Author: Gerhard van Niekerk
This is the third edition to a four-part series that discusses Japan’s fascinating evolution as a great power in East Asia. This series will lay out the key themes in Japan’s foreign policy evolution from the Meiji Restoration, and the birth of modern Imperial Japan, to Japan’s contemporary pacifist role in the region. The objective of this series is to draw insights from Japan’s past and discuss how this has influenced the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy in the contemporary period. The scope of this series will be limited to the East Asian region, and Japan’s interaction with proximate states in north- and southeast Asia, as well as those faraway powers that have vied for influence in the region.
The analysis here is focused on Japan’s total reconfiguration as a state in the postwar era alongside its new unlikely ally, the United States (US). As the US instilled the Liberal International Order (LIO) across the globe in a period of intense geopolitical rivalry, Japan was earmarked as the US’s regional partner to maintain the status quo against future revisionist forces. This was despite the fact the threat of a revisionist Soviet Union in East Asia was light enough for Japan to maintain relatively muted role despite being the US’s closest regional ally. As such, Japan’s foreign policy typically centred around economic diplomacy and re-engagement with a region it had just recently colonised.
The preceding article in this series concluded with Japan’s defeat at the hands of the US, which marked the end of Japan’s brief stint as the regional hegemon in East Asia in the early 1940s.[1] In 1945, the US was the world’s undisputed superpower, but was rivalled by the increasing strength of the international communist movement.[2] Right after the defeat of Imperial Japan, the Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) started where the US administered the Japanese government and facilitated a wholesome reconfiguration of its domestic political system. Japan was now an adherent to key values of the LIO such as parliamentary democracy and a free market economy, and accepted a significantly decreased role for the Imperial family, now subordinated by the institutions empowered by the new constitution. Additionally, this new constitution mandated a pacifist security outlook for Japan where it could only use its military for defensive purposes. Nevertheless, the de facto militarisation of Japan began in 1954 with the creation of the Maritime, Air and Ground Self-Defence forces.[3] By design, Japan was to become a key US ally in the region and a highly normative player according to the LIO. This was similar to the approach taken by the US with regards to its previous adversaries, Italy and Germany.[4]
Right after Japan regained autonomy from the US in 1952, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was codified. This is the single most significant event that has determined Japan’s foreign policy outlook for the contemporary era. The terms of the agreement states that the US guarantees Japan’s independence in the face of any third entity, and in return Japan hosts various locations for US military bases and supports its operations financially through host nation support. Japan’s mainland and islands are also included under the US’s nuclear security umbrella, the most potent form of deterrence in the global security realm. Although the alliance was codified in 1952, further codifications were made changing the nature of the alliance.[5]
Alongside the US’s postwar reconfiguration of the global system, China was facing enormous internal difficulties spanning back to tensions that have emerged in the 1920s, reaching the height of its intensity after the withdrawal of the Japanese Kwantung army. The nationalist Republic of China’s (ROC) Kuomintang party and its National Revolutionary Army, under Chiang Kai-shek, waged war with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Chinese Communist Party and its People’s Liberation Army, under Mao Zedong. Mao received significant support from the Soviet Union, who hoped that the gargantuan Chinese population could join the union. Despite US support, Chiang was defeated on the mainland in 1949, and thereafter moved to Taiwan which was already administered by the ROC after Japan’s exit. Chiang proclaimed the ROC the rightful government of China as a whole and planned to regather strength and retake the mainland. On the other hand, the PRC proclaimed itself the rightful government of China, and critically over the island of Taiwan as well.[6] From here on, they will be referred to as China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC).
Japan, now relatively uninvolved in political matters between the two parties, wanted to engage both China and Taiwan as a means of capitalising on the new markets. However, the US pressured it to boycott China and recognise Taiwan as the legitimate government.[7] Additionally, Japan was still technically at war with China as the confusion of the civil war never led to a formal peace agreement. As such, when the dust started to settle, Japan signed the bilateral Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (or Treaty of Taipei) with Taiwan in 1952, recognising it as the rightful Chinese government.[8] This moment was highly significant for two very important reasons. Firstly, Japan was not only strategically dependent on the US, but it also had an external constraint placed on it by Washington for its domestic and foreign policy choices. Secondly, Japan’s relations with China, which were desperate at this point, would have very little chance of improving with the US’s great power politics dictating its policy. Gaining better relations with China was of great importance to Japan. It was a great power at proximity, and tense relations would cause serious disturbances to Japan’s national interests.
