Author: Gerhard van Niekerk
This is the first edition of a four-part series that discusses Japan’s fascinating evolution as a great power in East Asia. This series will lay out the key themes in Japan’s foreign policy evolution from the Meiji Restoration, and the birth of modern Imperial Japan, to Japan’s contemporary pacifist role in the region. The objective of the series is to draw insights from Japan’s past and discuss how this has influenced the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy in the contemporary period. The scope of the series will be limited to the East Asian region, and Japan’s interaction with proximate states in north- and southeast Asia, as well as those faraway powers that have vied for influence in the region.
The analysis here is subdivided into two key moments in Japan’s modernisation. First, the Meiji Restoration and the subsequent drive for industrialisation (1868-1884). This section discusses how Imperial Japan emerged from the Unequal Treaties of the 1850s and leveraged its exposure to the West to achieve significant industrial and military modernisation. The second section, covering 1884-1912, delves into how Japan’s newfound power initiated an internal drive to expand its borders. This period saw a rise in anti-Western sentiment, fuelled by the events of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). However, this sentiment was temporarily laid to rest with the passing of Emperor Meiji (1912).
The Meiji Restoration and the Seeds of Japanese Regional Leadership (1864-1884)
The Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868) that preceded the Meiji Government was a feudalistic and dynastic arrangement similar to other early modern regimes in the wider East Asian community. During the rule of the shogunate, the emperor was isolated in Kyoto Palace and had very little control over the administrative affairs of Japan.[1] The Tokugawa government had a strictly isolationist foreign policy (sakoku) and interstate trade was monopolised by the shogunate which drew great profits in their dealings with the English, Spanish, and Portuguese.[2] The arrival of United Stated (US) Commodore Matthew Perry (1853) marked the start of the Bakumatsu period; the final stages of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Perry sought to open up the Japanese economy to foreign trade through a threat of confrontation. The shogunate capitulated and was subsequently forced to sign a series of treaties with Western powers, known as the Unequal Treaties. These treaties gave the West access to Japanese markets, ultimately ending the sakoku-era isolationism.[3]
This drove an already existing wedge in Japanese society even deeper, as widespread disgust with the corrupt shogunate had been simmering for decades. Two dominant groups were now pitted against each other, the Ishin Shishi pro-imperialist nationalists against the shogunate forces. In alliance with the daimyos (feudal landowners), the pro-imperialist forces overthrew the shogunate and restored imperial rule under Emperor Meiji in 1868.[4] The new Imperial government was driven by a vision of elevating Japan to become a “normal” power that could bargain on equal footing with the West. The embarrassment of the Unequal Treaties and the damage it did to Japanese society provided an impetus for the Meiji government to grow Japan’s power projection in the international arena. As such, the new government introduced reforms that placed great emphasis on industrialisation, military modernisation, the introduction of foreign ideas, and the eradication of dynastic feudal practices.[5] The new Meiji government realised that it needed to incorporate some Western practices during their increased exposure if it sought to grow from this new arrangement.
This desire to prove itself as a capable power in the eyes of the West formed the first element of Japan’s new foreign policy outlook. The “Iwakura Mission” embodied this new goal, in 1871, Tomomi Iwakura, acting as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan, set out with 107 top officials to learn from the US and western Europe. The mission found that the West’s power came from their highly developed industries, from which strong militaries are built; this would form the basis of Japan’s new doctrine fukoku kyōhei (rich nation, strong army).[6] The Iwakura Mission is viewed as the first step towards Japan’s true modernisation journey. As part of an ambitious state-led modernisation drive, Japan employed 3,000 foreign experts (o-yatoi gaikokujin) to train the Japanese in science, foreign languages, and military. In trade, Japan employed mercantilist economic policies where raw materials were imported and finished products were exported. By the 1890s, Japan had an advanced capitalist economy allowing the Meiji government to relinquish much of its developmentalist responsibilities.[7]
The second element came only after Japan had achieved an impressive record of economic growth from adapting to the Western models. As it grew and implemented more Western political ideals, such as democratic practices, it started to develop a disdain for its Northeast Asian neighbours, China and Korea, who it increasingly viewed as backward and despotic. As such, its second national goal was to break away from the China-centred regional order.[8] Japanese leaders held the belief that the state of Japan, now civilised, cannot wait for its neighbours to become civilised. The conclusion was that Japan should treat Korea and China just as the Western powers have in the past, breaking from its centuries-long doctrine of isolation.[9] By the 1880s, Japan’s military had evolved to become an impressive force, and the voices of the military leaders had become too powerful to ignore. They argued that Japan needed to engage in a game of conquest if it wanted to further develop into a military might.[10] This outward search for power came to a head with the Seoul Uprising of 1884.
