigated how these narratives have been received by the targeted audiences. However, there might be some evidence that the strategic narrative of the CCP has generated positive results. For instance, Olusegun Obasanjo, the former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria stated:

*If Chinese Dream — and it surely does — Africa, collectively, needs an African Dream and each of our countries needs its own dream. That is another lesson that Africa can learn and imbibe from China. We must draw up dreams that are attainable and that will carry Africa collectively and individually to the promised land in this century.* (Obasanjo, 2013)
Moreover, Asha-Rose Migiro, a former UN deputy secretary-general and Minister of Justice and Constitution Affairs of Tanzania, pointed out that the “Chinese Dream resonated with the dream of Africa, as China and Africa can achieve common development through common efforts” (All Africa, 2013). Both statements of these high-ranking political officials indicate that the African Dream constructed by the CCP has caught the attention of African leaders and is not merely viewed as a propaganda campaign. However, it must be acknowledged that by picking up on the term “African Dream”, African high officials could likewise use language strategically to please the Chinese government or gain material support from Beijing. Therefore future research will have to elaborate on how these narratives resonate with audiences.

Bibliography


Anny Boc

“Forum: The power of language: globalising the ‘Chinese Dream’”
China’s growing security relationship with Africa: for whose benefit?*

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Abstract

China’s security relationship with Africa has evolved significantly since the 1960s and early 1970s when China was a modest provider of military assistance and training for African liberation and revolutionary groups. China has become an increasingly important supplier of conventional and light weapons to African governments and stepped up the volume of its military exchange visits. It is a major troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, a member of the international anti-piracy force in the Gulf of Aden, and is taking steps to protect its growing physical presence and interests in Africa.

*Forum contributions are discursive and topical articles written by authors to encourage debate or share new information and ideas. Forum articles do not form part of the peer-reviewed section of the AEAA but contribute by extending the academic discussion beyond the limits of a review process.

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Introduction

China’s security relationship with Africa has evolved significantly since the 1960s and early 1970s when China was a modest provider of military assistance and training for African liberation and revolutionary groups. China has become an increasingly important supplier of conventional and light weapons to African governments and stepped up the volume of its military exchange visits. It is a major troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, a member of the international anti-piracy force in the Gulf of Aden, and is taking steps to protect its growing physical presence and interests in Africa.

As China develops its strategy as a regional military power and eventually a global naval presence, it is important, however, to put Africa in perspective. Compared to the countries on China’s periphery, near neighbours and especially those with substantial energy resources, Europe, and North America, Africa is a low security priority. Africa is geographically distant and poses no security threat to China except to its personnel and interests in Africa and in offshore waters. As is the case with all nations, China will try to maximise its leverage, influence, and ability to protect its interests in Africa. This will not always work to the mutual advantage of Africa generally or for individual African countries.

While China is paying increasing attention to its security interests in and around Africa, the challenge for African countries is to obtain maximum benefit from China’s security initiatives. This will require concerted effort by the African Union, sub-regional organisations, and the leaders of key African states. As African leaders and organisations grapple with maximising benefits from Chinese responses to security interests, most of them will also want to avoid alienating Western countries, several of which already have major security interests in and co-operation with African states. In addition, African countries will need to balance China’s security interests with those of key emerging nations such as India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf States.

The current China-Africa security structure
Former President Hu Jintao launched the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security at the 2012 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial meeting in Beijing. The stated purpose was to deepen co-operation with the African Union and African countries for maintaining peace and security, to provide financial support for African Union peacekeeping missions, to develop the African Standby Force, and to train more security personnel and peacekeepers for the African Union (Xinhua, 2012). To the extent China follows through, all of these objectives would seem to benefit Africa.

The Fifth FOCAC Ministerial Action Plan (2013-2015) added that China will support African countries’ efforts to combat illegal trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons. China agreed to contribute within its means to Africa’s conflict prevention, management, resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. It pledged to continue support for UN peacekeeping missions and implied it stood ready to mediate African conflicts. China agreed to strengthen co-operation with Somalia, the African Union, and relevant African sub-regional organisations in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. Finally, China said it was prepared to increase co-operation in fighting all forms of terrorism (FOCAC, 2012).