As such, a north-south regional division started to emerge in northeast Asia between the pro-LIO faction and the internationalist communist movement. The Soviet Union, China, and North Korea had initially appeared united with their shared Marxist-Leninist ideology in the north.[9] However, the US had quickly formed a tight security umbrella encompassing South Korea, Japan and Taiwan in the south. Japan’s regional posture strictly adhered to the LIO, but it had nearly zero input on matters of security at the time, while the US and South Korea were actively cooperating in war against a coalition of communist forces in North Korea. Instead, Japan engaged in an initial strategy of economic engagement based on the values of the LIO.[10] A prudent strategy considering the destruction it had experienced just a few years ago. This attitude of economic maximisation would dominate Japanese foreign policy for the next several decades.
Additionally, this came at the height of US unipolarity, and Japan had to commit all of its resources to benefit from the advantages of its new friendly relations with the US. Even with a united communist front, there was little hope that any entity could oppose the US economy at this time, it was at the ultimate height of its power, commanding nearly half of the world economy. With the guarantee of US backing, its new allies had begun free riding on the US economy with very little concern for security threats. The US also needed its allies in Europe and East Asia to grow stronger in order to stand against revisionist forces in the future.[11] As such, Japan engaged in a mercantilist economic strategy to maximise exports and rapidly grow its industries. The US absorbed much of these exports, tolerating this as an effective means of leading Japan to become the most powerful player in the region.[12]
By the 1950s and 1960s, this style of Japan’s foreign policy had started to take more concrete form, explicitly engaging other regional actors to a greater extent. Although, it should be stated that Japan’s reputation was still significantly damaged due to its actions in WWII. This resulted in a region that was greatly suspicious of its actions, quick to reject any appearance of hegemonic intentions. However, the US’s security umbrella and the forced pacifist nature of its military, which is solely devoted to defensive purposes (senshu boei senryaku), placed it in a more attractive position.[13] By moulding itself as a state that now dismisses violence and rather seeks to promote integration on the basis of mutual benefit as opposed to extraction, Japan rebranded itself as an attractive partner in a region that is yet again, today, the battleground of a great power rivalry.
The first postwar Prime Minister (PM) Shigeru Yoshida, in office from 1948 to 1954, embodied this approach with a strategy later termed the Yoshida Doctrine. It was informed by the described environment Japan found itself in alongside the US and was primarily a strategy of national interest. It sought to oppose communism in the emerging Cold War rivalry exclusively through economic diplomacy. While doing so it could maximise economic gains as it needed to expend minimally on matters of security due to being guaranteed sovereignty under the US security network.[14] Alongside his minister of finance, Hayato Ikeda, Yoshida envisioned a realist economic policy where unrestrained growth would be targeted as a means of rebuilding the industrial capacity of the state, after which Japan could be remilitarised. This strategy held regional hegemonic intentions, but as a break from the past, these were mostly economic aspirations.[15] This is the opposite strategy Japan employed in the late-1800s and early-1900s, termed rich nation, strong army (Fukoku kyōhei).
Nevertheless, Japan’s exclusive use of diplomatic and economic tools to achieve its policy goals were not enough to convince the region of its supposed benevolent intentions. The memories of Japan’s wartime efforts were still fresh and its engagement with the region had to be conducted with careful subtlety. Therefore, when Japanese politicians and businesses made an effort to penetrate the markets of southeast Asian states, they were met with some significant opposition, such as large-scale protests in Thailand and Indonesia when PM Kakuei Tanaka visited to promote economic engagement in 1974.[16] Nevertheless, Japan had achieved immense economic success between the 1950s and 1970s, now known as the Japanese Economic Miracle (Kōdo keizai seichō). Through its access to markets in South Korea and Taiwan, it grew at speed and became an undeniable partner for the region’s developing economies.[17]
During the same timeframe, the threat of a united communist bloc in East Asia deteriorated for two important reasons. Firstly, the economic success of the capitalist states in East Asia overshadowed the promise of state-led economic endeavours, especially with Tokyo’s growing regional economic order. Secondly, the Soviet Union, who was the greatest multiplying force of communism, had not gained much regional influence. It became burdened by discontent towards the union in Eastern Europe which drew much of its attention, and the emergence of a Sino-Soviet rift left it with little legitimacy to instil the norms it sought to be accepted in the region.[18] Alongside these developments, the US had initiated its re-engagement with China as a means of further hampering Soviet influence.
