Author: Gerhard van Niekerk
This is the second edition to a four-part series that discusses Japan’s fascinating evolution as a great power in East Asia. This series will lay out the key themes in Japan’s foreign policy evolution from the Meiji Restoration, and the birth of modern Imperial Japan, to Japan’s contemporary pacifist role in the region. The objective of this series is to draw insights from Japan’s past and discuss how this has influenced the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy in the contemporary period. The scope of this series will be limited to the East Asian region, and Japan’s interaction with proximate states in north- and southeast Asia, as well as those faraway powers that have vied for influence in the region.
The analysis here focuses on the two contrasting approaches of the Taishō and Shōwa governments during the two World Wars. First, the Taishō period from 1912 to 1926 is discussed, during which Japanese foreign policy changed considerably from the aggressive expansionism of the Meiji era into one consonant with a parliamentarian state with increasingly democratic features. In fact, this new government made the decision to curb a settled domestic anti-Western sentiment by aligning more closely with the West and by incorporating more Western institutional ideals. Second, , this article focuses on the Shōwa government’s rule of Imperial Japan from 1926 to 1945. This period saw a reawakening of Japan’s anti-Western sentiment and a growth in power of the hyper nationalist military leaders. This section engages less extensively with Japan’s foreign policy, as the primary focus is on Japan’s manoeuvres during the Second World War.
The Taishō Period (1912-1926)
On the 30th of July 1912, Emperor Taishō ascended the throne to take over his father’s duties. Prince Yoshihito was the third and only living son of Emperor Meiji out of fifteen children, and had to follow up on the highly successful reign of his charismatic father, taking the name Taishō. However, his time as ruler is enigmatic when compared to the famous Meiji and Shōwa periods it is sandwiched in between. It was relatively short and comparatively uneventful, and has been somewhat neglected by scholars, contrasting with the extensive coverage of his predecessor and successor.[1] His reign also came at a time of global monarchical crises where they were being replaced by republics, while at the same time Japan was seeing the rise of domestic liberal movements which placed great pressure on the government. As such, the emperor often downplayed his authority, one that his father had built up considerably. His weak influence was not aided by the fact that he suffered from neurological disease, which led to his forced unofficial “retirement” in 1921.[2] The following discussion of the Taishō era should be considered within this context, and it will be shown that the emperor’s relative weakness led to a pragmatic government often described as the Taishō democracy.
The start of Emperor Taishō’s reign was marked by immediate instability. The Taishō political crisis (Taishō seihen) saw three different prime ministers who each attempted to restore the balance between the Japanese public and the elder statesmen (genrō). Emperor Meiji had notably exhausted the national fiscus due to his government’s extensive investment in the military and overseas assets. The Meiji constitution required an active duty general to serve as the Army Minister, and the military had realised their power in disrupting the Japanese government by withholding appointments of Navy or Army ministers. First was the resignation of Prime Minister Saionji, appointed by Emperor Meiji, who decided to cut defence spending to ease the fiscal stress on the government. The then Army Minister resigned, stalling formation of an effective government.[3] The emperor then appointed Katsura Tarō, a member of the genrō, as the new Prime Minister, who was even more unpopular due to his strong allegiance to the genrō and the military. The growing influence of the press, who was opposed to Katsura, was underscored by riots against his appointment due to his resistance to the navy who also sought larger budgets. Katsura subsequently lost a vote of no-confidence in the National Diet, Japan’s legislative body, and he was replaced by Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, a former navy admiral. The outsized influence of the military leadership over the government of Japan would be seen as the greatest shortcoming of the Meiji constitution. Yamamoto, a supporter of liberalism and democracy, then abolished the rule that the ministry needed an active duty army and navy minister.[4] This domestic trend of resignations and impeachments would dominate the early Japanese democratic experiment.