The key takeaway from this section is that the 1868-1884 timeline of Japanese foreign policy was characterised by one desire, and that was freedom from foreign interference. It achieved this by mimicking the success of some Western states through the implementation of the fukoku kyohei strategy. Although, during this time the same expansionist tendencies paired with the civilised/uncivilised dichotomy started to drive Japan to seek power and influence beyond its borders, just as it did in the minds of Western leaders. Japan’s negative experiences with the West had therefore driven it to view the West as the model of success. The next section discusses how these unfolded in Japan’s foreign relations.
Colonial Mission in Northeast Asia during the Meiji era (1884-1912)
The voices calling for conquest, especially on the Korean peninsula were growing ever more powerful by the mid-1880s. Korea was a mineral rich state which had been a Chinese tributary for centuries, but within Korean society there was a growing pro-Japanese reformist group. This was Japan’s first opportunity to bring modernisation to the Asian mainland.[11] The Seoul Uprising (1884), or the Gapsin Coup, saw pro-Japanese reformers overthrow the conservative pro-Chinese government. The Korean reformers of the Enlightenment Party viewed Japan as an Asian model of success and sought to enact similar reforms in Korea. This coup was promptly reverted by nearby Chinese forces. The following Tianjin Convention (1885) would be Japan’s lynchpin for war; it stated that both China and Japan needed to notify the other of any future military deployments and that neither state can claim suzerain status of Korea.[12] International law and the construction of interstate treaties and conventions were now at the forefront of the Meiji government’s efforts to become a normal power. It had seen the advantage gained by the West through their superior knowledge of the legal realm, and how they could ‘trick’ states into signing documents that would put them at a disadvantaged position.[13]
The Qing dynasty in China had opted not to respect the convention, and quickly sought to exercise greater control over the Joseon dynasty between 1885-1894, which had ruled Korea for nearly 500 years. In 1894, Japan had set a deadline for China to denounce its suzerain claim over Korea. Despite Western mediation, Japan seized the Royal Palace in Korea on the 23rd of July, and officially declared war on China on the 1st of August, sparking the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). During the war, Japan successfully ejected China from Korea, installed a pro-Japanese government, seized Liaodong province from China, and invaded Manchuria. The treaty of Shimonoseki forced China to cede Taiwan and Liaodong to Japan, and successfully opened the markets of Korea and China for the creation of a Japanese hinterland[14] Japan had proved its technological superiority over the region’s longstanding hegemon in a deciding victory, walking away with access to new markets, and two new territories.