The 1970s would prove to be a most significant decade in Japan’s foreign policy evolution. During the early 1970s, the US and China started a process of rapprochement with secret visits to discuss the Sino-Soviet tensions. Shortly thereafter, the ROC government in Taiwan was removed from the United Nations Security Council and replaced with the PRC government in China to represent the “China” seat. A key institution of the LIO had now suddenly recognised a communist government over a capitalist government aligned with the US as the legitimate governing body, a highly significant moment. Thereafter, US President Richard Nixon visited Chairman Mao Zedong in China in 1972 and spent eight days discussing relations; culminating in the Shanghai Communiqué, representing an agreement to improve relations. In 1979, US President Jimmy Carter established official relations with China, recognising its One China policy, and severed official ties with Taiwan.[19] Washington had not consulted Japan on this matter, one which its policymakers viewed as a moment which would fundamentally change the face of East Asia. As such, it was a scenario that they would have sought to prepare for. Fortunately, there was popular support within the Foreign Ministry and the electorate for a re-engagement with China.[20]
Consequently, Japan quickly followed suit and was greatly eager to kickstart a new positive relationship between the two powers. The Nixon visit sparked vigour from Japanese policymakers, and by 1972 Japan had accepted its role during WWII and the One China policy.[21] Diplomatic ties recovered steadily, marking an unprecedented period of friendliness between two states who had been at odds for decades. China’s economy was also soaring at the time, and with the death of chairman Mao in 1976, Beijing became more open to trade as a means of boosting the economy. The Sino-Japanese trade relationship was a significant contribution to their tightening bond, and Japan earmarked large contributions of official development assistance in the form of grants and loans in order to develop the Chinese economy.[22]
As China’s economy took off after these sets of engagement, Japan, which was now the second largest economy in the world and leader in many industries, had experienced a significant slowdown. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 created intense moments of anxiety for Japanese businesses who relied on oil for imports. As such, increased engagement with China and southeast Asia was an imperative at the time as a means of gaining access to other sources of oil outside of the Middle East.[23] Economically, the 1970s did not match the great improvements Japan was making with regards to its foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, Japan still made impressive gains in the coming decades, but nothing near the prior two decades’ average 10% year-on-year GDP growth.[24]
In 1975, the most significant proxy war between the communists and the US was concluded. The US backed the supposedly capitalist South Vietnam, and China and the Soviet Union supported the communist North Vietnam. Vietnam was now a full-fledged communist state, prompting renewed fears of a joint attempt between the region’s communist powers to destabilise the LIO, especially in southeast Aisa. However, the exact opposite happened. Both Vietnam and North Korea had refused to be subordinated under a Chinese vision, and to make matters worse, Vietnam invaded communist Cambodia in 1978.[25] Communist nations, although being united under similar norms, had proven to be unable to cooperate with each other.
On the other hand, Japan had no problem being subordinated under a US regional hegemony and had rather opted to focus on gaining an upper hand on economic matters. The difference between the capitalist states who were satisfied with their subordinate positions and the communist camp who could not seem to cooperate, is that the LIO was a great unifying force at the time.[26] The late-1970s was a time of great success for the capitalist world, despite the fact that the US was technically losing nearly every single proxy war it had engaged in. The market economy was vindicated by the immense success of the East Asian economic miracles and the revival of other powers such as Germany and Italy.[27] Additionally, the collapse of South Vietnam caused great concern for the leaders of Japan and South Korea. The Vietnamese situation was not much different from the Korean peninsula, and the idea that communism could unite the two Koreas was a scenario neither wanted to entertain. As such, ties between Seoul and Tokyo strengthened immensely, marking a departure from the cold relations they have had in the past. Japan restarted its funding drive in South Korea and jointly lobbied the US not to withdraw its troops from the peninsula.[28] The time of the international communist movement was nearly at its end, and the attractiveness of the norms Japan promoted through its economic diplomacy were becoming increasingly convincing.