In remarks at the UN in 2013, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Wang Min, called on the international community to promote peace and stability in Africa, strengthen collaboration with the African Union and sub-regional organisations, and take concrete measures to help Africa reinforce its collective security mechanism. He added that China is actively pursuing the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security by providing personnel to UN peacekeeping missions and military aid to the African Union (Wang Min, 2013). In 2014, Premier Li Keqiang reaffirmed China’s support for the Initiative and promised to enhance collaboration with Africa on peace and security issues.

The ninth and most recent of China’s military white papers made few references to Africa, but commented that China’s national security is more vulnerable to international regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and
epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad. China’s interests in Africa are relevant to all of these concerns and the paper underscored the need to safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests (China, 2015).

The paper emphasised the role of the PLA Navy (PLAN), which will gradually shift its focus from “offshore waters defence” to a combination of “offshore waters defence” with “open seas protection,” and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force for that purpose. It added that great importance must be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. The paper said that China will develop a modern maritime military force commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic sea lines of communication and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime co-operation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power (China, 2015). While China did not spell out what “open seas protection” means in practice, it is a major strategic shift towards a more assertive maritime strategy.

The paper also noted that the armed forces will continue to conduct military operations other than war such as emergency rescue and disaster relief, counterterrorism and stability maintenance, rights and interests protection, guard duty, international peacekeeping, and international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In this regard, China pledged to continue escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and other seas as required, enhance exchanges and co-operation with naval task forces of other countries, and jointly secure international sea lines of communication (China, 2015).

**Support for United Nations peacekeeping and combating piracy**

Over the last 15 years, China has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. As of 30 September 2015, it had 2,420 troops, 171 police, and 26 experts assigned to seven of the UN’s nine peacekeeping operations in Africa.
(United Nations, 2015). This constituted more than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council but was notably less than the number from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Ethiopia.

China has traditionally assigned non-combat engineers, medical, and logistical personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. This began to change with the assignment of combat guard forces to the UN operation in Mali. In 2015, China deployed a 700-person combat infantry battalion to the UN mission in South Sudan, where China has significant interests in the oil sector. This was its first ever deployment of a combat infantry battalion to a UN peacekeeping operation. The UN, African countries, and even the United States have welcomed Chinese participation in these peacekeeping operations.

President Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly in 2015 that China will contribute 8,000 troops to a UN peacekeeping standby force, although he gave no details on timing. He pledged US$100 million over five years in military assistance for African Union peacekeeping missions. Xi also committed US$1 billion over ten years to a joint China-UN peace and development fund (Huang, 2015).

Late in 2008, China began sending PLAN vessels to the Gulf of Aden to join an international force dedicated to deterring Somali piracy. Usually consisting of two frigates and a supply ship, these vessels are continuing their engagement and rotate every four months. The Chinese operate independently of Western naval task forces, but have been widely praised for their professionalism and co-operation. The decision to join this operation marked a major turning point in China’s response to security threats beyond its borders. It has resulted in a significant increase in PLAN visits to African port cities and led to a discussion within China over the need for more formal arrangements with other countries to support its naval vessels.

**China pursues its national security interests in Africa**

China, like any other nation, pursues its own national interests in Africa and elsewhere. President Xi Jinping stated in a 2014 speech that “We should protect China’s overseas interests and continue to improve our capacity to provide such
protection” (Xinhua, 2014; Godement, 2014). China’s security interests often align with those of African countries. African leaders seek, for example, political stability, which is in China’s interest for economic reasons.

It is not surprising that China often contributes troops to UN peacekeeping operations in countries where it has significant commercial interests such as Sudan (oil), South Sudan (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (minerals). The peacekeeping operations also provide China with experience and training for its troops far from its borders and underscore China’s global reach. It contributes to China’s desire to be seen as a great power.

China has engaged in the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden in its own interest. Chinese flagged vessels and crews were subject to attacks and kidnapping by Somali pirates. Public criticism in China that the government was not being sufficiently responsive hastened its decision to send frigates to the Gulf of Aden. In addition, much of the commerce passing through these waters was headed to or from China. Had these Chinese interests not been present, it is questionable whether the PLAN would have engaged (Erickson and Strange, 2015:73-75).