Internationally, the Taishō era was characterised by an alliance with the British state, which had been opposed to the influence of the Russian Empire in western Europe. The alliance was transactional in nature; with the 1905 renegotiations it was agreed that Britain would support Japan in its quest for Korean annexation if the Japanese supported the wavering British colonial mission in India. The 1911 revision came early, but Britain needed reassurance of Japanese loyalty as the great power game with the German Empire in Europe was taking form.[5] This alliance was founded on economic concessions to Japan in the form of favourable tariffs, and in return Japan acted to secure British interests in the Far East. Japan also used its ties with Britain as a means to diplomatically elevate itself on the global stage and renegotiate for better treaties.[6]
As Britain’s security guarantor in the Far East, Japan was tasked with keeping an eye on German activity, especially in China. Although China was neutral, due to being in complete disarray, it did assist Germany with protecting its assets within its borders in 1914. This was viewed by Japan as sufficient to be considered an alignment. It sought to capitalise on this and extend its gains made during the Meiji era. In 1915, Japan issued a series of demands, called the Twenty-One Demands (Taika ni jū ichi-kajō yōkyū) to the Chinese military leader, Yuan Shih-kai, who was faced with a choice to comply or face Japanese invasion.[7] The original demands were harsh, and would have effectively subordinated the Chinese government to Japan. Facing pressure from external powers and a rejection from Yuan, Japan reduced the demands to thirteen, after which China agreed to the appeasement.[8] The liberal government had now mastered the act of expansionism through treaties, just as the West had done to Japan in the 1850s.
The collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917 resulted in the installation of an anti-monarchist Bolshevik government marching its troops eastward. This was of great worry to the Imperial Japanese leadership, which decided to join the Allies in Siberia. The following Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between the Central powers and Russia in 1918, which opened up the eastern front for Germany.[9] This presented further opportunities for Japanese expansion as the Allies assisted the White Russian anti-communist forces. The Japanese Intervention in Siberia (Shiberia Shuppei) lasted from 1918 to 1922, where Japan occupied the coastal city of Vladivostok and various towns in Primorsky Krai. Japan’s greater plan was to take control over large parts of Siberia in order to prevent future incursions by the Russians in Manchuria.[10]
Domestically, the year 1918 marked the start of a rapid succession of democratic reforms. Inflation and food shortages negatively affected Japanese villagers and farmers, who progressively started supporting the militaristic hyper nationalists. The subsequent Rice Riots of 1918 happened for a multitude of reasons, chief among them the unaffordability of government controlled rice prices, but also as an opposition to the anti-Soviet Siberian Expedition and the government’s repression of the press.[11] The Rice Riots made way for a new Prime Minister, Hara Takashi, a moderate democrat domestically, and a liberal internationalist on the global stage. Soon after his appointment, the movement for universal suffrage was in full swing, Japan participated in the Paris Peace Conference, assisted with the founding of the League of Nations, and relaxed colonial restrictions on Korea.[12] Hara was assassinated by far-right nationalists in 1921, a pre-eminent group in Japanese society at the time.[13]
The Japanese Intervention in Siberia created great divisions in the Japanese government. The government’s purported reasons for Japan’s participation were for the support of the Allied powers against an emerging illiberal foe. However, the real purpose was likely for the creation of the Siberian buffer state, and the eventual Bolshevik victory after the civil war created awkward relations with Japan going forward. The subsequent conflict between the Japanese government and the military leadership created even greater divisions as foreign policy visions increasingly conflicted.[14] The independence of the military in Japan, as designed during the Meiji era, created great difficulties for the more liberal minded politicians and bureaucrats to fulfil a consistent approach to foreign policy. Only a foreshadow of what was to come.
Post-First World War, the great powers had reached a point of military exhaustion, for which the 1920s turned out to be a good, although short-lived, time for liberal internationalists. With the women’s suffrage movement gaining steam in the West, this phenomenon was accompanied by a major drive for disarmament by the women’s movements and protestant churches.[15] Japan’s alliance with Britain was set to expire in 1922, and they decided to side with the United States as the US-Japan rivalry in naval technology in the Asia-Pacific was ramping up. In order to prevent a military buildup akin to Britain and Germany pre-First World War, the Washington Naval Conference was signed in 1922 to avoid further military stockpiling. During the treaty negotiations, Japan was treated as an equal power in the eyes of the West, achieving the Meiji government’s goals set out in 1868.[16] Japan had elevated itself to the level of a Western colonial power.
