11 Nov 2022

Written by Dr Francis Vorhies

CITES COP19 - the 19th Conference of the Parties of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora - starts on the 14th of November. The African Wildlife Economy Institute (AWEI) will be following closely the negotiations on measures to enable or inhibit the trade in African wildlife products.

See: CITES COP19 and the African Wildlife Economy

Once again, some of Africa’s megafauna top the agenda with proposals on the trade in hippo, rhino, and elephant products. There are also a number of other African species on the agenda including a helmethead gecko that lives on coast of western North Africa, guitarfishes found in shallow waters around the continent, and seven species of wild African mahogany found across sub-Saharan Africa. The megafauna, however, are likely to get most of the attention.

Hippos

A group of ten African countries - Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo – have proposed to up-list hippos from Appendix II to Appendix I. In so doing, that want to stop the trade. Their proposal argues that “Legal international trade in hippo parts and products is having a detrimental impact on hippos by providing an avenue to market illegally acquired specimens from poached hippos into trade.”

Under the current Appendix II listing, traders who wish to export hippo products must secure confirmation from their national government that the trade is not detrimental to the survival of the species and that the products have been legally acquired. Imposing these non-tariff barriers increases the costs of exports with the aim of reducing or stopping exports to conserve the species. Under Appendix I, there are additional non-tariff barriers – i.e., the national governments of any importing countries must also confirm that the trade is not detrimental as well as confirm that the trade is not primarily for commercial purposes.

So, imagine the impacts of an Appendix I listing on a hippo trader in northern Zambia who exports fresh hippo meat to customers in DR Congo. The trader must secure non-detriment and legal acquisition confirmations from Lusaka as well as non-detriment and not-primarily-for-commercial-use confirmations from Kinshasa. For even a large, well-established trader, this will not be easy. Hence, an Appendix I listing may encourage the trade in hippo products to go underground or hippo habitat to be converted to uses that can generate a livelihood for the harvesters, traders, and others who now cannot earn a living from hippo products.

Will the 10 African countries proposing an Appendix I listing for hippos be supported by other African countries and enough other countries? If they are successful, will the additional non-tariff barriers on the hippo trade ensure that the impact on hippo traders does not in turn have a detrimental impact on the survival of hippos?

Rhinos

There are two proposals on the COP19 agenda to remove non-tariff barriers on the trade in rhino products – one for Namibian white rhinos and another for Eswatini white rhinos.

Botswana and Namibia are proposing to move the Namibian population of white rhinos from Appendix I to Appendix II. This would mean that the rhino traders would only need non-detriment and legally acquired confirmation from Windhoek. However, they are only requesting this down-listing for trade in live animals for in-situ conservation and for hunting trophies. All other trade, notably trade in rhino horn, would remain subject to Appendix I trade barriers.

Eswatini is proposing to go further and is requesting that its rhinos are down-listed to Appendix II to enable “regulated legal trade in Eswatini’s white rhinos, their products including horn and derivatives.” Unlike Namibia, the country is not active in the markets for live sales or hunting trophies, and thus wants to secure benefits from the sale of horn and other rhino parts.

Will Botswana, Namibia, and Eswatini be supported by the other African countries or by enough other countries to remove some of the non-tariff barriers to trade in rhino products? If Namibian rhinos are moved to Appendix II but not Eswatini rhinos, will this be a step towards possible further trade liberalisation at the next COP?

Elephants

There are several proposals on the agenda to manage the trade in elephants – one from Zimbabwe, one from four West African countries, and another from Kenya.

Zimbabwe is proposing amendments to Annotation 2 on the elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. In addition to the core non-tariff barriers of an Appendix I or II listing, the Parties sometimes agree to additional annotations. These can include more trade barriers or the removal of some barriers for some products. For example, trade in elephant leather goods for commercial purposes is not allowed by Zimbabwe, and they are requesting that this is changed. They also want to be allowed to trade ivory with the revenues used “exclusively for elephant conservation and community conservation and development programmes.”

On the other hand, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, and Senegal are proposing that all African elephants, including the southern African populations currently listed on Appendix II, should be listed on Appendix I. They argue that the current split listing of elephants has been detrimental and that “A unified pan-African approach, listing all of Africa's elephants in Appendix I, sends a clear signal to consumers and criminal syndicates that international ivory trade is, and will remain, prohibited.”

Will these four West African countries be supported by other African countries, in particular by the southern African countries with Appendix II populations? Will they get enough support from other countries? If the Appendix I listing is approved, how will this impact on those who are advocating for a legal and regulated trade in elephant products? Will the trade continue underground? Will elephant habitat continue to be converted to other land uses?

In addition to these proposals, Kenya has put forward a proposal to establish a fund for the non-commercial disposal of ivory stockpiles, i.e., “the complete destruction of government controlled ivory stocks.” Funding might be sourced from the Global Environment Facility, debt-for-nature swaps, and other international financial instruments. Countries who destroy their ivory stocks could then request funds for elephant-related activities such as elephant population surveying and monitoring, expansion of protected areas that benefit elephants, and human-elephant conflict resolution.

If such a fund is established, will it consider the full potential value of ivory in global value chains including the production of ivory products such as carvings and jewellery? How will this fund address the legal trade in other elephant products such as hides, hair, meat, and “hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes”? If international donor funding is not forthcoming, could the fund consider options at some point to trade ivory to raise funds for elephant-related conservation activities?

Regarding the barriers imposed on the trade in elephant products and proposals to fund the destruction of the products, the Zimbabwe proposal wisely observes that “The future of elephants ultimately depends on the aspirations, needs and attitudes of the people with whom they have to co-exist.” Unfortunately, these people will not be participating in the CITES COP14 negotiations.

Francis Vorhies, AWEI Director and member of the IUCN Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist Group

 

 

.