Chinese arms sales are welcomed by African leaders, especially those in countries facing Western sanctions such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. For China, arms sales are a source of foreign exchange, one of its basic interests. On the other hand, neighbouring countries, political opposition groups, and elements of civil society do not necessarily welcome the importation of Chinese weapons or those from other countries, especially when they reach repressive African governments or are not subject to adequate controls.

China has not always been sufficiently attentive to the transfer of its weapons as occurred when the government of Sudan provided Chinese arms to its ally in Darfur, the Janjaweed, which then engaged in ethnic cleansing. This outraged opposition groups in Darfur and led to several attacks on Chinese personnel and facilities in Sudan. Similarly, Norinco announced in 2014 the delivery of US$ 38 million in arms to the South Sudanese government in the middle of a civil war (Henry, 2014). This put into question China’s neutrality as a mediator in the conflict; Beijing eventually
ended the shipment. Increasingly, because of their ubiquity, Chinese weapons are showing up in conflicts in the eastern Congo, Darfur, and Somalia. In some cases they were purchased at international arms markets, but on other occasions they were transferred by African governments that sympathised with the rebel movements (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012:172-179; Enuka, 2011:70-79).

The huge financial losses and evacuation of almost 36,000 Chinese nationals from Libya in 2011 after the fall of the Muammar el-Qaddafi government was a wakeup call. Most of the Chinese in Libya were working on contract for Chinese companies on infrastructure projects valued at almost US$ 19 billion. While China orchestrated a successful evacuation, this incident exposed its limited ability to protect its economic and security interests and resulted in a serious reassessment of ways to preserve its interests in Africa (Alden, 2014:4). The Libyan evacuation highlighted the need for China’s state-owned enterprises to protect Chinese nationals overseas and resulted in the principle that whoever sends personnel overseas is responsible.

The larger the Chinese presence in Africa, the greater the likelihood that Chinese nationals will find themselves in harm’s way and the louder will be calls by Chinese netizens to protect their own. A couple of recent cases make the point. In 2014, Nigeria’s Boko Haram terrorist group seized ten Chinese construction employees with Sinohydro in neighbouring Cameroon, which had recently acquired Chinese military equipment (McGregor, 2014). They were released several months later, presumably after a ransom payment was made. There are about 60 Chinese state-owned and 400 private companies in Angola today. There is growing Angolan resentment to this large presence. The drop in the price of oil has resulted in a sharp downturn of Angola’s economy. Angolans are engaging in the kidnapping and ransoming of foreigners. In 2015, the Chinese chamber of commerce in Luanda sent a letter to the president of Angola requesting more protection of foreigners (Coroado, 2015).

More Chinese living in Africa will probably lead to higher numbers of unscrupulous individuals. In 2012, China’s Ministry of Public Security sent 30 police officers to Angola to work with local police in countering a Chinese mafia operation. Angola
arrested and deported 37 Chinese nationals to China. In 2015, Kenyan authorities arrested 30 Chinese nationals in Nairobi for cybercrimes and repatriated them to China where they now face trial (Anthony, Esterhuyse and Burgess, 2015:3).

There has been a greater emphasis on risk assessment, especially in the case of national oil companies and state-owned enterprises. China is also taking a closer look at the role of private security protection of its nationals overseas. The problem is that the Chinese private security industry is relatively new and largely confined to China; it is only beginning to emerge overseas. The Shandong Huawei security company has, for example, entered into a partnership with a South African security company (Anthony, Esterhuyse and Burgess, 2015:3). On the other hand, there are no Chinese private security companies operating in South Sudan, one of the countries from which China evacuated oil workers in 2014. The Libyan evacuation and a series of other attacks on Chinese nationals have resulted in new procedures by China’s embassies in Africa to protect its interests and led to a re-evaluation of its non-interference principle.

**Evolving policy on non-interference**

There is an on-going debate concerning a possible modification of China’s long-standing policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries. China’s government insists there has been no change in this policy but others disagree. In the case of Africa, the debate dates back to China’s policy in Sudan in 2007 and 2008 when it applied pressure on President Umar Hassan al-Bashir to accept a hybrid African Union/UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Al-Bashir reluctantly accepted the hybrid force (Shinn, 2009:90-94).