The 1920s’ agricultural depression gave further impetus for the growing nationalist sections in the domestic political scene in Japan. The government became increasingly aggressive toward the colonial governments of Korea and Taiwan to supply rice for Japan as a means of alleviating food shortages. This, however, resulted in competition with the embattled Japanese farmers, forcing many villagers to enlist in the increasingly nationalistic and anti-Western military.[17] Despite the growing threat of hyper nationalism and the strengthening influence of the military, democratisation persisted, with the General Election Law of 1925, extending suffrage to all males over the age of 25; more than tripling the size of the electorate.[18] However, despite Japan’s march towards Western liberal ideals, the US-Japan geopolitical contest had gained steam. In 1924, the US enacted the Asian Exclusion Act (Immigration Act of 1924), again interpreted as a demeaning act that rendered Japan as a lesser Asiatic state. Something that would add to the coming slide in democratic values.[19]
To conclude this section, the Taishō era was characterised by a complex mix of expansionism, cooperation, and democracy. These contradictions emanated from a government that never had the same unity as under the decisive Meiji government. Yoshihito took a more hands-off approach to governing Japan, which saw democratic rule grow as a consequence of the greater authority given to the Prime Minister’s cabinet and the National Diet. However, due to a mismatch in foreign policy visions between the powerful army and the governing institutions, Japan also engaged in adventurist endeavours and had belligerent relations with its neighbours.
The Shōwa Period (1926-1945)
This section does not cover the full extent of the Shōwa era and ends at the point of Japan’s surrender at the end of the Second World War on the 14th of August, 1945.
The short-lived reign of Emperor Taishō (1912-1926) would be followed by Emperor Shōwa, or Hirohito, one of the longest reigning monarchs in history (1926-1989). Shōwa had already to fulfil some of his father’s duties as a result of the latter’s illness, so he was experienced in the role when he was crowned at the young age of 25.[20] The start of Shōwa’s reign was characterised by a reversal of the democratic and liberal internationalist ideology that had slowly developed during the Taishō era. Conservative forces in the government who were aligned to the military were opposed to the extending suffrage and had campaigned for the Peace Preservation Act in 1925, right before Hirohito’s coronation. The law was designed to quell the leftist forces in Japanese society. With it came the elevation of the kokutai symbol of national sovereignty centred in the emperor.[21] This would be the start of an anti-parliamentarian trend in Japanese politics, and founds the basis for the illiberal trend following Taishō’s ascent to the throne.
The late-1920s was characterised by increasing instability and financial crisis in the global system, culminating in the Great Depression. This sparked growing hyper nationalism, and a restless military leadership.[22] The destitute were highly frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the civilian government to resolve these issues, upon which the nationalists capitalised on these feelings by promoting the idea of kodo. This idea stated that by centring the power in the emperor and a handful of senior officials, it would be easier to resolve the state’s problems.[23] In the 1930s, the concept of kokutai and kodo became formalised in Japanese education, where students were distributed a booklet titled the “Fundamentals of our national polity” (kokutai no hongi).[24] This led to an exacerbation of the split between the military and the civilian government due to a groundswell support for a supreme emperor.
The domestic rift that began forming with the Rice Riots of 1918 reached its peak between the late 1920s and early 1930s. By this time, the rural conservative movement had gained enough strength for the military leaders to act more boldly. This period set the stage for the foreign policy of the Shōwa era. The subsequent expansionist trend started with China, which held significant economic importance for Japan following the treaties of World War I. Since the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Japanese leaders had viewed the ongoing instability in China with concern. However, the emergence of a new nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, who aimed to unify the country, posed an even greater threat to Japan’s future ambitions. [25] In 1927, Japan launched the Shandong Expedition under the pretext of protecting Japanese interests. In reality, the objective was to support Zhang Zuolin, a Manchurian warlord, against Chiang’s advancing forces. [26]
Zuolin’s lack of loyalty to Japan and failure to curb the advances of Chiang’s Northern Expedition created frustration among the leaders of Japan’s Manchuria-based Kwantung Army. Again, breaking from orders of the civilian government, the military leaders sought to assassinate Zuolin and replace him with a more cooperative leader. In 1928, the Kwantung military secretly placed a bomb that detonated when Zuolin’s train cart crossed a bridge on the Jingfeng Railway. This failed miserably, as the news of Zuolin’s murder by the Japanese reached his son, Zhang Xueliang, upon whom the reins of power now fell. Xueliang, fearing Japanese domination, plotted with Chiang to combine forces in the face of Imperial Japanese tyranny. This would come to be known as the Huanggutun Incident. Again, none in the military were punished for their insubordination. [27] This reveals the level of weakness the civilian government had reached, not being able to restrain overt acts of war.