As such, during the late 1970s, Japan realised that it needed to do more to break into the markets in southeast Asia. Tokyo did not have the same advantage it had with South Korea, Taiwan, and China with the access it had gained through the US’s broader efforts. So, in 1977, Japanese PM Takeo Fukuda delivered a speech to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Manila Summit that would define Japan’s relations with southeast Asia for the coming decades. It was later to be termed the Fukuda Doctrine and was based on the fact that Japan was now a major economic power, and had a responsibility to lead the region through its advanced technological expertise. However, the ASEAN member states were still highly suspicious of Japan’s intentions, so Fukuda emphasised that Japan would never again strive to become a military power. Additionally, he stressed that northeast Asia and southeast Asia should be viewed as one East Asia where trade is not divided into blocs which are hurtful for progress. Rather, the region should work together beyond economic and regional concerns to address serious and lingering issues, and the lesser economies should be given greater access to technologically advanced states like the US, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Lastly, he also stressed that tensions between Indochinese states and the rest of southeast Asia should be addressed and resolved.[29]
Japan was playing a key role as a normative player in the region, drawing in states with the promises of the LIO. Japanese PM Kantarō Suzuki reaffirmed his peaceful attitude with his 1981 speech in Bangkok, after which Japanese aid and investments saw even greater increases to southeast Asia and China.[30] Additionally, the 1980s also saw a strengthening bond between the US and Japan, as PM Yasuhiro Nakasone had a very close personal relationship with US President Ronald Reagan. During this time, the US economy was taking enormous strain from its assistance to its allies in Europe and East Asia. Therefore, the Reagan administration had been given a mandate to decrease its trade deficit with its allies and encourage them to take greater responsibility to maintain the LIO. As such, Nakasone’s term saw a qualitative shift in Japanese foreign policy, where he took the initiative to transform Japan from a “follower state” into an economic and political superpower. This would be achieved through increased engagements with regional actors, especially China, by increasing military expenditure, and by further strengthening its alliance treaty with the US. This marks a major departure from the Yoshida and Fukuda doctrines, sparking the first talks of “normalising” Japan and amending its pacifist constitution.[31]
However, the vision of transforming Japan into a superpower would hit a significant speed bump after Japan signed the Plaza Accords of 1985 along with Germany and Italy, agreeing to increase the values of their currencies against the US dollar in order to decrease the US deficit. After a series of grave miscalculations, the Bank of Japan sent the economy in overdrive with skyrocketing inflation and an eventual crash of the Japanese Economic Bubble in 1989.[32] Finally, the Japanese economy would enter a prolonged period of deflationary stagnation known as the Lost Decades (Ushinawareta 30-nen). [33] Japan was suddenly more restricted in its foreign policy actions as it mostly relied on its superior access to resources to influence the region in a manner congruent with its national interest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the surge in capitalist economies and new democracies recalibrated the global system,[34] and therewith formed new kinds of opportunities and risks for Japan’s foreign policy interests.
This edition to the series reads far differently to the preceding two articles, which were overwhelmingly characterised by territorial expansion and successive geopolitical realignments. The postwar era saw a Japan that was fundamentally reborn into the kind of international player that many know today in the contemporary era. During the early postwar years Japan underwent a physical reconstruction as well as a total institutional reconfiguration congruent with the LIO. In the succeeding decade Japan had to come to grips with a region that was highly suspicious of its intentions, but thanks to its new ties with the US, it had gained access to the markets of South Korea and Taiwan to grow its economy. After the Japanese Economic Miracle (1950s-1970s), Japan had become a more attractive economic partner, and through the Yoshida and Fukuda doctrines it could further penetrate the Chinese and southeast Asian markets by marketing itself as a reformed benevolent actor. It had therefore normalised relations with its neighbours and used economic diplomacy to further the interests of the LIO. Most significantly, it had also assisted the US into bringing China onto the world stage after its seclusion under Mao Zedong.
Japan was a highly normative player up until this point, promoting the liberal agenda through extensive engagement efforts, such as breaking down trade barriers, development assistance, reparations, and widespread investment. However, Nakasone’s term in office saw a subtle return to notions of remilitarisation and the ultimate “normalisation” of Japan as a state. This indicates that Japan has initiated somewhat of a paradigm shift where it believes that it needs to do more to assist with the maintenance of the LIO. This will only realise much further in the future though, possibly braked by the economic troubles Japan might face in the coming decades and a relative lack of external threats. This will be discussed in more depth in the final edition to this series.
NOTES
[1] See G. van Niekerk’s “Japan’s Foreign Policy Evolution During the Two World Wars: The Contrasting Approaches of the Taishō and Shōwa Governments (1912-1945)” at: https://www0.sun.ac.za/japancentre/2024/07/26/japans-foreign-policy-evolution-during-the-two-world-wars-the-contrasting-approaches-of-the-taisho-and-showa-governments-1912-1945/ for more on the second edition to this series.