Following the independence of South Sudan and the outbreak in late 2013 of civil war, China was active in efforts to bring the fighting to an end. Early in 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi engaged in an effort to strengthen the Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace process aimed at ending the conflict in South Sudan (Tiezzi, 2015).

Even Chinese officials and scholars are having trouble explaining the best way to
describe China’s evolving policy on non-interference and support for state sovereignty. The Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of African Affairs, Lu Shaye, said China needs to adopt the tactic of “constructive involvement” on the basis of non-interference. He makes the case that China’s adherence to the non-interference principle should not remain rigid but has to become flexible (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Hang, 2014:18-19).

The vice dean of the School of International Relations at Peking University, Wang Yizhou, coined the concept of “creative involvement.” He argues that it does not contradict non-interference because it is based on the consent of the parties concerned, support from the UN and regional organisations, full exploration of all possible diplomatic means, and prudent views on the use of force (Wang Yizhou, 2012). A professor at Renmin University, Zhongying Pang, believes that China’s objective is not to abandon or replace the non-interference principle, “but rather to improve on its definition.” He adds that “China is adopting a new approach which combines non-interference with conditional intervention.” (Zhongying, 2013:46).

Zhejiang Normal University professor, Wang Xuejun, acknowledges that China’s responsibilities as a big power and its need to protect its nationals and interests have forced it to get more involved in African security issues. As a result, China’s traditional concept of sovereignty and non-interference “underwent some changes” and is becoming “increasingly pragmatic.” (Wang Xuejun, 2012:91).

To my mind, all of these explanations constitute a semantic threading of the needle. An excellent study in 2014 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute titled Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-interference concluded that “Since non-interference remains crucial for Chinese ‘core interests’—and especially for regime survival and territorial integrity—China will not easily relax its vigilance and drop this principle in the foreseeable future” (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Hang, 2014:57). The authors added that “China has engaged in a policy of pragmatic adaptation and shown growing flexibilities in its practice of non-interference. The emergence of new concepts facilitates this gradual change and equips China with more leeway to pursue an increasingly engaged
foreign policy posture” (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Hang, 2014:57).

**The People’s Liberation Army Navy strategy in Africa**

China is engaged in a major expansion of the PLAN. It has already developed an impressive long-range submarine force, which is beginning to make appearances in the Indian Ocean, and put its first carrier, a retrofitted Soviet-era ship, into service. There is strong evidence that China has laid the keel for its first home-built carrier that some believe could be completed as early as 2017. Experts suggest that China intends to maintain at least three carrier groups (Qi, 2015:35; O’Connor, 2015).

Since the beginning of its anti-piracy deployment in the Gulf of Aden, PLAN vessels have made at least 16 port calls at Djibouti and one or two each at Algiers, Alexandria, Mombasa, Casablanca, Maputo, Port Victoria, Durban, Walvis Bay, and Dar es Salaam (Erikson and Strange, 2015:81-82). The PLAN deployment in the Gulf of Aden has significantly improved its ability to operate in waters far from China and underscored the need for naval support facilities. China has also used submarines in the anti-piracy operation in an effort to improve the skills of its submarine force (Defenceweb, 2014).

China’s growing economic interests in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Indian Ocean are putting increasing demands on the PLAN to operate in “open seas” far from China’s coast to protect Chinese nationals, investments, and shipping. President Xi Jinping’s announcement in 2013 of the Maritime Silk Road, which is designed to connect China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, will add to China’s interests in eastern and northern Africa (Alden and Sidiropoulos, 2015:3-4; Zheng, 2015; O’Rourke, 2015:44-45).