In the 1930s, the leaders of the Kwantung Army believed that a war with China needed to be provoked in order to best secure Japan’s interests in Manchuria. They thought a provocation of the Chinese to attack Japan was the best way to legitimise a full-scale war. Despite Minister of War Jirō Minami’s best efforts to curb insubordination, the Kwantung Army leaders started to devise a plan to encourage Chinese offenses in May, 1931. On September the 18th, 1931, a weak and ineffectual explosion was detonated near a Japanese-controlled railway. Blaming the Chinese forces, the Kwantung Army used this as a casus belli to invade Manchuria on the 19th of September. This is known as the Mukden Incident (Manshū-jihen).[28] Xueliang, in charge of a large modern army, stood down in the face of Japanese offenses allowing the Kwantung to take large parts of Manchuria. The Chinese government faced numerous domestic problems of their own, of which the invasion of Manchuria exacerbated their fatigue. As such, they faced little choice but to turn to the international community for diplomatic assistance.[29]
The League of Nations condemned Japan’s bellicose behaviour and ordered it to retreat from Manchuria. Once a proponent of international law, Japan refused to withdraw and stated it wanted to negotiate with China’s leaders directly.[30] In October 1932, Japan gave official recognition to the state of Manchukuo in Manchuria. After condemnation by the League of Nations General Assembly, Japan served its formal withdrawal from the institution. There was no resistance within the domestic political system, and the civilian cabinet was replaced by military officials, completely ending the brief period of democratisation and social reform.[31] This came to a head with the February 26 Incident in 1936, where ultra-nationalists sought to assassinate the Prime Minister, along with several others with liberal internationalist views, and initiate the Shōwa Restoration, restoring all power to the Emperor just as in the days of Meiji. The coup attempt ultimately failed its grand goal and some of the ultra-nationalists were tried in court, but it did succeed in giving even more power to the military within the civilian structures of the government.[32]
Its exit from the League of Nations and continued aggression towards China left Japan isolated internationally. It had found a common interest among the other European powers who had become disaffected with the liberal internationalist order, but more openly against the rising strength of the Soviets. In 1936, Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact as an agreement on the opposition to the growth of the communist ideology.[33] As such, Japan was now officially moving away from its liberal past and towards Germany with whom the conservative sections of the government shared a long-held ideological kinship.
The build-up, domestically and internationally, was now complete for a full-scale invasion of China. The Emperor approved the commencement of the “holy war” (Seisen), Imperial propaganda had been disseminated among the Japanese population as preparation for such future actions. In 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began as Japan fought simultaneously against the nationalists under Chiang, the communists under Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union who opted to support the Chinese in the face of Japanese aggression. In 1940, Japan received aid from a breakaway faction of Chiang’s Nationalist forces.[34] This is often regarded as the beginning of the Second World War in Asia, as the international alignments of both parties functioned as fitting preludes to the upcoming Pacific Theatre. The Sino-Japanese War was the largest conflict in the Pacific Theatre, with the most civilian and military casualties.[35]
The European and the Pacific Theatre are seen as two different wars, but they both concurrently merged into what is today known as the Second World War. Some of the members of the loosely aligned Anti-Comintern Pact, namely Germany, Italy, and Japan, formed the Tripartite Pact, a formal alliance binding the Axis forces against the US. They were later joined by numerous other eastern European states. However, due to Japan’s distance from the other signatories who were waging war in Europe and Africa, the defensive clauses were never invoked.[36] Therefore, this essentially served as an international alignment for Japan in a war that was rapidly spreading the globe. What drew them each together was a desire to carve out their Empires by creating large territorial states with distinct ethnicities and cultures.
The culmination of Japan’s wartime plans came with the announcement of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS). A vague version of this idea had already been promoted in 1938 as the New Order in East Asia (Tōa Shin Chitsujo), as anti-Western sentiment among Japanese leadership was growing. This idea was expanded in 1940 to include the territories of Southeast Asia, now renamed the GEACPS (Daito Akyo Eiken). Japanese leaders proclaimed a new “Asia for Asiatics”, where common Asian customs would be celebrated and promoted in contrast to the colonial experience under Western Imperialism.[37] As such, this would be Japan’s lynchpin for the invasion of Southeast Asia in the 1940s. After the Japanese invasion of Indochina (today subdivided into Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Zhanjiang, China), the US responded by placing steel and oil embargos on Japan to curb its expansionist efforts in August, 1941. Citing an overt effort to disturb the Japanese efforts, with all other diplomatic avenues exhausted, Japan promptly declared war on the US and Britain in December. The subsequent attack on Pearl Harbour occurred well-before the US had even received the declaration.[38] The Pacific Theatre was now in full-swing.