[2] Cumings, B. (2016). From Japanese Imperium to American Hegemony: Korean-Centrism and the Transformation of the International System. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 79.
[3] Takemae, E. and Ricketts, R. (2003). The Allied occupation of Japan. New York: Continuum, p.93.
[4] Tammen, R.L. and Kugler, J. (2006). Power Transition and China-US Conflicts. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 1(1), p.37
[5] Xu, B., Maizland, L., Cheng, N. and Fong, C. (2024). The U.S.-Japan Alliance. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-alliance [Accessed 28 Aug. 2024].
[6] Cumings, B. (2016). From Japanese Imperium to American Hegemony: Korean-Centrism and the Transformation of the International System. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p.83.
[7] Fairbank, J.K. and Roderick Mac Farquhar (1995). The Cambridge history of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.820.
[8] United Nations (1952). Treaty of Peace between the Repuiblic of China and Japan. [online] Un.org. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801526ae&clang=_en [Accessed 25 Sep. 2024].
[9] Kotkin, S. and Armstrong, C.K. (2016). A Socialist Regional Order in Northeast Asia After World War II. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 111.
[10] Moon, C-i. and Suh, S-w. (2016). Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 126.
[11]Ibid.
[12] Beckley, M., Horiuchi, Y. and Miller, J.M. (2018). America’s Role in the Making of Japan’s Economic Miracle. Journal of East Asian Studies, 18(1), pp.14–21.
[13] Moon, C-i. and Suh, S-w. (2016). Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 128.
[14] Ibid. p. 129.
[15] Brook, C. and McGrew, A. (2013). Asia-Pacific in the New World Order. Routledge, p.49.
[16] Halloran, R. (1974). Violent Crowds in Jakarta Protest the Visit by Tanaka (Published 1974). The New York Times. [online] 16 Jan. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/16/archives/violent-crowds-in-jakarta-protest-the-visit-by-tanaka-thousands.html [Accessed 25 Sep. 2024].
[17] Kotkin, S. and Armstrong, C.K. (2016). A Socialist Regional Order in Northeast Asia After World War II. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 112.
[18] Ibid. p. 111.
[19] Council on Foreign Relations (2024). Timeline: U.S.-China Relations. [online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations [Accessed 26 Sep. 2024].
[20] Hattori, R. (2022). China-Japan rapprochement and the United States in the wake of Nixon’s visit to China. London: Routledge, pp.24–26.
[21] Zhao, S. (2022). The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. Stanford University Press, p.98.
[22] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2022). Overview of ODA to China. [online] mofa.go.jp. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/ [Accessed 26 Sep. 2024].
[23] Mihut, M.I. and Daniel, D.L. (2012). First Oil Shock Impact on the Japanese Economy. Procedia Economics and Finance, 3, p.1042.
[24] The World Bank (n.d.). World Bank GDP Growth Japan. [online] theworldbank.com. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2023&locations=JP&start=1961 [Accessed 29 Sep. 2024].
[25] Kotkin, S. and Armstrong, C.K. (2016). A Socialist Regional Order in Northeast Asia After World War II. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 111.
[26] Ibid.
[27]Endaylalu, G.A. (2022). The Implication of The Rise of China to the US-led liberal International Order: the Case of One Belt and One Road Initiatives. Chinese Journal of International Review, 4(1), p. 4.
[28] Moon, C-i. and Suh, S-w. (2016). Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, p. 130.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2013). Japan’s ODA Accomplishments of 50 Years. [online] Tokyo: MOFA, pp.3–7. Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2004/part1-1.pdf [Accessed 29 Sep. 2024].
[31] Moon, C-i. and Suh, S-w. (2016). Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea. In: G. Rozman, S.S. Kim and S. Kotkin, eds., Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia. London: Routledge, pp. 131-134.
[32] See G. van Niekerk’s “From Decades of Deflationary Stagnation to Inflation-led Growth: A Glimmer of Hope for Japan?” at: https://www0.sun.ac.za/japancentre/2024/09/04/from-decades-of-deflationary-stagnation-to-inflation-led-growth-a-glimmer-of-hope-for-japan/ for a more in-detail discussion of the economics of this timeline.
[33] Kihara, L. (2012). Japan eyes end to decades long deflation. [online] Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-economy-estimate-idUSL4E8JH1TC20120817/ [Accessed 14 Aug. 2024].
[34] Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy’s Third Wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), p. 13.