There has been considerable discussion in recent years, especially by Indian and Western analysts, concerning China’s perceived intention of developing a series of naval bases along the northern rim of the Indian Ocean and continuing to the eastern coast of Africa. In 2015, for example, a Chinese state-owned enterprise signed a 40-year lease for over 2,000 acres of land at the port Chinese companies are developing in Gwadar, Pakistan as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. It is widely
believed in India that Gwadar could be converted into a dual-use port facility by China to extend PLAN power into the western Indian Ocean (Panda, 2015). Dubbed the “string of pearls” strategy, the facilities China is constructing are ostensibly designed for commercial use. There is no hard evidence at this point to suggest China is pursuing the development of full-fledged military bases (Brewster, 2014; Singh, 2011).

While China continues to restate its long-standing policy of opposing overseas military bases, it is, however, seeking ways to support more effectively its PLAN vessels in the Indian Ocean and African waters. A scholar at the Communist Party School in Chongqing, Xu Yao, suggested in January 2015 that to ensure its energy security, “China can obtain a staging post or access to some temporary facilities on the maritime route to overseas oil supply.” (Xu, 2015). China is also interested in expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean so that it will be in a stronger position to take part in deep seabed mining opportunities, perhaps in collaboration with other countries in the region (Chellaney, 2015).

The vice president of the PLA Dalian Naval Academy, Senior Captain Fang Jiang, commented in July 2015 at a symposium on the Maritime Silk Road that military bases are an important part of the PLAN’s maritime strategic pre-positioning. He said the PLAN “will establish strategic support points overseas with a focus on personnel and materials support and warship maintenance.” While he suggested U.S. military bases are strongly offensive and not what China has in mind, he emphasized that China “needs to ensure safe navigation along the Maritime Silk Road” and suggested China will build overseas military bases on the basis of strategic need (Fang, 2015).

Chinese analysts usually argue China will not build “Western-style” military bases overseas but could take a gradual approach to first set up a relatively long-term and stable logistical support and maintenance base. For the time being, the PLAN’s strategy in African and Indian Ocean waters seems to be one of enhancing the ability to service its ships and crews by creating a facility or agreement with host governments that can plausibly be described as something less than a military base.
As China becomes a major maritime power, however, this begs the question as to how long such a policy will meet the needs of the PLAN.

Reports of possible PLAN facilities in Africa

While the public discussion in China of possible PLAN overseas naval facilities has been muted, it has been lively in the Western, African, and Indian media. Much of the commentary has centred on the Seychelles, Namibia, and Djibouti.

Chinese Defence Minister, Liang Guanglie, visited the Seychelles in 2011 when the government of Seychelles invited the PLAN to use its ports for resupply and recuperation as PLAN ships supported the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. Some of the media accounts suggested that Seychelles was offering China a military base. China was quick to clarify that it would consider the Seychelles for resupplying its ships but rejected the idea it had any intention to establish a military base (Buckley, 2011). China and the Seychelles subsequently increased their military contact, but there is no evidence a Chinese base has been or is being built in the islands.

There have been persistent rumours since 2014 that China is in discussion with Namibia concerning the establishment of a naval base at Walvis Bay. Senior Namibian and Chinese officials have denied the reports (Hartman, 2014). In 2014, the PLAN’s escort task force did visit Walvis Bay and in 2015 Chinese Defence Minister, Chang Wanquan, led a delegation of 15 PLA officials to Namibia where he donated US$ 5 million of military equipment to the government. There is, however, no evidence that a naval base is being constructed in Namibia and one has to ask why at this point in the development of the PLAN it would need a naval base in a country so far from its current operational area.

The most likely location for the PLAN’s first naval facility in Africa is Djibouti, with which it signed in 2014 a defense and security agreement. PLAN vessels have made frequent visits to Djibouti since 2008 in order to resupply ships that support the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. China has stated that it will continue indefinitely to support the anti-piracy effort. Djibouti is already home to military
bases of the United States, France, and Japan.

The President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, stated in May 2015 that “discussions are ongoing” between his country and China concerning a military base, adding that Beijing’s presence would be welcome. The chief of staff of the PLA general staff, General Fang Fenghui, and the deputy chief of the Chinese Air Force visited Djibouti in November 2015. Fang told Djiboutian officials that China looks to deepen co-operation with Djibouti’s military but made no mention of talks on the naval facility. Referring to the visit, a Chinese naval expert, Li Jie, suggested that China is developing a facility to support the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and to counter terrorism in the region (Agence France-Presse, 2015).