Although impressive for a newly industrialised nation, this was insufficient for the West to start engaging with Japan on an equitable basis. As such, this led to a series of events which would generate an overt anti-Western fervour amongst the Japanese leadership. The Triple Intervention, initiated by Germany, Russia, and France, placed political pressure on Japan to cede some of its gains of the war, most importantly Liaodong province.[15] Following this, the nearby Russian Empire saw a power vacuum opening in East Asia with the Qing dynasty diminished. With the finalisation of the Trans-Siberian railway, which gave Russia greater influence in the Far East, it sought to capitalise on trade in Manchuria and Korea. This clearly conflicted with the regional interests of Japan, who rightly believed that it was now the regional power. As such, these two events set the stage for Japan’s new anti-Western attitude. As Japan and Russia failed to arrive at workable solutions, the Tsar decided to declare war on Japan in 1904 to accelerate its newfound interests in Northeast Asia.[16]
The Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) was different from the preceding war with the Qing dynasty, which was fragmented and did not have much access to modern military equipment. The Russian Empire was a great Western power with a large standing military and functioning navy, this would prove a far superior challenge to Japan’s vision of regional leadership. Nevertheless, Japan had reached such a level of technological advancement by the early 20th century that allowed it to go toe-to-toe with the Russians. As the conflict progressed, it appeared to be approaching a state of attrition warfare as both sides’ wartime economies had become exhausted. Until the fateful battle of Tsushima, where the Japanese navy demonstrated its naval capabilities with a deciding victory of the Russians. Facing his own domestic challenges, Tsar Nicholas II was brought to the negotiating table at the Treaty of Portsmouth to end a war that was severely unpopular and threatening to destabilise the imperial regime. As a consequence of the treaty, Russia had to cede all claims over East Asia and consent to Japanese annexation of Korea and Liaodong.[17]
Although this victory would have emboldened the Japanese leaders in their positioning towards the West, Japan’s foreign policy took a sharp turn in the 1910s. The last major act of the Meiji government was concluded with the annexation of Korea in 1910.[18] The death of Emperor Meiji in 1912 left a great legacy of Japanese modernisation, expansionism, and introduction of Western practices.[19] After his funeral, The New York Times said the following: “the contrast between that which preceded the funeral car and that which followed it was striking indeed. Before it went old Japan; after it came new Japan.”[20] Japan had, in only 44 years, emerged from a severely weakened post-sakoku Tokugawa government, and defeated the Qing dynasty, as the regional hegemonic power, and the great Russian Empire on the Asian mainland. Where Japan’s neighbours were limited by foreign intrusion, it managed to extract lessons from its adversaries and become a major threat to their regional interests.
NOTES
[1] Lillehoj, E. (2011). Art and palace politics in early modern Japan, 1580s-1680s. Leiden: Brill. p.62.
[2] Hane, M. and Perez, L.G. (2015). Premodern Japan: a historical survey. Boulder: Westview Press. p.134.
[3] Hunt, Lynn, Thomas R. Martin, Barbara H. Rosenwein, R. Po-chia Hsia et al.. The Making of the West, Peoples and Cultures. 3rd ed. Boston: Bedford, 2009. 712–713.
[4] Ember, M. (2001). Countries and Their Cultures. Malibu: Pepperdine University, p.1140.
[5] Yamamura (1987). The Political Economy of Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 102.
[6] Kitaoka, S. (2018). The Origin of Japan’s Modernization. [online] The Government of Japan. Available at: https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2018/spring2018/the_origin_of_japans_modernization.html#:~:text=It%20was%20the%20Meiji%20Restoration [Accessed 13 Jun. 2024].
[7] Tang, J.P. (2014). Railroad Expansion and Industrialization: Evidence from Meiji Japan. The Journal of Economic History, 74(3), p.863.
[8] Moon, C-i. and Suh, S-w. (2016). Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p.127.
[9] Inoguchi, T. (2016). Korea in Japanese Visions of Regional Order. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p.11.
[10] Greve, A.Q. and Levy, J.S. (2017). Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Security Studies, 27(1), p. 174.
[11] Ibid. p. 159.
[12] Ibid. p. 161.
[13] Ibid. p. 172.
[14] Ibid. pp. 161-162.
[15] Moon, C-i. and Suh, S-w. (2016). Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p.127.
[16] Rotem Kowner (2006). Historical dictionary of the Russo-Japanese war. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, p.304.
[17] Jukes, G. (2002). The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. London: Botley Osprey Publishing, pp.86–90.
[18] Inoguchi, T. (2016). Korea in Japanese Visions of Regional Order. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p.13.
[19] Bowman, J.S. (2000). Columbia chronologies of Asian history and culture. New York: Columbia University Press, p.149.
[20] The Funeral Ceremonies of Meiji Tenno. (1912). The New York Times.