In order to continue the war, Japan needed to expand its efforts and refocus on the British and Dutch controlled territories in Southeast Asia to make up the shortfall in oil, rubber and steel. The Japanese campaign in Southeast Asia from 1941-1942 was enormously successful. Tasked to wage war against the American-British-Australian-Dutch Command (ABDACOM), Japan achieved decisive victories at the Battle of Singapore and the Battle of the Java Sea. Moreover, Japan achieved total air superiority leading to a brief bombing of Darwin in Australia.[39] In 1942, the US had gained an edge over the Japanese after they staged the Doolittle air raid where they bombed parts of Tokyo. Over-eager, the Japanese planned a trap for the US fleet around Midway, an Hawaiian island, as a first step in for the Japanese Hawaiian Campaign. Nevertheless, US cryptographers deciphered the date of the attack and lured Japan into a trap of their own. The Battle of Midway saw a major US victory, sinking six of Japan’s most powerful vessels, causing major shortages in materials – Japan could no longer keep pace with this conflict.[40]
The loss at Midway caused an inverse trend for Japan and the US in the Pacific. Japan struggled to extract sufficient resources from its new colonies and was too short on man- and firepower to wage war at the current rate while exercising control over its wide stretch of colonies. On the other hand, the US had only begun to fully capitalise on its superior industrial base and was producing naval vessels at record speed. By 1944, an overextended Japan could only achieve a decisive victory through a unified attack, but due to Japan’s oil shortages this was not possible. The US had therefore achieved successive minor victories the one after the other, neutralising isolated Japanese strongholds.[41] As this proceeded, Japan lost its vital air superiority, and the US’s bombing strategies were detrimental to any Japanese defence. The strategic battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were the final steps before an invasion of the Japanese home islands.[42]
The international context of the time before the conclusion of the Pacific Theatre was one of shock and exhaustion. By mid-May 1945, Mussolini and Hitler, the only Japanese allies of substantial power, were deceased and their armies had surrendered. Europe laid in ruins, and Japan was the last part of the Axis Powers standing, and it had a particularly skilled fighting force. The casualties lost in ground battles such as Okinawa and Iwo Jima were rated too much for the Americans for the strategic importance of the victories. Invading the home islands of Japan were deemed too costly to attempt in a war that was now wearing down the American public. As such, the military leaders in the US started considering the only means of securing a victory over Japan without loss of more American manpower.[43]
The decision was taken to utilise atomic bombs to shock Japan into a surrender, and on August the 6th, the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The first nuclear attack in history. On the 9th of August, a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. On the same day, the Soviet Union moved over one million troops all the way from Europe to invade the last Japanese strongholds in Manchuria, and eventually assisted in overthrowing the regime in Manchukuo. On the 14th of August, Japan officially surrendered unconditionally.[44] It is today widely debated whether the use of the atomic bombs were necessary without staging an invasion. The argument for nuclear non-proliferation rests on the experiences of the Japanese people, which is why Japan is one of the greatest proponents for this cause.
This concludes the tumultuous Shōwa era, which reads slightly more like military history than the treaties, negotiations and domestic political debates found in the Taishō era. It is also a cautionary tale for the role and accountability militaries in a state, In this instance, the military had far too much independence and had no means of being controlled, effectively minimising the civilian government to domestic matters. The next edition of this series will take as departure this appraisal of the Shōwa-era pre-1945, and how Japan evolved from an imperial force in the pre-1945 period to a pacifist proponent of international law in the post-war era.
[1] Hara, T. (2001). Emperor Taisho: Image vs. reality. Japan Quarterly, 48(2), pp.56–59.
[2] Ibid. pp. 59-61.
[3] Young, L. (2023). The Breakdown of Democracy in 1930s Japan . In: A. Fung, D. Moss and O.A. Westad, eds., When Democracy Breaks. Oxford University Press. p. 10.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Streltsov, D. and Shimotomai, N. (2019). A History of Russo-Japanese Relations. Leiden: BRILL. pp. 97-98.