The state-owned China State Construction Engineering Corporation has a US$ 420 million contract to improve Djibouti’s port infrastructure, including a railway to Ethiopia and two international airports. China has neither confirmed nor denied the ongoing negotiations with Djibouti over some kind of support facility for the PLAN. The only question seems to be whether the final agreement succeeds in permitting China to make the plausible argument that the facility is something less than a military base. If not, a military base in Djibouti would end China’s policy established in 1949 that it has no overseas military bases. A facility in Djibouti would also open the door to the establishment of other Chinese overseas military bases.

**Maximising benefits for Africa**

China’s expanding security interests in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean pose a challenge to African leaders for deriving the most benefit from this evolving relationship. Since the 2012 FOCAC ministerial meeting, China has made a series of pledges, some subject to limitations within its means, to help African countries in meeting their security needs. President Xi Jinping significantly increased China’s commitment to peacekeeping during his remarks at the UN General Assembly in 2015. It is now the responsibility of the African Union, African sub-regional organisations, and individual African states to hold China to these pledges. Some involve financial support while others require greater policy intervention.
While China has been extremely helpful in contributing to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and the anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden, its financial contributions to other security challenges, at least until 2015, have been modest. China provided the African Union Mission in Somalia US$ 4.5 million worth of equipment and material to combat al-Shabaab and US$ 1.8 million in 2007 to the African peacekeeping mission in Sudan (Alden, 2014:6). In 2015, China donated military equipment worth US$ 5.5 million to Uganda for its forces in Somalia. China donated US$ 100,000 in 2013 to the West and Central African Maritime Security Trust Fund of the International Maritime Organization, donated five patrol boats since 1987 to Sierra Leone, and gave Benin US$ 4.8 million in 2011 to purchase a patrol boat (Zhou and Seibel, 2015:16).

To take advantage of China’s increasing security interests in Africa, African countries individually and collectively need to have a better understanding of China’s goals and how those goals coincide with African security requirements, including ways for obtaining more policy and financial help from China in meeting those needs. In 2006, the African Union established a Task Force on Africa’s Strategic Partnership with China, India, and Brazil. Comprised of African experts, it produced an excellent report complete with recommendations (African Union, 2006). Something similar could be established by the African Union to look specifically at ways African countries can obtain greater benefit from their security co-operation with China and other countries (Benabdallah, 2015:61-62).

One underdeveloped policy area is the Maritime Silk Road. The Chinese government’s 2015 white paper titled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” makes scant reference to Africa. In fact, the section that speaks of co-operation with multi-lateral co-operation mechanisms refers to ten organisations in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe but none in Africa; there is no mention of FOCAC (China, National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). Some analysts are questioning whether the Maritime Silk Road will offer any benefits to Africa (Wekesa, 2015:154-157).

One forum for looking at maritime security co-operation may be the Indian Ocean...
Rim Association (IORA). It has 20 members, eight of them African countries; China is a “dialogue partner” of the IORA. Indonesia now has the chair; its term ends in 2017 when South Africa will assume the chairmanship presenting an opportunity to emphasize African concerns.

The African Union’s “2050 Africa’s Maritime Strategy” makes minimal reference to foreign naval involvement in Africa. This would seem to be an important omission from this comprehensive document. The final draft of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development “Integrated Maritime Safety and Security Strategy (2030)” and an associated “Action Plan” has been completed but is not publicly available. It is not clear if it deals with the issue of foreign navies in African waters (Walker, 2015).

When it comes to security, China, like every nation, is primarily focused on its own interests. There are cases where China’s security engagement in Africa coincidentally works to the benefit of African nations. Chinese contributions to peacekeeping and the anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden are cases in point. Arms transfers have a mixed legacy as the arms increasingly are appearing in conflict zones and China makes little effort to monitor their movement after they have been transferred to African governments. The impact on Africa of several other initiatives is not yet clear. Will China’s growing naval involvement in the western Indian Ocean offer benefits for African countries? How will the Maritime Silk Road affect Africa? It is clear, however, that if Africa wants to maximise the benefits of these activities, the African Union and key nations will have to take the initiative in its interaction with China.

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