22 Sep 2022

Written by Dr Jane Wiltshire and Dr Francis Vorhies

In 1977, not long after the launch of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), rhinos were listed on its Appendix I. Listing on this Appendix sets up restrictive trade barriers aimed at preventing species loss. In 1994, trade in some white rhino products from South Africa were down-listed to the less restrictive Appendix II, and in 2004, this was also extended to Eswatini.

At the upcoming 19th Conference of the Parties (COP), Namibia is asking for its white rhinos to join South Africa and Eswatini on Appendix II, and Eswatini is asking that the trade conditions – known as annotations – for the Appendix II listing are removed. Both Namibia and Eswatini are seeking further trade liberalisation, which they believe will prevent continuing species loss. Others, however, such as many of the private rhino owners, would like the trade to be completely liberalised through the removal of their rhinos from Appendix II all together.

The Appendix I listing of all rhinos except white rhino in Eswatini and South Africa is often referred to as a trade ban. Though technically trade in an Appendix I species is possible, the conditions are highly restrictive and thus the listing acts as a de facto trade ban. An exporting country must confirm that the trade is not detrimental to the survival of the species and that the product has been legally acquired. The importing country must also confirm that the trade is non detrimental and not primarily for commercial purposes. It is not easy to get such confirmations from both the exporting and importing countries – hence it’s a de facto ban.

Appendix II listing is less restrictive since conditions are only for the exporting country, i.e., to confirm that the trade is non-detrimental, and that the product is legally sourced. There are no conditions for importing countries. However, for several Appendix II species, added conditions – so called annotations – have been placed by the CITES Parties. In the case of Appendix II rhinos in Eswatini and South Africa, and also now being requested by Namibia, the annotations are that only exports of live rhinos to suitable locations and as hunting trophies are allowed. Eswatini is now asking that they be allowed to export more than live animals or trophies through removal of this annotation for their rhinos, i.e., most importantly, that they are allowed to export rhino horn.

Are the proposals from Namibia and Eswatini likely to be endorsed by COP19, taking place in November in Panama? The Namibian request has a chance in part because the TRAFFIC assessment of their proposal is that it is unlikely to put rhinos at a greater risk. The Eswatini requestion, however, is most unlikely to be endorsed because this would legalise trade in rhino horn that effectively has not been allowed since 1977.

Why are the Parties unlikely to allow for a resumption in the rhino horn trade? This is a question that particularly vexes the private South African rhino owners. Currently most of the rhinos left in Africa are in South Africa and today roughly 50% of the South African rhinos are in private hands. These private rhino owners, and notably the four CITES-recognised captive breeding organisations (CBOs), have demonstrated that rhino populations can be increased. One CBO owner, for example, has had annual growth rate of more than 15%. 

Rhino protection and management – whether public or private – is expensive. The Private Rhino Owners Association (PROA) estimates that security costs alone are more than US$ 10, 000 per rhino per year. If rhino owners were allowed to export their horn – which they can harvest without killing the rhino – they could make more than enough money to cover the costs of rhino protection and be incentivised to further increase rhino stocks. This logic also holds true for the sale of horn held by the South African National Parks and other government agencies. They too could cover the high costs of protecting rhinos from poachers through the revenues they could earn by selling horn.

Hence, there are strong advocates in several southern African countries for delisting rhino from the CITES appendixes and removing the associated barriers to trade. If this is a possible pathway to preventing extinction, why it is not happening? The step towards trade liberalisation proposed by Namibia – allowing trade in live rhinos and trophies – is a step forward, but it will not provide the revenues needed to finance sustainable rhino management in Namibia, let alone in the other countries in southern Africa and in Kenya where most of the remaining rhinos in Africa can be found. 

Why is the further step of removing Appendix II annotations on Eswatini’s rhinos to enable the country to export horn unlikely to be supported at the upcoming COP? A widely held view among South African rhino owners is that the CITES process has been captured by a well-financed and committed animal rights lobby that is successfully convincing subsequent COPs to keep rhinos on the appendices with barriers to trading rhino horn. These animal rights groups either believe that trade in wildlife products is fundamentally wrong and/or that trade liberalisation will stimulate more poaching and lead to extinction. Using both ethical arguments and instrumental arguments, they lobby to maintain the so-called trade ban.

Though the animal rights lobby is certainly a factor in CITES negotiations, could there perhaps be other reasons why rhinos remain on the CITES appendices? Trade relations are terribly complex, and few countries are willing to take a strong stand on exporting a particular community without considering the ramifications for other exports. For example, if South Africa unilaterally puts its rhino horn on the market – even with non-detriment and legally-acquired findings – how will its trading partners in Europe, North America, Asia, and indeed Africa react? It is likely that their trading partners will be most uncomfortable, if not opposed, to such a decision and that they may start to think twice about their ongoing trade relations with South Africa? 

The complexity of international trade relations may also explain why South Africa and the other major rhino range states have not joined Eswatini in asking for the removal of the Appendix II annotations. There may be too much at risk with respect to international relations, notably regarding trade, to ask for the change in the status quo, which has effectively been in place since 1977.

This, of course, does not bode well for South Africa’s rhino owners – both public and private – as they are unlikely to secure much-needed income anytime soon for rhino protection and management. Further, if the rhino owners are correct that trade liberalisation is the pathway to preventing extinction, then the continued listing of rhinos on CITES appendixes does not bode well for rhinos either. Hence, some are even calling for southern African countries to withdraw from the CITES agreement. This, too, however, is unlikely to happen.

Is there a way forward? If unilateral action is unlikely, perhaps there is an opportunity for collective action. Could the roughly 30 rhino range states in Africa – most of whom have none or only a handful of rhinos left – come together to develop a common African position on rhinos? Could they look at the options for trade liberalisation desired by most of the countries with viable rhino populations as well as the options for keeping rhinos on CITES appendices collectively? Could they see a way forward for African range states to agree collectively on how to conserve and sustainable use Africa’s rhinos?

As today is World Rhino Day, it is a good day for Africans to start a conversation on how they can protect and manage their rhinos. And maybe this conversation could continue in the margins of CITES COP19 in November in Panama.

Dr Jane Wiltshire, AWEI Fellow

Dr Francis Vorhies, AWEI Director

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