[6] Davis, C.L. (2009). Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–23. International Security, 33(3), pp.175–178.
[7] Kawamura, N. (2000). Turbulence in the Pacific. Bloomsbury: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 27.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Fry, M.G., Goldstein, E. and Langhorne, R. (2004). Guide to international relations and diplomacy. New York: Continuum, p.188.
[10] Humphreys, L.A. (1995). The way of the heavenly sword : the Japanes army in the 1920’s. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 25.
[11] Hanneman, M.L. and Ebrary, I. (2007). Hasegawa Nyozekan and liberalism in modern Japan. Kent: Global Oriental. P. 59.
[12] Mitchell, R.H. (1996). Political Bribery in Japan. Honolulu: University Of Hawaii Press, p.44.
[13] Hanneman, M.L. and Ebrary, I. (2007). Hasegawa Nyozekan and liberalism in modern Japan. Kent: Global Oriental. P. 60.
[14] Meirion Harries and Harries, S. (1994). Soldiers of the sun : the rise and fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York: Random House, pp.123–124.
[15] Pugh, M. (2000). The march of the women : a revisionist analysis of the campaign for women’s suffrage, 1866-1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.86.
[16] Schenkein, J. (2014). Japan, The Great Power: Industrialization Through The Lens Of Zaibatsu. Seattle: Amazon. p. 5.
[17] Hanneman, M.L. and Ebrary, I. (2007). Hasegawa Nyozekan and liberalism in modern Japan. Kent: Global Oriental. P. 60..
[18] Colegrove, Kenneth (1929). “Labor Parties in Japan”. American Political Science Review. 23 (2): 329–363.
[19] Atkinson, D.C. (2017). What History Can Tell Us About the Fallout From Restricting Immigration. [online] Time. Available at: https://time.com/4659392/history-fallout-restricting-immigration/ [Accessed 23 Jul. 2024].
[20] Bix, H.P. (2000). Hirohito and the making of modern Japan. London: Duckworth, p.123.
[21] Mitchell, R.H. (1973). Japan’s Peace Preservation Law of 1925: Its Origins and Significance. Monumenta Nipponica, 28(3), pp.317–345.
[22] Pyle, K.B. (1996). The Making of Modern Japan. Boston: Cengage Learning. p. 189.
[23] Suhama, K. (2020). A Reexamination of Emperor Hirohito’s Military and Political Role in Wartime Japan, 1926-1945 . Interdisciplinary Journal of Student Research and Scholarship, 4(1). P. 15-16
[24]Ibid. P. 13.
[25] Hanneman, M.L. (2014). Japan faces the world, 1925-1952. London: Routledge. p. 28-29.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid. p. 30-31.
[28] Cohen, P.A. (2002). Remembering and Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China. Twentieth-Century China, 27(2), p.23.
[29] Ibid. pp. 24-25.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Tanaka, H. (1988). Liberal Democracy in Japan: The Role of Intellectuals. Hitotsubashi journal of social studies, 20(1), p. 25.
[32] Jansen, M.B. (2002). The Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press. p. 598.
[33] Boyd, C. (1981). The Berlin–Tokyo Axis and Japanese Military Initiative. Modern Asian Studies, 15(2), p.318.
[34] Bix, H.P. (1992). The Showa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility. Journal of Japanese Studies, 18(2), p.295.
[35] Hsiung, J.C. (1992). China’s Bitter Victory: War with Japan, 1937-45: War with Japan, 1937-45. Routledge, p.171.
[36] Trefousse, H.L. (1951). Germany and Pearl Harbor. The Far Eastern Quarterly, 11(1), p.35. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2048903.
[37] Hsiung, J.C. (1992). China’s Bitter Victory: War with Japan, 1937-45: War with Japan, 1937-45. Routledge, p.173.
[38] Wynn, S. (2020). The rise and fall of imperial Japan. Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, pp.83–85.
[39] Evans, D.C. and Peattie, M.R. (2012). Kaigun : strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, p.113.
[40] Symonds, C.L. (2018). World War II at Sea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.293.
[41] Ibid. p. 293-298.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Victor Davis Hanson (2004). Ripples of battle : how wars of the past still determine how we fight, how we live, and how we think. New York: Anchor Books, p.218.
[44] Anderson, D. (2011). World Wars: Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan. [online] BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nuclear_01.shtml [Accessed 23 Jul. 2024].